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This thesis contains four empirical chapters which together contribute to behavioural economics in the 
area of fish production in a developing country context. The key thread connecting all the empirical 
studies is the behavioural characteristic of farmers (risk and ambiguity attitudes) elicited through 
incentivised field experiments and general survey questions. 
The first empirical chapter seeks to answer the questions: What is the risk attitude of a typical 
smallholder fish farmer in a developing country? Do risk attitudes of fish farmers remain stable 
across different elicitation methods and contexts of validation? Risk attitude measures are known to 
be sensitive to the method of elicitation and context (Bauermeister and Mushoff, 2016). The purpose 
of this chapter is three-fold. 
1.  It elicits and compares the risk attitudes of within-subject sample of smallholder fish farmers 
in southern Ghana using three of the frontier methods used to elicit risk attitudes in the 
literature. The risk attitudes elicited from these methods are employed in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis to investigate how risk preferences affect production efficiency and 
technology adoption. 
2. It investigates how the risk attitude measures correlate with each other, and how they vary 
with farmer characteristics. 
3. It assesses whether the risk attitude measures can predict farmer responses to questions on 
hypothetical economic choices. 
The results show that a typical smallholder fish farmer is risk preferring in the gains-only lottery 
experiment, risk averse in the gains-and-losses lottery experiment but is risk neutral from the self-
reported risk attitude scale. However, the risk attitude measures from the two lottery experiments are 
positively correlated, consistent with the assumption that the two experiments capture similar traits of 
the same farmer. This confirms that risk attitude measures are influenced by the method of elicitation 
and the context being examined. Some personal characteristics of the farmers influence their risk 
attitudes. Finally, while risk preferences from the lottery experiments failed to explain hypothetical 
economic choices, the stated risk preferences were significantly correlated with some hypothetical 
economic choices, perhaps due to hypothetical bias. These results indicate that care should be taken to 
tailor the elicitation of risk attitudes to contexts and domains farmers are familiar with.  
The second empirical analysis attempts to answer the question: WRZKDWH[WHQWGRHVD ILVK IDUPHU¶V
risk attitude affect his/her level of economic efficiency? This is predicated on the assumption that the 
types, levels and frequency of application of inputs could be influenced by the risk attitudes of 
farmers. Data on the units of inputs, outputs and prices are collated from the farmers in an earlier 
survey, and their risk attitudes obtained from the previous chapter are then juxtaposed on their 
production data. The economic efficiency of the farmers is assessed with both the Stochastic Frontier 
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Analysis (SFA) and the Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) techniques. While the former 
assumes that all deviations from the cost frontier are due to farmer-specific factors (including risk 
attitudes) and stochastic factors, the latter, a deterministic procedure, attributes all deviations from the 
frontier to farmer-specific factors. The evidence from this chapter suggests that over 80% of the total 
deviation from the cost frontier results from stochastic factors beyond the control of the farmers. It is 
also found that risk attitudes play no significant role in the economic efficiency of fish production in 
the study area. Based on the findings, it is concluded that stochastic factors, such as government 
policies, may have a greater impact on economic efficiency rather than risk attitudes of farmers. 
The third empirical study assesses how risk attitudes of fish farmers affect the speed of technology 
adoption; adoption decisions are modelled with duration models. This study focuses on the adoption 
of Floating Cages, Extruded Feed and Akosombo Strain of Tilapia (AST) technologies in the fish 
farming sector in southern Ghana. Contrary to most existing literature on speed of adoption of 
technologies (e.g. Liu, 2013), the results from this chapter show that risk averse farmers have a higher 
proclivity to adopt the AST, Extruded Feed and Floating Cage technologies at a point in time. This 
novel outcome is due to the nature RIWKHWHFKQRORJLHVLQTXHVWLRQDVSHUFHLYHGE\WKHIDUPHUV/LX¶V
(2013) study, for instance, focuses on the adoption of cotton seeds modified genetically with Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) bacteria, which enables cotton plants to produce phytotoxins to kill pests. The 
subjective risks posed by these phytotoxins to the farmers themselves may be an additional source of 
uncertainty and a likely reason for the delayed adoption by risk averse farmers. However, in this 
chapter, even though the AST is also genetically modified, it produces no toxins and yet it is more 
disease-resistant than the local breeds, therefore it may be perceived by the farmers as risk-reducing 
and hence it may not be surprising that risk averse farmers adopt this technology earlier. 
In the final empirical study, attention is on how ambiguity attitudes affect the farming decisions of 
smallholder fish farmers, using the speed of adopting the AST technology as an example of such 
decisions. The speed of technology adoption is analysed with the hazard/survival model. Additionally, 
this chapter introduces and interacts the number of previous adopters in the same village with 
DPELJXLW\DWWLWXGHDVDEHWWHUWHVWRIWKHHIIHFWRIDPELJXLW\DYHUVLRQRQIDUPHUV¶GHFLVLRQV:KHUHD
farmer cannot predict with certainty the yield to be obtained from the new technology, an ambiguity 
averse farmer is expectHGWRDGRSWWKHWHFKQRORJ\ODWH$PELJXLW\DWWLWXGHVDUHHOLFLWHGZLWK(OOVEHUJ¶V
(1961) two-colour urn experiment. The results from this chapter show that the average fish farmer is 
ambiguity averse. However, risk aversion, but not ambiguity aversion, has a significant effect on the 
speed of adopting the AST technology in the study area, confirming the robustness of the finding in 
the previous chapter. I also find that the speed of adopting this technology increases with the number 
of prior adopters in the same village. The lack of any significant impact of ambiguity attitudes in 
determining the speed of adopting this technology suggests that there are other important determinants 
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of adopting this technology, rather than lack of information about it, that affect other technology 
adoption decisions. 
Overall, this thesis demonstrates and presents the elicitation of risk and ambiguity preferences outside 
the usual laboratory setting by engaging fish farmers in a field experiment involving real cash 
incentives, as well as field surveys. The experiments and methods employed are at the frontier of 
research in the field of development economics. The results of the analysis presented in this thesis 
indicate that that risk preferences are sensitive to the method of elicitation, as well as the context or 
domain in which it is elicited. While contrary to findings from other studies, risk averse farmers are 
more prone to adopt improved fish farming technologies earlier than farmers who are not risk averse. 
This conclusion is plausible because the technologies may be perceived as risk-reducing by the 
farmers. This outcome remains robust when ambiguity aversion is introduced into the analysis of the 
technology adoption decision. Therefore, research on farmer production choices should take their risk 
attitudes into account, and such risk attitude measures should be elicited in a manner that is 
compatible with the context of operation of the farmers.  
 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr Zaki Wahhaj 
Title: Senior Lecturer in Economics 
 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr Adelina Gschwandtner  




Table of contents  
Dedication ................................................................................................................................................ i 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. ii 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. iv 
Table of contents ................................................................................................................................... vii 
List of tables ............................................................................................................................................ x 
List of figures ......................................................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 10 
Chapter 2 Risk attitudes of smallholder fish farmers in Ghana: a comparison of multiple elicitation 
methods ................................................................................................................................................. 13 
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 13 
2.2 Overview of relevant empirical literature and hypotheses ....................................................... 16 
2.2.1 Overview of the use of questionnaires to elicit risk attitudes ................................................... 16 
2.2.2 Overview of experiments to elicit risk attitudes in developing countries ................................ 17 
2.2.3 Summary of the literature reviewed ......................................................................................... 19 
2.2.4 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................... 20 
2.3 Experimental design ................................................................................................................. 21 
2.3.1 The self-reported risk attitude measure .................................................................................... 21 
2.3.2 The modified Brick-Visser-Burns (BVB) lottery-choice task ................................................. 22 
2.3.3 The modified Tanaka-Camerer-Nguyen (TCN) lottery-choice task ........................................ 24 
2.4 Measurement of TCN parameters ............................................................................................ 25 
2.5 Data Collection ........................................................................................................................ 27 
2.5.1 Sampling procedure ................................................................................................................. 27 
2.5.2 Field experiment and survey procedures .................................................................................. 28 
2.5.3 The real monetary-incentive game design ............................................................................... 30 
2.6 Results ...................................................................................................................................... 31 
2.6.1 Summary of the measures of risk attitudes .............................................................................. 31 
2.6.2 Distribution of fish farmers by elicitation method ................................................................... 32 
2.6.3 Correlations among risk attitude measures .............................................................................. 34 
2.6.4 Demographic characteristics and attitudes to risk .................................................................... 35 
2.6.5 Validation of risk attitudes with economic choices ................................................................. 37 
2.7 Discussion, summary and conclusion ...................................................................................... 45 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 48 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................................................... 50 
Chapter 3 Effect of risk attitudes on economic efficiency of smallholder fish farmers in Ghana ........ 52 
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 52 
viii 
 
3.2 Review of literature on efficiency ............................................................................................ 55 
3.2.1 Concepts of efficiency and frontier models ............................................................................. 55 
3.2.2 Risk, risk attitudes and efficiency of production ...................................................................... 59 
3.2.3 Estimating efficiency of production in agriculture in developing countries ............................ 61 
3.3 Hypothesis ................................................................................................................................ 63 
3.4 A skewness test on OLS Residuals .......................................................................................... 63 
3.5 Stochastic frontier analysis and economic efficiency .............................................................. 65 
3.6 The corrected ordinary least squares approach to measuring economic efficiency ................. 68 
3.7 Explaining efficiency ............................................................................................................... 70 
3.8 Empirical application ............................................................................................................... 71 
3.9 Description of the data ............................................................................................................. 73 
3.9.1 Definition of variables.............................................................................................................. 74 
3.10 Empirical results ...................................................................................................................... 76 
3.10.1 Descriptive statistics................................................................................................................. 76 
3.10.2 Hypothesis testing .................................................................................................................... 79 
3.10.3 SFA and COLS model estimates of economic efficiency ........................................................ 81 
3.10.4 Economic efficiency analysis ................................................................................................... 83 
3.10.5 Summary and conclusion ......................................................................................................... 85 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 89 
Chapter 4 Effect of Risk Attitudes on the Speed of Adopting Aquaculture Technologies in Ghana ... 96 
4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 96 
4.2 Review of literature .................................................................................................................. 99 
4.2.1 Definition and concept of technology adoption ....................................................................... 99 
4.2.2 Measurement of technology adoption .................................................................................... 100 
4.2.3 The roles of risk and risk aversion in technology adoption ................................................... 101 
4.2.4 Speed and determinants of technology adoption .................................................................... 102 
4.2.5 Explaining the trend of adoption of technologies .................................................................. 103 
4.2.6 Modelling technology adoption ............................................................................................. 105 
4.2.7 Related empirical literature .................................................................................................... 106 
4.2.8 Complementarity and substitutability among technologies and hypotheses .......................... 109 
4.3 Duration model of technology adoption................................................................................. 111 
4.4 Empirical application of duration analysis ............................................................................. 116 
4.5 Data and description of variables ........................................................................................... 117 
4.6 Results .................................................................................................................................... 128 
4.7 Duration analysis: empirical results ....................................................................................... 129 
4.7.1 Nonparametric results ............................................................................................................ 129 
4.7.2 Parametric results ................................................................................................................... 133 
ix 
 
4.7.3 Adoption of technologies in the absence of risk attitudes ...................................................... 133 
4.7.4 Effects of risk attitudes on speed of technology adoption...................................................... 135 
4.7.5 Robustness check on the functional form of the hazard ......................................................... 140 
4.8 Summary and conclusion ....................................................................................................... 143 
References ........................................................................................................................................... 145 
Chapter 5 Effect of ambiguity attitudes on the adoption of technology: the case of smallholder fish 
farmers in Ghana ................................................................................................................................. 153 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 153 
5.2 The role of ambiguity attitudes in farming decisions ............................................................. 156 
5.3 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................. 161 
5.4 Data sources and experimental procedures ............................................................................ 163 
5.5 Results .................................................................................................................................... 167 
5.5.1 Summary of data .................................................................................................................... 167 
5.5.2 Ambiguity attitudes ................................................................................................................ 169 
5.5.3 Correlation among risk aversion and ambiguity aversion measures ...................................... 170 
5.5.4 Demographic characteristics and attitudes towards ambiguity .............................................. 172 
5.5.5 Effect of ambiguity attitudes and other variables on the speed of adopting the AST technology
 174 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 178 
References ........................................................................................................................................... 181 
Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations .................................................................................... 184 
6.1 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 184 
6.2 Limitations of the thesis ......................................................................................................... 188 
6.3 Future considerations ............................................................................................................. 189 





List of tables  
Table 2.1: Summary of risk attitude measures......................................................................... 32 
Table 2.2: Correlation among the elicitation methods ............................................................. 34 
Table 2.3: Regression Analysis for determinants of risk attitudes among fish farmers in 
Ghana ....................................................................................................................................... 36 
Table 2.4: Linear Regression of Investment in a hypothetical bank........................................ 40 
Table 2.5: Probit Analysis of Investment in Hypothetical Bank ............................................. 41 
Table 2.6: Willingness to pay for a hypothetical rainfall index insurance .............................. 44 
Table 3.1: Summary of determinants of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency .......... 77 
Table 3.2: Description and summary of variables used in the efficiency analysis .................. 78 
Table 3.3: OLS regression results of the estimation of the cost function ................................ 79 
Table 3.4: Results from Skewness Test ................................................................................... 80 
Table 3.5: Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality ................................................................... 80 
Table 3.6: Estimates of the SFA and COLS cost frontier function and inefficiency model .... 84 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of variables used in the analysis (N=120) .......................... 122 
Table 4.2: Summary of Risk Attitude Measures .................................................................... 128 
Table 4.3: Correlations among TCN parameters, SRRA and CRRA .................................... 129 
Table 4.4: Technologies and adoption ................................................................................... 131 
Table 4.5: Estimates of Duration Model of the adoption of AST (Weibull Model) .............. 136 
Table 4.6: Estimates of Duration Model of the adoption of Extruded Feed (Weibull Model)
................................................................................................................................................ 137 
Table 4.7: Estimates of Duration Model of the adopting Floating Cages (Weibull Model) . 139 
Table 4.8: Robustness check with Cox Hazard Model .......................................................... 141 
Table 5.1: Cumulative Number of adopters from the same village ....................................... 163 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of smallholder fish farmers in Ghana ................................ 168 
Table 5.3: Willingness to Pay (WTP) for gambles and ambiguity aversion ......................... 170 
Table 5.4: Correlations among Risk and Ambiguity Aversion Measures ............................. 171 
Table 5.5: Regressions of factors affecting attitudes to ambiguity ........................................ 173 
Table 5.6: Hazard Ratios for Ambiguity And Risk Attitudes with Weibull Model .............. 175 




List of figures 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of farmers according to switch point in the BVB lottery .................. 33 
Figure 2.2: Distribution of farmers according to TCN (Gains-Only) ...................................... 33 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of farmers according to SRRA .......................................................... 34 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of OLS residuals from cost estimation .............................................. 81 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of farmers by year of adoption of Extruded Feed ........................... 119 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of farmers by year of adoption of Akosombo Strain ...................... 119 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of farmers by year of adoption of Floating Cages .......................... 119 
Figure 4.4: Length of time to adoption of technologies for risk averse and risk preferring 
farmers with BVB lotteries .................................................................................................... 131 
Figure 4.5: Length of time to adoption of technologies for risk averse and risk preferring 
farmers with TCN lotteries .................................................................................................... 132 






Smallholder farmers in developing countries are exposed to many and diverse risks, such as 
floods, droughts, pest attacks, illnesses and price fluctuations. In the absence of well-
developed credit and insurance markets, they are not able to shift these risks to a third party. 
Consequently, they are likely to make farming choices that minimize their risk exposure, 
often at the expense of productive efficiency (Morduch, 1995).  
Most developing countries face food insecurity issues, and achievement of food security has 
been a developmental concern over the years (Yaro, 2013). These concerns have arisen from 
the inability of agricultural production systems in developing countries to supply the food 
necessary to meet demands. This situation is made worse by rapid population growth and to 
some extent income growth (Ahsanuzzaman, 2014). Evidence also suggests that risks and 
risk attitudes of farmers negatively impact the production and supply of food (Chavas and 
Holt, 1996). Farmers may be less willing to undertake activities and investments that may 
have higher expected outcomes, but which are inherently risky or ambiguous. For instance, in 
some cases farmers use less production inputs than they should if they were to maximize 
expected profits, due to risk aversion (Yesuf, et. al., 2007).  
When farmers are exposed to similar risks and ambiguities, differences may be observed in 
the performances of the farmers. These differences in performances may be attributable to the 
differences in the attitudes of the farmers to these uncertainties (Ullah et. al., 2016). This is 
because farmers exhibit heterogeneous preferences towards risks and ambiguities. These 
GLIIHUHQFHV LQ SUHIHUHQFHV DIIHFW IDUPHUV¶ XWLOLW\ IXQFWLRQV DV ZHOO DV WKHLU YDOXH IXQFWLRQV
which subsequently may result in sub-optimal investment and/or production decisions 
(Ahsanuzzaman, 2014). Thus, to understand economic behaviour of farmers, it is imperative 
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to assess their individual risk and ambiguity preferences (Reynaud and Couture, 2012). 
However, the challenge faced by researchers investigating unobservable traits such as risk 
and ambiguity attitudes is the measurement of these traits. 
To minimize the effects of climate change on smallholder farmers and to ensure food 
security, the use of improved agricultural technology is seen as a plausible policy tool not 
only to enhance productivity but also to meet the excess demand (Ahsanuzzaman, 2014). 
Therefore, coupled with appropriate institutional and behavioural changes, adoption of 
improved technologies not only improves the agricultural sector, but also potentially reduces 
poverty, and improves the livelihoods of farm households through increased productivity 
(Barrett and Carter, 2010; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006).  
Despite the vast expected benefits such as increased yield, pests and disease-resistance from 
the adoption of improved technologies, it is puzzling that some farmers often fail to adopt or 
adopt these technologies at a slower rate than may be expected (Suri, 2011). Among the 
many factors known to influence the decision-making processes of farmers, such as the 
adoption of technologies, are their attitudes to risk and ambiguity (Binswanger, 1980; Feder 
et. al., 1985; Liu, 2013; Ward and Singh, 2014)1.  
This thesis is a collection of four empirical studies that measure the risk and ambiguity 
attitudes and how these behavioural attributes affect farming choices of 120 smallholder fish 
farmers in Ghana, using both experimental and survey data. The elicitations of risk and 
ambiguity attitudes are carried out with methods at the frontier of current research.  
The first essay, titled ³5LVN$WWLWXGHVRI6PDOOKROGHU)LVK)DUPHUVLQ*KDQD$&RPSDULVRQ
RI0XOWLSOH(OLFLWDWLRQ0HWKRGV´, provides a description of the elicitation and measurement 
                                                 
1
 Other factors include education, information constraints, social networks and social learning, credit 
constraints etc. (Ahsanuzzaman, 2014). 
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of the risk attitudes of the smallholder fish farmers. The challenge with the measurement of 
risk attitudes is that risk attitudes are known to be sensitive to the method of estimation and 
the context (Bauermeister and Mushoff, 2016; Ihli et. al., 2013; Reynaud and Couture, 2012). 
Therefore, this study employs three different procedures to investigate the risk attitudes of 
farmers: lotteries modelled after Brick, Visser and Burns (BVB) (2012); lotteries modelled 
after Tanaka, Nguyen and Camerer (TCN) (2010) and for comparative purposes, self-
reported risk attitude (SRRA) measures on an 11-point scale, following Dohmen et. al., 
(2011). These methods are at the frontier of modern research in the development economics 
literature. The BVB is a gains-only lottery, while the TCN is a gains-and-losses lottery. The 
two lottery experiments are employed to assess whether, and if so how the attitudes of 
farmers to risks are affected in the presence of gains and losses. Together, the two lottery 
experiments capture the attributes that influence the choices of the farmers as pertains to their 
real operations: fish farmers encounter gains and losses in their business. In conducting these 
experiments, it is also acknowledged that farmers could approach the experiments as mere 
games and therefore their choices may not reflect their attitudes in real operations. Therefore, 
farmers were incentivised to reveal their real preferences for risks with real monetary payoffs 
(Holt and Laury, 2002). After obtaining the risk attitude measures, I assess their correlation 
with hypothetical economic decisions of the farmers. The study shows that the risk attitude 
classification of a typical farmer obtained from the three elicitation methods was different. 
For instance, while the BVB classifies a typical fish farmer as risk preferring, the TCN 
classifies a typical fish farmer as risk averse, but the two measures are positively and highly 
correlated, so they may be capturing the same trait of the typical farmer. The SRRA measure 
places the typical fish farmer about the middle of the scale. These findings confirm the 
findings of some research in the extant literature that risk attitude classification of an 
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individual may vary subject to the method of elicitation and context (e.g. Bauermeister and 
Mushoff, 2016).  
These varied outcomes from this present study may have resulted from the relatively small 
number of fish farmers which may not necessarily be representative of the entire population 
of fish farmers in the study area. Therefore, in the elicitation of risk attitudes, a larger number 
and representative sample of farmers should be recruited and the context of their operation 
should be taken into consideration.  
The second empirical chapter-³(IIHFW RI 5LVN $WWLWXGHV RQ (FRQRPLF (IILFLHQF\ RI
Smallholder Fish Farmers in GhDQD´- focuses on the estimation of the economic efficiency 
of fish production and how this is affected by the risk attitudes of the farmers. This chapter 
uses data from a collaborative survey carried out by researchers from the University of 
Ghana. Their data was collected from December, 2013 to January, 2014 through a field 
survey. This included data on the inputs and output produced by the farmers in the previous 
fish production season. From their survey sample of 380 fish farmers, this study subsampled 
120 and engaged them in the experiments outlined in the previous chapter to elicit their risk 
attitudes. With the production data obtained from the previous survey, this chapter estimates 
the economic efficiency of the farmers using both the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), a 
parametric procedure, and the Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS), a deterministic 
procedure. It then assesses if, and to what extent the observed differences among the farmers 
in terms of their economic efficiencies are explained by the differences in their risk attitudes. 
As mentioned earlier, the differences in the risk attitudes of farmers affect their utility and 
value functions, which in turn could lead to production choices that may not be economically 
optimal. Therefore, it is imperative to include risk attitudes in the analysis of the economic 
performance of smallholder fish farmers as this may account for some of the differences in 
the outputs obtained by the farmers. Generally, risk averse farmers are more likely to make 
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suboptimal choices under uncertainty, because of the aversion to risks. For instance, a risk 
averse farmer may feed his fish more frequently and with more feed to avoid low market 
sizes, but this decision could also result in higher costs and therefore less profits. The results 
of this chapter show that risk attitudes play no significant role in the economic efficiency of 
the farmers in the study area. The reasons for this finding could be due to the relatively small 
number of farmers interviewed, and also the likelihood of recall bias among some of the 
farmers. The study suggests that the differences in the economic efficiency of smallholder 
fish farmers in the study area are influenced more by stochastic factors, such as weather 
conditions and government policies, rather than the risk attitudes of the farmers.  
The third empirical essay is titled ³(IIHFW RI 5LVN $WWLWXGHV RQ WKH 6SHHG RI $GRSWLQJ
Aquaculture Technologies in Ghana´ Technology adoption has been advocated by many 
researchers and policy makers as an important tool to improve the productivity and livelihood 
of farmers (Liu, 2013; Barham et. al., 2014). In the analysis of technology adoption decisions, 
many researchers do not consider the effect of time on the adoption decision and thus reckon 
the adoption decision as a binary variable, thereby binary model such as probit and logit are 
normally used in the estimation (e.g. Polson and Spencer, 1991). However, technology 
adoption decision is dynamic and time-varying, as are some of the determinants 
(Ahsanuzzaman, 2014; Lapple, 2010). Therefore, static and binary models which do not 
account for the effect of time on the adoption decision may produce misleading results. The 
duration/hazard/survival models are alternative models for analysing the adoption of 
technologies. These models consider the time it takes a farmer to adopt a technology in the 
estimation of the adoption decision (Burton et. al., 2003). For many studies that employ the 
survival models, a single technology is normally studied (e.g. Liu, 2013). Farmers generally 
make decisions regarding multiple technologies at a time and the prior adoption of one 
technology may enhance or delay the adoption of other technologies. For instance, if 
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technologies are complementary, farmers may adopt the technologies together, while a 
substitute technology may not be adopted. Therefore, modelling the decision of farmers to 
adopt multiple technologies may give more accurate results (Byerlee and Hesse de Polanco, 
1986). In this study, the duration models are employed to assess the determinants of the speed 
of adopting three improved technologies by including the risk attitude measures obtained in 
the second empirical chapter in the estimation2. The rationale behind the use of three 
technologies is that one is able to assess whether there is complementary or substitutability 
among some technologies, and if these relationships influence the adoption decision. The key 
hypotheses being tested in this chapter are that risk aversion slows the speed of technology 
adoption, and some technologies are substitutes. The results of the analysis show that risk 
attitudes matter significantly in the speed of technology adoption. An interesting finding 
emerging from this chapter is that risk averse farmers have a higher probability to adopt each 
of the three technologies at a point in time, ceteris paribus. Even though it may seem 
counterintuitive, the evidence suggests that the three technologies may be risk-reducing; 
thereby risk averse farmers have the incentive to adopt these technologies earlier as they 
reduce their exposure to risks. Also, this study indicates substitution between some of the 
technologies, and therefore by adopting one of the technologies, a farmer may be less likely 
to adopt the other technology speedily.  
The fourth empirical chapter, titled ³(IIHFW RI $PELJXLW\ $WWLWXGHV on the Adoption of 
Technology 7KH &DVH RI 6PDOOKROGHU )LVK )DUPHUV LQ *KDQD´ examines the effect of 
ambiguity attitudes on the decision-making of fish farmers, citing the adoption of technology 
as an example of such a choice. This chapter explores how ambiguity aversion influences the 
decision to adapt to climate change, take up index insurance, invest in financial services and 
adopt a technology. Focussing on the adoption of technology, this chapter is premised on the 








assertion that newer technologies present more uncertainties regarding the distribution of 
output as well as prices than existing technologies. Thus, since newer technologies contain an 
unknown risk (or ambiguity), there is a possibility that ambiguity attitudes may play a role in 
the decision to adopt technologies (e.g. Ahsanuzzaman, 2014; Barham et. al., 2014). An 
ambiguity averse farmer is expected to delay the adoption of a new technology. In addition to 
ambiguity attitudes, the adoption decision of a farmer may be influenced by the behaviour or 
decisions of other farmers, especially those within the same village. This may be explained 
by the fact that farmers learn from other farmers (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006), and also the 
cost of information acquisition is reduced as more farmers adopt the technology. Therefore, 
for two identical fish farmers, the farmer who has more prior adopters of the technology in 
the same village is more likely to adopt the technology earlier. Hence in this study, the 
number of prior adopters in the same village is included as a variable to capture the effect of 
the influence other farmers have on the speed of adopting the technology. Following Keller 
et. al., (2007), this study measures ambiguity preferences as the differences in the willingness 
to pay (WTP) for an ambiguous lottery and the WTP for DULVN\ORWWHU\XVLQJWKH(OOVEHUJ¶V
(1961) two-colour urn experiment in a field setting. Additionally, this chapter examines how 
other socio-economic characteristics of farmers affect their ambiguity attitudes. The 
technology studied in this chapter is the Akosombo Strain of Tilapia, a genetically modified 
breed that is fast-growing and resistant to diseases. The adoption decision is analysed with 
the hazard/survival model.  
The results from this chapter show that the average fish farmer in the study area is ambiguity 
averse. Also, some personal characteristics including age, marital status and educational 
status affect the ambiguity attitude of the farmers. This study finds no significant effect of 
ambiguity aversion on the speed of technology adoption. This may be due to the fact that for 
a given farmer, ambiguity is eliminated or diminished if there is at least one prior adopter of 
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the technology in the same village. The number of prior adopters in the same village is also 
found to be positively and significantly correlated with the speed of technology adoption. 
Upon inclusion of risk attitudes in the estimation in this chapter, risk aversion, but not 
ambiguity aversion, is significant in explaining the speed of technology adoption. This 
finding confirms the robustness of risk attitudes in influencing technology adoption decisions 
reported in the previous chapter.  
Based on the key findings of the four empirical essays discussed above, this thesis makes two 
contributions to broaden the understanding of how risk and ambiguity attitudes of 
smallholder fish farmers affect their production choices in a developing country.  
The first contribution is the measurement of unobservable behavioural characteristics (risk 
and ambiguity attitudes) of fish farmers in a developing country setting, obtained with two 
experimental lotteries and a survey instrument. Evidence from the extant literature suggests 
that risk attitudes are sensitive to the method of elicitation and context (Reynaud and 
Couture, 2012; Ihli et. al., 2013, Bauermeister and Mushoff, 2016). This chapter provides the 
characterisation of the measurements of the risk attitudes of the fish famers. This is achieved 
by engaging farmers to make choices in multiple price binary lotteries, comprising both gains 
and losses, in order for the farmers to reveal their risk attitudes. Also, a general survey 
question is asked for farmers to report their own subjective risk attitudes. Furthermore, I 
FRPSXWHWKHDPELJXLW\SUHIHUHQFHVRIWKHIDUPHUVXVLQJDPRGLILHGYHUVLRQRI(OOVEHUJ¶VWZR-
colour urn experiment. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to elicit the risk 
and ambiguity preferences of smallholder fish farmers in Ghana through incentivised field 
experiments and surveys. The insights thus gained from this investigation will help policy 
makers in developing countries in planning interventions in the fish farming sector, such as 
the introduction of new technologies and insurance facilities, taking into account the risk 
preferences of the target recipients. This could help improve the rate of technology adoption 
9 
 
and fish farming outcomes, improve the wellbeing of smallholder fish farmers and improve 
food security in the long run.  
The second contribution of this thesis relates to further investigation of the field of farmed 
fish production. While considerable number of studies have been carried out on technology 
adoption in crop production (Barham et. al., 2014; Liu, 2013, Ahsanuzzaman, 2014), not 
much has been done specifically in the field of farmed fish production. One study that looks 
at fisheries in a similar geographical setting to this present study is by Brick et. al. (2012). 
They study the effect of risk attitudes on the compliance with fishing regulations in South 
Africa among fishers. Even though their study is conducted in an African setting, it focuses 
on fishers, but not fish farmers. The present investigation differs from their previous study as 
it focuses on the decisions of smallholder fish farmers. Fish farming entails higher economic 
risks than fishing in the sea. Fishers do not invest financial resources to stock the oceans or 
other wild water bodies with fingerlings and tend them till harvest, like fish farmers, but 
rather, fishers harvest fish from the wild and therefore do not incur the same level of 
economic risks. This makes the field of farmed fish production a befitting setting to assess 
how the attitudes to risks and ambiguity affect the production choices of fish farmers. This 
investigation is important especially because fish farming has been seen as a vital alternative 
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Risk attitudes of smallholder fish farmers in Ghana: a comparison of multiple 
elicitation methods 
2.1 Introduction  
That risks and risk attitudes influence economic choices and decisions of people is a well-
established fact in the economic literature, and many studies have been carried out since 
%LQVZDQJHU¶V  VHPLQDO SDSHU WR PHDVure risk attitudes. People respond to risks and 
ambiguities differently, and these differences are attributable to attitudes to risk and 
ambiguities (Ihli et. al., 2013). Thus, to understand economic behaviour of farmers, it is 
imperative to assess their individual risk attitudes (Reynaud and Couture, 2012). Such an 
understanding requires the measurement of risk attitudes. 
In recent years much effort has gone into this endeavour; and there is extensive literature 
especially on the use of experimental methods to elicit risk attitudes across the world (Ihli et. 
al., 2013). Farmers are generally known to be risk averse (Binswanger, 1980; Liu, 2013). 
However, the emerging summary from the use of different elicitation methods, such as lottery 
choice tasks, hypothetical gambles, self-reported assessments, and willingness to pay, and 
from both the developing and developed world contexts, is that risk attitudes of the same 
individual may not be consistent across different elicitation methods and contexts (Reynaud 
and Couture, 2012, Ihli et. al., 2013, Bauermeister and Mushoff, 2016). The differences in 
risk attitudes observed for the same individual across different elicitation methods is 
sometimes due to the differences in the complexity of the methods of elicitation and the lack 
of understanding of tasks by the participants in an experimental setting. Furthermore, the 




While this chapter does not attempt to find which method is the best for capturing the risk 
attitudes of fish farmers in Ghana, it rather provides a characterisation of the measurements 
of risk preferences of the farmers. This purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, it elicits 
and compares the risk attitudes of within-subject sample of smallholder fish farmers in 
southern Ghana using three of the frontier methods used to elicit risk attitudes in the 
literature. These are the modified version of the Brick-Visser-Burns (BVB) (2012) multiple 
price lottery, the Tanaka-Camerer-Nguyen (TCN) (2010) multiple price lottery and a general 
self-reported risk attitude (SRRA) measure following Dohmen et. al. (2011), on an 11-point 
scale. The risk attitudes elicited from these methods are employed in the subsequent chapters 
of this thesis to investigate how risk preferences affect production efficiency and technology 
adoption.  
Secondly, it investigates how the risk attitude measures correlate with each other, and how 
they vary with farmer characteristics. Finally, it assesses whether the risk attitude measures 
can predict farmer responses to questions on hypothetical economic choices.  
The BVB lottery is modelled after the seminal work by Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) multiple 
price lotteries where participants make a choice between two lottery pairs. However, the 
BVB differs from the HL in that instead of varying the probabilities and fixing payoffs, it 
changes the payoffs but keeps the probabilities fixed. This is premised on the assumption that 
participants find it relatively easier to comprehend changing payoffs than changing 
probabilities (Brick et. al., 2012). The BVB lottery is a gains-only lottery and there is no 
likelihood of losing any amount in the experiment. The TCN lottery is very similar to the 
BVB but instead of being gains-only, it is a mixed lottery consisting of both gains and losses. 
Introduction of this lottery in the experiment is meant to capture whether farmers react 
differently in the context of gains-only and mixed frames, where losses are involved. The 
final method of eliciting risk attitudes, the SRRA, is a general question meant to capture the 
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subjective willingness to take risk on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 indicates unwillingness to 
take risks and 10 indicates full preparedness to take risks (Dohmen et. al, 2011). 
It is found that the risk attitudes obtained from the hypothetical general self-reported risk 
attitude measure is not significantly correlated with the risk attitude measures obtained from 
the two incentivised lottery experiments. The results also show that the average farmer is risk 
averse according to the BVB but risk loving in the TCN lotteries. However, the risk attitudes 
from the two lotteries (BVB and TCN) are positively and highly significantly correlated. The 
average self-reported risk attitude score is 5.4, which is very close to the middle of the SRRA 
scale. These varied outcomes show clearly that the risk attitude of a farmer may be different 
depending on the method of risk attitude elicitation employed and context. 
In validating the explanatory powers of the risk attitude measures, two hypothetical economic 
decisions of the farmers are assessed with their risk attitude measures. The results show that 
the SRRA is significantly correlated with one of the hypothetical investment choices of the 
farmers. However, I find no significant correlation between the risk attitude measures from 
the BVB and TCN lottery experiments and either hypothetical economic choice. This 
outcome may be explained by the fact that both the SRRA and the investment choices are 
stated measures and may suffer from hypothetical bias. Thus, this may be a plausible reason 
why they vary together. 
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the related 
literature and hypotheses, section 2.3 summarises the experimental design, and section 2.4 
describes the estimation of the parameters in the TCN lottery. The data collection process, 
results, summary and discussion, and the conclusion are discussed in that order in sections 




2.2 Overview of relevant empirical literature and hypotheses 
This study attempts to obtain a measure of the risk attitudes of smallholder fish farmers in 
southern Ghana, and to assess the predictive power of these measures in economic situations. 
This process begins with the identification of an appropriate method to elicit the risk attitude 
of the farmers. This section explores two major strands of recent literature on methods of 
eliciting risk attitudes: using surveys and experimental techniques. 
2.2.1 Overview of the use of questionnaires to elicit risk attitudes  
Questionnaires have been used as a method to elicit the self-reported risk preferences of 
subjects in different settings. Normally, subjects are asked a general question or a series of 
questions and then asked to rate themselves on a predefined scale. This approach assumes 
that there is a single stable risk preference for each person that underlies their behaviour in all 
domains of life.  
Weber et. al. (2002) used a psychometric scale to study risk preferences of individuals and 
their decisions in the financial, health/safety, recreational, ethical and social domains. The 
questionnaire consisted of a total of 101 items in five domains of risk. The subjects in this 
study were 560 undergraduate students from the Ohio State University (307 women and 253 
men), aged between 16 and 46, with a median age of 18. Respondents evaluated the 
likelihood of engaging in risky behaviours on a five-point rating scale ranging from 1 
µH[WUHPHO\XQOLNHO\¶ WRµH[WUHPHO\OLNHO\¶7KHUHVXOWVIURPWKLVVWXG\VKRZHGWKDW WKH
degree of risk taking was highly domain-specific, i.e. respondents were not consistently risk-
averse or consistently risk seeking across all content domains. Women appeared to be more 
risk-averse in all domains except social risk.  
Hanoch et. al. (2006) used a German version of the domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) 
scale (DOSPERT-G) to show that risk taking is domain-specific. They recruited individuals 
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who were known to be risk takers or risk avoiders in one domain, hence they examined not 
RQO\GRPDLQVSHFLILFEHKDYLRXUVEXWDOVRHPSOR\HGµµGRPDLQ-VSHFLILF¶¶SDUWLFLSDQWVLQRUGHU
to test the validity of the DOSPERT scale (Weber et. al., 2002). The DOSPERT-G contains 8 
items each for recreational, health, social, and ethical risks and 4 items each for the gambling 
and investment domains. Decisions were made on 5-point Likert scales, where higher values 
indicated greater likelihood of engaging in the behaviour. Their results showed that 
individuals who exhibit high levels of risk-taking behaviour in one context (e.g., bungee 
jumpers taking recreational risks) can exhibit moderate levels in other risky domains (e.g., 
financial).  
Dohmen et. al. (2011) examined the association between risk preferences solicited through a 
general risk attitude question and field experiments and analysed how well they predicted 
individual behaviour of a large German population. The authors found a significant positive 
correlation between the general risk attitude question and the risk attitude obtained through 
the field experiment with real monetary stakes. Although the general risk attitude question 
had some predictive power across some domains, the best predictor of behaviour in a 
particular domain was the corresponding domain-specific measure elicited through a method 
similar to the DOSPERT scale. 
The use of questionnaires to elicit risk attitudes has its pros and cons, for instance they are 
simple to understand, but they are mostly non-incentivised. Therefore it is debatable whether 
WKHHOLFLWHGULVNSUHIHUHQFHVUHIOHFWDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V WUXHDWWLWXGHV WRZDUGULVNSDUWLFXODUO\ LQ
the domain of financial decision making (Weber et. al.,2002).  
2.2.2 Overview of experiments to elicit risk attitudes in developing countries 
Some of the earliest studies about risk aversion among farmers in developing country context 
were by Binswanger (1980). In this study, attitudes to risk were elicited from 140 households 
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in India using an interview method eliciting certainty equivalents and an experimental 
gambling approach with real payoffs which, at their maximum, exceeded monthly incomes of 
unskilled labourers. The outcome from this study showed no significant correlation between 
the risk attitudes obtained with the two measures of risk attitudes. In the experimental set up, 
outcome probabilities were fixed, but the payoffs of the lotteries were varied. Further analysis 
from the experimental gambling approach showed that a typical respondent was moderately 
risk averse at high payoff levels. The study also indicated that risk aversion is positively 
correlated with certain socio-economic characteristics, such as age, but not significantly 
affected by wealth.  
Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) measure risk attitudes and time preferences in 
Vietnamese villages using a mix of gain-only and gain-and-loss lotteries and also investigated 
how these attitudes and preferences are influenced by the socio-economic characteristics of 
respondents. This study used multiple price lotteries (MPL) in which the lottery payoffs are 
fixed in each choice task, and the outcome probabilities are varied. However, it differs from 
previous studies by ensuring monotonic switching among respondents during the experiment. 
They reported that the mean village income is affected by the risk and time preferences of the 
respondents. Also, they indicated that the rural poor are more averse to losses than to 
uncertainties.  
Most of the previous studies cited measure and sometimes compare the risk attitudes of 
respondents with different elicitation methods as well as the determinants of the estimated 
risk attitude measures. However, Brick et. al. (2012) go beyond these assessments and not 
only assess risk attitudes and their determinants but analyse the compliance of fishers in 
South Africa, using the estimated risk attitudes as explanatory variable. They found 
compliance with fisheries regulation to be significantly correlated with risk attitudes. 
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Furthermore, socio-economic characteristics such as gender and age were found to influence 
the risk attitudes of the respondents as well as compliance with regulations. 
2.2.3 Summary of the literature reviewed 
Through the years, risk attitudes have been elicited with hypothetical questions or through 
experimental procedures, especially multiple price lotteries. There is mixed evidence 
regarding the validity of either method of risk elicitation in every situation, but there seems to 
be a general consensus that a typical farmer is risk averse (e.g. Liu, 2013). For instance, 
Menapace et. al. (2016) test the validity of different mechanisms of eliciting the risk attitudes 
of farmers, varying the mechanisms in terms of simplicity, context and payoff scales. They 
assess the relative ability of each mechanism to explain actual economic choices of the 
farmers and conclude that risk attitudes of the farmers are not consistent across all elicitation 
methods. Having said this, it is imperative to incorporate the attitudes to risk of fish farmers 
in the analysis of their economic decisions and choices; because risk attitudes influence the 
utility and value functions of farmers and therefore their economic decisions. To do this, 
however, would require an appropriate measure of the risk attitudes of risk attitudes.  
This study follows Brick et. al., (2012). They incorporate risk attitudes into the analysis of the 
choice to comply with fishing regulations in South Africa. This present study adapts their 
gains-only multiple price lottery experiment, assuming the constant relative risk attitude 
(CRRA) utility function within the expected utility framework. However, to date this study 
differs from the Brick et. al., (2012) lottery experiment in some aspects: the respondents and 
contexts are different. The present investigation focuses on smallholder fish farmers in 
southern Ghana, not fishers in South Africa. Fish farming is different from fishing from open 
water bodies in terms of the economic and financial risks involved: fish farmers invest money 
in constructing ponds or cages, purchase and stock fingerlings, and feed them till they are 
ready for harvest. The variability in input and output prices of farmed fish puts fish farmers at 
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more economic risks than fishers who only go to fish in the open ocean without investing 
financially in the stock of fish.  
Finally, this current study differs from the previous study by eliciting the risk attitudes of fish 
farmers not only with the multiple price lottery employed by Brick et. al., (2012) but by also 
exploring an alternative measure of risk attitudes following Dohmen et. al. (2011) and 
Tanaka et. al. (2010).  
2.2.4 Hypotheses 
In recent years there has been a vast increase in the number of studies on risk preferences, as 
well as the different elicitation methods of risk attitudes; only a few studies compare risk 
attitudes of the same sample with different elicitation methods. In verity, the number of such 
studies is even scarcer in the case of smallholder farmers in developing countries, like Ghana. 
It is evident from the literature reviewed that the risk attitudes of individuals could vary 
depending on the method of elicitation and the context. However, no study has been carried 
out to assess the risk preferences of farmers in the developing world using an adaptation of 
the BVB lottery which is a gains-only lottery, the TCN lottery which is a gains-and-losses 
lottery methodology and the general self-reported risk attitude question proposed by Dohmen 
et. al. (2011).  To our knowledge this study is the first to attempt this in Ghana.  
Following Ihli et. al., (2013), the consistency of risk attitude measures across the three 
distinct methods of elicitation are analysed. Thus, the first hypothesis of this study is: 
1. BVB vs TCN vs. SRRA: There are no significant correlations among the risk attitude 
determined by the self-reported risk score, the BVB and TCN lotteries.  
The extant literature (e.g. Bauermeister and Mushoff, 2016) indicates that risk attitude 
measures are not consistent across elicitation methods and contexts. Thus, it becomes 
difficult to make policy recommendations based on general risk attitude measures. Therefore, 
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after obtaining risk attitude measures from the three different risk elicitation methods, this 
study assesses whether and if so, which of the measures of risk attitudes explains some 
economic choices of the farmers in real life contexts, although hypothetical in nature. 
2. Explanatory power of BVB, TCN and SRRA: There are no significant differences in 
the predictive powers of the risk attitude measures in real economic choices. 
2.3 Experimental design 
This section presents the designs and implementation of the methods employed in eliciting 
the risk attitudes of the fish farmers in this study. Farmers were presented with three methods 
for measuring their individual risk attitudes: the BVB, TCN and SRRA. Each farmer is 
interviewed in a survey and in addition given the opportunity to indicate on a scale of 0-10 
what they believe is their risk attitude is, in a general sense. They are then tasked with the 
BVB experiment, followed by the TCN lottery.  
2.3.1 The self-reported risk attitude measure  
This is the first method employed to measure risk preference of the respondents. This method 
is a self-assessment of the general willingness to take risks on a scale of 0-10. Farmers are 
asked the following general risk attitude question: 
³+RZGR\RXVHH\RXUVHOIDUH\RXJHQHUDOO\DSHUVRQZKRLVIXOO\SUHSDUHGWRWDNHULVNV
or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please write on the scale, where the value 0 means: 
µQRWDWDOOZLOOLQJWRWDNHULVNV¶DQGWKHYDOXHPHDQVµYHU\ZLOOLQJWRWDNHULVNV¶ 
7KLVPHWKRGLVD³YHU\VLPSOHDQGIDVWLQVWUXPHQWWRPHDVXUHULVNDWWLWXGHV´0HQDSDFHet. al. 
2016), and has been used in a large study in Germany by Dohmen et. al. (2011) and also by 
Reynaud and Couture (2012) among French farmers. The strength of this approach lies in its 
simplicity and the wide potential for eliciting risk preferences for a large number of people at 
a relatively low financial cost. Nonetheless, this general question lacks any context and the 
scale used does not have any quantitative meaning directly, therefore, it is impossible to 
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assign any risk preference coefficient to each individual. Furthermore, because it does not 
involve the use of monetary incentives or probabilities, it is potentially possible that not all 
the variation in the responses of farmers could be attributable solely to risk preferences.  
2.3.2 The modified Brick-Visser-Burns (BVB) lottery-choice task 
The current study adapts the original BVB lottery design in three ways: first, there are ten 
rows in this study instead of the eight in the BVB set up. The second adaptation is in the 
payoffs: in this study, there is constant decrease of GHC1.00 from the first row in the less 
risky lottery option (A), unlike the nonlinear decreases in the original BVB set up3. The final 
difference lies in the presentation of the lottery matrix to the farmers. In this investigation, the 
payoffs and probabilities are represented with coloured bingo balls; different colours have 
different monetary values (Ihli et. al., 2013). However, I maintain the probabilities (50%) and 
the payoffs in the more risky lottery option, B. I proceed to provide some more details on the 
BVB lottery and its implementation as employed in this study. 
The design of the modified BVB in this study asks participants to choose from two options 
(A or B) in ten rows. The probability of getting the value indicated on the balls in option A is 
100% and 50% in option B. In option A, the payoffs decreased from GHC10.00 in the first 
row to GHC1.00 in the last row, and each row presents a secure alternative. In option B, blue 
and green balls respectively with a value of GHC10.00 or GHC0.00 each with a 50% 
probability is presented consistently in all rows. In the visual presentation used, there are ten 
red coloured bingo balls in each row, which change in their values as one goes down from the 
first to the tenth row. In option B, there are five blue balls valued at GHC10.00 each and five 
green balls each valued at GHC0.00. Given the payoffs and probabilities, the expected values 
of lottery A reduce from GHC10.00 in the first row to GHC1.00 in the last row; for option B, 
the expected values remain at GHC5.00. 
                                                 
3
 GHC is Ghana Cedis, the official currency of Ghana. 
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From the first to the fifth row, the expected value of lottery option A is greater than that of B; 
but this changes from the 6th row in favour of lottery option B. Thus, participants who switch 
from the safe lottery A, to the risky option B, at the fifth row (would choose the safer option 
four times) are classified as risk neutral; participants who switch to the risky lottery option 
before and after fifth row are classified as risk-preferring and risk averse respectively. 
I DVVXPHWKDW WKHIDUPHUV¶XWLOLW\IXQFWLRQIRUWKHORWWHU\SUL]HVLVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\FRQVWDQt 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) (e.g. Holt and Laury (2002), Brick et. al. (2012)). Given this 
DVVXPSWLRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VXWLOLW\KDVWKHIRUP ݑሺݔሻ ൌ ௫ೝ௥ , which is a function of the payoff ሺݔሻ from the Brick et. al. lottery4.  
The CRRA parameter, ݎ, describes the degree of relative risk aversion for an individual: in 
this case a farmer is risk averse if ݎ ൏  ?, risk neutral if ݎ ൌ  ?, and risk loving if ݎ ൐  ?.  
8VLQJDIDUPHU¶VVZLWFKLQJSRLQWLQWKHORWWHU\DQGWKHSD\RIIVLQWKDWURZ, it is possible to 
FRPSXWH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V &55$ SDUDPHWHU *HQHUDOO\ WKH SD\RII LQ WKH VZLWFKLQJ URZ
suggests that the expected utility from this option must be greater than or equal to the utility 
derived from any other option, in particular the next largest and next smallest possible 
LQYHVWPHQW FKRLFH ([SUHVVLQJ WKHVH WZR FRQGLWLRQV LQ WHUPV RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V XWLOLW\
function, and substituting the payoff as an argument, it is possible to solve for upper and 
lower bound values for ݎ (Holt and Laury, 2002).  
In order to avoid inferring extreme parameter values from the lottery choices, I assume an 
initial wealth level of zero (Dohmen et al, 2011). This assumption is not trivial but could 
instead capture the real notion that farmers do not take their current wealth into consideration 
when making their decisions.  
                                                 
4
 Here I use the power ሺݎሻ instead of ሺ ? െ ݎሻto conform to the utility functional form in the TCN 
utility function for gains. 
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If we assume a wealth level of zero (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002), indifference between the 
lottery of winning GhC10 or GhC0 with equal probability ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? and a safe option in say 
row 3 in Table A.3 implies the expected utility of lottery A equals the expected utility of 
lottery B i.e.  ?Ǥ ? ቀଵ଴ೝ௥ ቁ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ቀ଴ೝ௥ ቁ ൌ ଼ೝ௥ . This simplifies to  ?Ǥ ?ሺ ? ?௥ሻ ൌ  ?௥ and hence ݎ ൌ୪୬ ଴Ǥହ୪୬ ଼ି୪୬ ଵ଴ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?. The value of r in the next row is 1.943, the value of r in row 3 lies between 
3.106 and 1.943. However, in my estimation I used the upper limit of ݎ in each switching 
row. 
2.3.3 The modified Tanaka-Camerer-Nguyen (TCN) lottery-choice task 
Unlike the BVB lottery experiment which characterizes risk preferences by one parameter 
(ݎ), the concavity of the utility function, the TCN lottery argues that concavity of the utility 
function is not the only parameter affecting risk preferences, but rather nonlinear weighting 
of probabilities and aversion to loss also influence risk preferences. Thus, the TCN design 
measures all three parameters in a prospect theory framework. In the original set up, there are 
three complementary lotteries5; the first and second series consist of fourteen rows of gains-
only lottery options and the third consists of seven rows of lottery pairs involving gains and 
losses. In the modified version of this lottery, I employ the same probabilities and payoffs as 
used by TCN (2010) but I enhance the visual appeal for ease of comprehension by using 
coloured bingo balls; the number of balls in each bag represents the respective probabilities, 
and the values of each ball is indicated by the colour of the balls. Take row 25 of this lottery 
for instance: bag A contains one red ball (10%) (lower payoff) and nine (90%) yellow balls 
(higher payoff); while bag B contains three blue (30%) (lower payoff) and seven (70%) green 
balls (higher payoff)6.  
                                                 
5
 See appendix A 
6
 More in-depth explanations are given in Tanaka et al. 2010. 
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A major difference between the TCN lotteries and the BVB lies in the variation in the 
probabilities and payoffs. While there was a 100% probability of obtaining the amounts in 
lottery A, and 50% chance of obtaining the higher payoff consistently in the BVB design, the 
TCN lotteries vary in both payoffs and probabilities in every series. The parameters in this 
study are obtained via the prospect theory framework following Tanaka et. al., (2010).  
2.4 Measurement of TCN parameters  
(VWLPDWLRQRIıDQGĮ 
7KH ILUVW SDUDPHWHU ı GLFWDWHV WKH FXUYDWXUH RI WKH SURVSHFW YDOXH IXQFWLRQ DQG FDQ EH
thought of as a measure of risk aversion. The higher the sigma, the higher the degree of risk 
DYHUVLRQDQGLQGLYLGXDOLVULVNORYLQJLIı ULVNQHXWUDOLIı DQGULVNDYHUVHLIı!
(Tanaka et. al. 2010). 7KHVHFRQGSDUDPHWHUĮFDSWXUHVWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKORZSUREDELOLW\
outcomes are disproportionately weighted when valuing risky prospects. The third parameter 
Ȝ FKDUDFWHUL]HV ORVV Dversion. Together, these three parameters jointly characterize the 
valuation of risky prospects. 
Consider the case of a risky prospect with two outcomes, ݔ and ݕ, occurring with 
probabilities ݌ and ݍ ൌ  ? െ ݌, respectively. The value of the prospect can be written as: 
ݒሺݕሻ ൅ ݓሺ݌ሻሺݒሺݔሻ െ ݒሺݕሻሻ; for (for ݔݕ ൐  ?ܽ݊݀ȁԜݔȁ  ൐  ȁݕȁ)                (1) 
Or  ݒሺݕሻ ൅ ݓሺ݌ሻݒሺݔሻ ൅ ݓሺݍሻݒሺݕሻ                    (2) 
Following Tanaka et. al., (2010), I assume a piecewise power function for value,  ݒሺݔሻ  ൌ ݔఙ for gains x > 0           (3) 
and ݒሺݔሻ ൌ െߣሺെݔሻఙ  for losses x< 0.        (4) 
where ݒሺݔሻ is the value function and the functional form would depend on whether ݔis 
below zero or not; ߣ measures the sensitivity to loss versus gain. Bigger values of ߣ would 
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indicate one is more sensitive to loss over gain. The parameter ߪ is the standard measure of 
risk aversion. The higher the sigma, the higher the degree of risk aversion; ݓሺ݌ሻ is the 
probability weighting function adapted from Prelec (1998). Following Tanaka et. al. (2010) 
and Liu (2013) the probability weighting function is  
ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሾെሺെ݈݊݌ሻߙሿ           (5) 
The values of ߪ and ߙ for all possible combinations of switching points in series 1 and 2 are 
summarized in the appendix of Tanaka et. al. (2010), but can be derived manually as 
demonstrated by Liu (2013). 
(VWLPDWLRQRIȜ 
As already stated, the ߣ parameter elicits the loss aversion. It is obtained from the switching 
point in the third series of the TCN lottery and WKHıIURPWKHILUVWWZRVHULHV7. For example, 
suppose a farmer switched from Option A to option B in the second row in series 3 of the 
lottery. I assume that the utility derived from option B in row 2 is the same as the utility from 
option A in the same row, i.e. farmers are indifferent between the two. From the series 3 
Table in Appendix A, the winning payoff in lotteries A and B are GhC1 and GhC30 
respectively, and the corresponding losses are -4 and -21.  
Thus utilities of the prospects in option A are set equal to that of option B as ݓሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻݒሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ ൅ݓሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻݒሺെ ?ሻ ൌ ݓሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻݒሺ ? ?ሻ ൅ ݓሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻݒሺെ ? ?ሻ      (6) 
This then becomes ݓሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻሾݒሺ ?ሻ ൅ ݒሺെ ?ሻሿ ൌ ݓሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻሾݒሺ ? ?ሻ ൅ ݒሺെ ? ?ሻሿ 
Which reduces to ݒሺ ?ሻ ൅ ݒሺെ ?ሻ ൌ ݒሺ ? ?ሻ ൅ ݒሺെ ? ?ሻ 
This becomes  ?ఙ െ ߣ൫െሺെ ?ሻ൯ఙ ൌ ሺ ? ?ሻఙ െ ߣ൫െሺെ ? ?ሻ൯ఙ 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix A. 
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ሺ ? ?ఙ െ  ?ఙሻߣ ൌ ሺ ? ?ሻఙ െ ሺ ?ሻఙ ൌ ߣ ൌ ሺ ? ?ሻఙ െ ሺ ?ሻఙ ? ?ఙ െ  ?ఙ  
Hence, if it is assumed WKH ı DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKLV IDUPHU¶V VZLWFKLQJ SRLQWV LQ WKH WZR
SUHYLRXVORWWHULHVLVLWLPSOLHVWKHXSSHUERXQGRIȜWKDWVDWLVILHVWKLVHTXDWLRQLV 
ߣ ൌ ሺଷ଴ሻబǤమିሺସሻబǤమሺଶଵሻబǤమିሺସሻబǤమ  ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?.          (7) 
7KH ORZHU OLPLW LVREWDLQHGIURPWKHYDOXHRIȜ LQ WKHSUHFHGLQJURZZKLFK LQ WKLVFDVH LV
0.14. Therefore the interval of values which could satisfy this relation is  ?Ǥ ? ?൏ ߣ ൏  ?Ǥ ? ?. 
Hence, following Tanaka et. al., (2010) and Liu (2013), I use the midpoint of this interval, 
0.70, in the estimations. 
2.5 Data Collection  
In this section I provide a description of the sampling technique, the implementation of the 
lottery design in the field and the survey to collect data from the smallholder farmers. 
2.5.1 Sampling procedure 
The data for this study are derived from two main sources: the first is the household survey to 
gather socio-economic and demographic data from the farmers with a structured 
questionnaire, as well as the SRRA in a face-to-face setting. The second source is the field 
lottery experiment, where farmers made choices from both the BVB and TCN multiple price 
lotteries. The current research was conducted in four regions in southern Ghana (Greater 
Accra, Volta, Ashanti and Western regions), from April to May, 2014. The farmers in this 
study were part of a larger group of about 380 smallholder fish farmers who were interviewed 
in an earlier study conducted by researchers from the University of Ghana to collect data on 
the use of inputs, production figures and the sale of fish. The list of the fish farmers 
interviewed in the previous survey which took place from December, 2013 to February, 2014 
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were obtained. Since the objective was to relate the productivity of the farmers to their risk 
attitudes, it was prudent for us to follow up these same farmers whose production data had 
been gathered already to provide the vital link between risk attitudes and output from them. 
Furthermore, by using a sub sample of this sample, time was saved as well as other resources 
that would otherwise had been spent trying to find the farmers for the present study.  
In sum, 120 fish farmers were selected because of logistical reasons and time constraints. 
Thirty farmers were selected from each region through a simple random sampling technique. 
After selecting the farmers randomly, this information was passed on to the researchers in the 
University of Ghana who had conducted the previous survey, and they in turn contacted the 
leaders of the fish farmers in the various areas within the regions via telephone conversations 
to inform them of the intended field experiment to follow up shortly. This invitation was 
made at least a month before the experiment took place in any region. Prior to the field 
experiment and survey for this study, four of the researchers who had participated in the 
previous survey were trained for the field experiment. These researchers were graduates from 
the University of Ghana and very experienced in research surveys, especially among the 
farmers in this study. In terms of communicating effectively to the farmers in each region, 
each research assistant was very fluent in at least two of the major local dialects used in all 
four regions, but English was used where necessary during the field experiment. The farmers 
were either the owners or the main decision makers for each fish farm.  
2.5.2 Field experiment and survey procedures 
Research assistants were briefed and trained for a day in the protocol and procedure of the 
field experiments and a pilot study was carried out in a village in the Greater Accra Region to 
assess the feasibility of conducting the study among the fish farmers, and to address any 
possible challenges that may be encountered in the main experiment. This pilot enabled us to 
make some changes to the original design of the questionnaire and the design of the final 
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visual layout of the coloured diagrams I used in the study. On the day of each experiment, 
farmers showed up to predesignated areas, which included church premises, under trees, and 
in open places and got registered and checked against the names I had collated. These places 
were selected based on recommendations from the contact person from each area, and places 
which farmers were fairly familiar with. The venues were also meant to be within walking 
distances for most of the respondents8. The contact person in each area introduced us to the 
farmers and then each group of farmers was briefed regarding the purpose of the experiments, 
the protocol for each lottery, and the incentives available. Farmers who consented to 
participate in the experiment were informed of the participation reward of GhC10.00 after the 
experiment9. Farmers were given the opportunity to seek clarification about any aspect of the 
experiment and their queries were duly addressed. After questions asked by the farmers were 
addressed and consent given by all farmers the sessions took off starting with the survey 
questions.  
Each session was composed of five farmers, who were individually interviewed by an 
enumerator and their responses recorded accordingly on the structured questionnaires. At the 
start of each experiment, every farmer randomly picked a ball out of five balls placed in a 
bag, and the number on the ball was the identification of the farmer throughout the session. 
After the interviews which lasted about 20-25 minutes on average, each farmer was presented 
with an A3 poster with the lotteries depicted as coloured bingo balls, each colour of ball 
representing a payoff. 
In all, every farmer was shown four posters: the first was the ten row-gains-only BVB 
lotteries, the TCN lotteries comprised posters which showed fourteen pairs of lotteries in the 
                                                 
8
 There were a few cases where farmers were asked to travel down to the venues and the cost of travel was duly 
refunded when they turned up. In other cases, we drove them from their farms and homes to the venue where 
necessary. 
9
 This was equivalent to 2.5 times the minimum wage rate per day in the regions at the time of the experiments. 
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second and third posters, and the last poster comprised seven rows of choices (mixed 
lotteries). When a poster was shown to a farmer, he/she chose between bag A or B in each 
row of the lottery, and the enumerator duly recorded the choice of the farmer in each row. 
Monotonic switching was maintained throughout the experiments to avoid the possibility of 
losing some data due to the likelihood of multiple switches (Tanaka et. al., 2010). Therefore, 
once a farmer switches from the safer lottery A, to lottery B, the enumerator records the row 
of switch and moved on to the next poster. After all the choices had been made by all the 
farmers, they all came together to play the lottery for real cash. This is explained further in 
the next section. 
2.5.3 The real monetary-incentive game design 
Farmers were informed at the start of each session that in addition to their participation 
reward, one of them would be randomly selected to play the lottery for real cash. They were 
also informed that one task will be selected at random for the game. The design of this 
incentive system introduces chance at two levels: each farmer had an equal chance to be 
selected out of five to play the game for real cash or loss of cash in the case of the TCN 
lottery. Secondly, one of the tasks, totalling 45 rows, is randomly selected to be played. This 
design was adopted instead of allowing every participant to play for real cash because 
research has shown that using high monetary incentives for a proportion of participants 
improves performance during the experiments (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).  
The amount of money a farmer won was based on the choice of the farmer between lotteries 
A and B in each of the 45 rows of all the lotteries together. The probability of a row being 
picked for the real payment was equal for each row. It must be noted that some of the rows 
(the last seven) involved negative payoffs.10 This real incentive design is implemented in the 
                                                 
10
 Even though farmers were informed that in the event of winning a negative payoff he/she would lose that 
much money, we did not enforce this at the end of the experiment; only four farmers had a negative outcome. 
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following manner. First, five balls are placed in a bag, numbered according to the number of 
farmers in each session of the experiment. An enumerator draws one ball from the bag, and 
the farmer whose number was picked was a winner of one of the prizes. The row which was 
relevant for payment was determined by drawing a ball from a bag containing forty five balls; 
this draw was done by the farmer. A final draw decided whether the low or high payoff of 
Bag A or Bag B would be the final prize. This third draw was not necessary if the second 
draw was a ball numbered 1-10, and the farmer indicated option A in that row. This is 
because these rows presented a sure sum, with a 100% probability. However, if the farmer 
chose option B, a number of blue and green balls according to the respective probabilities in 
each row are placed in the sack and the farmer draws out a ball, and the colour of he picks 
determines the final payoff. 
2.6 Results 
In the sections below I present the summary of the measures of risk attitudes as well as the 
distribution of farmers according to the elicitation methods described earlier. In addition, the 
correlation among the elicitation methods is also discussed.  
2.6.1 Summary of the measures of risk attitudes 
Assuming that the preferences of the farmers is characterised by the CRRA utility function, 
the risk aversion coefficients obtained from the BVB and TCN lotteries are calculated and the 
means are summarized in Table 2.1. In addition, the average score from the responses of the 
farmers in the SRRA question is stated. However, because the scale of the SRRA cannot be 
converted to values of relative risk aversion, it is not directly comparable to the TCN and 
BVB lotteries. The averages of the risk aversion coefficients from the BVB and TCN are 
respectively 2.35 and 0.89, which indicates that the average fish farmer is respectively risk 
preferring in the gains-only lottery and risk averse in the gains-and-losses lottery. The mean 
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SRRA value was 5.39, which is similar to the findings of Menapace et. al. (2016), who found 
the mean SRRA of 5.64 among farmers in Northern Italy. 
Table 2.1: Summary of risk attitude measures 
Risk Attitude Measure  Mean Standard Deviation 
BVB (CRRA) 2.35 2.45 
TCN ı 0.89 0.52 
SRRA  5.39 3.22 
2.6.2 Distribution of fish farmers by elicitation method  
In Figures 2.1-2.4, the distributions of farmers according to their switch point in the lottery 
and their self-reported risk attitudes are summarised. While a smaller number (earlier switch) 
indicates risk preferring attitude in the lotteries, it indicates less willingness to take risks on 
the self-reported risk attitude scale. Therefore, for clarity and ease of comparison, the self-
reported risk attitude scores have been arranged in a reverse order to align with the switch 
points in the lotteries. It may be seen that the distributions for all elicitation methods are not 
normally distributed. Furthermore, I see no similarity in the distribution of the farmers 
according to the different elicitation methods. One observation is that majority of the farmers 
in the BVB and the TCN (gains-only) do not switch from the safe lottery (A) at all, but the 
reverse is true for the TCN which involved gains-and-losses. For the TCN which involved 
losses, farmers visibly behaved differently than in the gains-only lotteries. For instance, about 
9% of the farmers switched from the safe to the risky lottery in row 1, indicative of very 
highly risk loving attitude, while some 11% stated 10 as their risk attitude on the SRRA scale, 
indicative of high willingness to take risks. The distributions get more dissimilar in the 
middle section. While about 14.2% of farmers switched at the 6th row, indicative of risk 
neutrality, 26.6% stated 5 or 6 as their risk attitude score (relatively risk neutral). Finally, 
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16.7% of the respondents did not switch from the safe to the risky lottery at all, a very risk 
averse behaviour; on the self-reported scale however, 14.2% of farmers stated 0 as their risk 
attitude score (not willing at all to take risks). However, the distribution of the farmers 
according to their risk attitudes contrasts the findings of Dohmen et al (2011); they find 78% 
of their subjects to be risk-averse, 13% arguably risk-neutral and 9% as risk loving.  
 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of farmers according to switch point in the BVB lottery 
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of farmers according to SRRA 
2.6.3 Correlations among risk attitude measures  
Beyond the row of switch, I consider how the risk attitude scores obtained from the utility 
function correlate with the SRRA measure, using the simple Spearman Correlation test of 
independence. The results for this correlation tests are summarised in Table 2.2. The SRRA 
measure is not correlated to any significant level with any of the other measures of risk 
attitudeV WKH %9% ORWWHU\ DQG WKH ı YDOXH IXQFWLRQ FXUYDWXUH IURP WKH 7&1 ORWWHU\
experiments are highly and positively correlated. Furthermore, the BVB is found to be 
negatively and significantly related to the ߙ (probability weighting) parameter from the TCN 
ORWWHU\)LQDOO\ıDQGȜERWKSDUDPHWHUVIURPWKH7&1ORWWHU\DUHDOVRSRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHG
The significant correlations among some of the risk attitude measures may suggest that those 
risk attitude measures may be capturing similar traits or characteristics of the farmers in 
relation to how the farmers respond to risk. This may be because they are both obtained from 
incentivised lotteries played by the same respondents in the same experimental setting. The 
findings thus far suggest that risk attitudes obtained with incentivised multiple price lotteries 
capture similar risk attitudes from the same sample11. Thus, contrary to the findings of 
Dohmen et. al., (2011), this study finds a disparity in the stated risk preferences (SRRA) of 
the farmers and their observed/revealed risk preferences (BVB and TCN). These results 
confirm the findings of Anderson and Mellor (2009) and Lönnqvist et. al., (2015) that the 
measures of individual risk attitudes obtained from the experiments and survey are not 
correlated. 
Table 2.2: Correlation among the elicitation methods 
 SRRA BVB ı Į Ȝ 
SRRA 1     
                                                 
11
 Even though the average values from Table 2.1 show that the risk attitudes of the average farmer is different 



























Note: Coefficients are Spearman rho coefficients, and p-values are in parenthesis; ** and *** show significance at 
5% and 1% respectively.  
2.6.4 Demographic characteristics and attitudes to risk  
One of the purposes of this study was to investigate the farmer/farm specific characteristics 
that affect the attitudes to uncertainty of the farmers. To accomplish this objective, a simple 
linear regression model relating each measure of risk attitude and specified characteristics of 
each farmer is estimated as follows: 
ܴ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛܺ ൅ ፴௜          (3) 
Where ܴ௜ is the risk attitude of the ith farmer; ߛ is a vector of parameters to be estimated; X 
LVWKHVHWRIWKHIDUPHU¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVVXFKDVDJHPDULWDOVWDWXVHWF፴࢏ is the error term of 
the linear regression. 
This investigates whether and if so which, of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
farmers collected as part of the field survey has any effects on their risk attitude measures. 
The characteristics of the farmers include personal information (e.g. age, educational status, 
marital status, past experiences etc.), household information (e.g. household size, ownership 
of house), farm data (regional location), and social network characteristics (e.g. membership 
in fish farmer associations, religious affiliation etc.). The results from these regressions are 
summarized in Table 2.3. To ensure consistency, the same characteristics of famers are used 
in all regressions. A positive coefficient implies increasing risk aversion. The results from 
these regressions show that none of the specified characteristics is significantly correlated 
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with the risk attitude measure from the BVB lottery. This may imply that this risk attitude 
measure is a distinct trait of the farmers, just as age or gender.  
The results DOVR VKRZ WKDW WKH 7&1 XWLOLW\ FXUYDWXUH SDUDPHWHU ı ULVN DYHUVLRQ LV
negatively correlated with gender and freehold tenure. However, there is a negative 
significant correlation (at 10% level of significance) of experience in fish farm-related 
activities and number of rooms and the SRRA risk attitude measure. In other words, the more 
experienced farmers and farmers who owned more rooms self-reported themselves as not 
willing to take risks in general. From this section, it is found that only a few personal 
characteristics affect the risk attitude measures, therefore it appears that there may not be 
much concern with multicollinearity arising from the inclusion of these socio-demographic 
characteristics and the measures of risk attitudes in subsequent chapters in investigating 
production efficiency and technology adoption decisions. 
Table 2.3: Regression Analysis for determinants of risk attitudes among fish farmers in Ghana 








































































































R-Squared  0.095 0.132 0.151 
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is the risk attitude measure. The number of 
farmers in each regression is 120. Simple linear regressions are employed for the reported 
results in each column. Numbers in parentheses are p-values; *, ** and *** show significance at 
5% and 1% respectively.  
2.6.5 Validation of risk attitudes with economic choices 
It has been demonstrated that while there is a significant correlation between the risk attitude 
measures obtained from the BVB and TCN lotteries, neither lottery is significantly correlated 
with the SRRA. Thus, the critical query that remains is which of the three measures of risk 
attitudes is able to proffer plausible explanations for the economic decisions of the farmers? I 
attempt to answer this query by assessing how risk attitudes explain two hypothetical 
economic choices made by the farmers. The next section explains this further.  
Investment 
Tables 2.4-2.6 summarise the outcomes for two economic decisions of farmers and how these 
are influenced by the risk attitude measures. The first economic decision has to do with 
investment in a hypothetical bank. The following scenario was presented to the farmers: 
Imagine you had won GhC5000. A reputable bank makes you an investment offer: you give 
them a part of the money for two years, and there is a 50% chance to double the money, and 
a 50% chance that you lose half of the money you gave to the bank. What share of the 
GhC5000 would you invest in this offer? 
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This scenario encapsulates the elements of risk and loss, and therefore a risk or loss averse 
farmer is expected to invest less amount in the bank, while a risk loving farmer is expected to 
invest relatively larger amount because of the likelihood of doubling the invested amount.  
In Table 2.4, the amount each farmer would like to invest in the bank is regressed on farmer-
specific socio-economic characteristics such as age and risk attitudes in a simple linear 
regression. Each column in the table bears the name of the risk attitude measure included in 
that linear regression. The results in the table show that only the coefficients of SRRA and 
WKHĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJDUHVLJQLILFDQW7KHSRVLWLYHVLJQRIWKHFRHIILFLHQWRIWKH655$
indicates that a farmer with a higher SRRA value (more prepared to take risks) is more likely 
to invest higher sums in the bank, and the negativHVLJQRIWKHFRHIILFLHQWRIWKHĮSUREDELOLW\
weighting) shows that a farmer who overweights small probabilities is less likely to invest 
larger sums in the bank. Also, it is found that religion influences the amount invested in the 
bank. This could be explained by the social network effect Christians have from being 
members of church communities, and hence are more likely to invest more money in the 
bank, as they observe others do same. They may learn from others whether or not it is safe to 
invest in any venture more easily than those who are not associated in a similar fashion. 
Having carried out the linear regression with the amount of money to invest as dependent 
variable, I proceeded to create a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 if a farmer is 
willing to invest at least GhC2500 (half of the amount) in the bank, and 0 otherwise. This 
new variable was used in place of the raw amount stated by the farmer as the dependent 
variable, in a probit regression and the results are summarised in Table 2.5. Only the 
coefficient of the SRRA variable is significant in explaining the probability of investing at 
least half of the amount in the bank: farmers with higher SRRA values are more likely to 
invest higher sums in the bank. This is consistent with expectations and similar to the 
outcome in the previous regression.  
39 
 
Additionally, in the presence of the SRRA variable, males, Christians and members of fish 
farmer associations (FFA) are more likely to invest at least half of the amount with the bank; 
however, farmers who own their houses are less likely to do so. In the case of the BVB 
model, farmers who own their houses and have more rooms are less likely to invest GhC2500 
or more in the bank, while Christians and members of fish farmer associations are more likely 
to invest larger sums in the bank.  
When all three TCN parameters are included in the estimation it is found that farmers with 
more experience and those who own their houses will be less likely to invest larger sums in 
the bank, whereas Christians and members of fish farmer associations are found to be more 




Table 2.4: Linear Regression of Investment in a hypothetical bank 
VARIABLES Model with SRRA Model with BVB 0RGHOZLWK7&1ı 0RGHOZLWK7&1Į 0RGHOZLWK7&1Ȝ Model with all TCN parameters  
SRRA 169.1***      
 (41.12)      
Age 5.294 6.024 5.467 6.076 4.275 6.194 
 (11.97) (12.86) (12.93) (12.70) (12.91) (12.86) 
Male 338.2 159.9 256.3 145.6 186.5 226.5 
 (477.9) (509.9) (529.4) (504.6) (514.2) (525.3) 
Married 71.03 95.48 179.6 129.4 167.5 165.6 
 (324.6) (349.4) (352.4) (343.7) (350.6) (350.3) 
Experience -24.73 -41.01 -43.92 -45.76 -43.97 -44.87 
 (26.62) (28.18) (28.22) (27.75) (28.22) (27.99) 
Education -35.60 -40.74 -40.86 -38.08 -39.91 -36.21 
 (31.91) (34.16) (34.38) (33.84) (34.48) (34.23) 
Past_Weather_Shock -484.9 -494.5 -483.1 -379.8 -527.5 -423.9 
 (304.6) (326.8) (328.6) (326.1) (337.1) (339.0) 
Main Occupation 179.0 153.3 139.7 92.17 127.6 85.24 
 (307.9) (329.8) (331.6) (327.1) (332.2) (330.0) 
Household Size -5.442 0.876 -2.879 -1.832 -7.378 -1.311 
 (50.63) (54.47) (54.68) (53.71) (54.63) (54.33) 
Own_house -278.4 -391.0 -416.5 -410.3 -399.3 -420.7 
 (285.0) (303.8) (306.3) (300.5) (305.5) (303.7) 
Number of rooms 11.09 -41.22 -32.87 -37.03 -27.03 -34.84 
 (53.57) (56.76) (56.65) (55.77) (57.01) (56.66) 
Credit_Access -1,071* -1,127* -1,214* -1,242** -1,167* -1,238** 
 (576.1) (618.6) (620.7) (610.4) (621.2) (617.2) 
Ashanti -152.7 36.03 87.47 89.61 112.1 79.44 
 (463.4) (494.9) (495.5) (486.7) (494.8) (491.3) 
Western 403.2 508.4 550.5 582.4 612.0 597.5 
 (400.7) (429.4) (430.2) (422.7) (434.4) (431.7) 
Volta -296.1 -149.6 -123.7 -168.4 -112.7 -152.8 
 (431.7) (460.7) (463.2) (456.0) (463.7) (460.2) 
Christian 801.0* 831.9* 909.0* 851.3* 849.5* 873.4* 
 (460.6) (493.9) (499.8) (488.0) (496.6) (496.4) 
Freehold -221.3 -62.04 -88.33 -51.57 -112.9 -17.00 
 (309.3) (334.6) (337.4) (329.4) (333.3) (336.4) 
FFA 452.1 551.7 518.7 522.6 525.4 527.7 
 (342.3) (367.3) (368.5) (362.4) (368.6) (365.4) 
CRRA  74.39     
  (56.76)     
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH   204.0   138.4 
   (278.3)   (280.4) 
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ    -892.9**  -848.6* 
    (449.6)  (457.9) 
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ     43.80 24.63 
     (60.12) (60.82) 
Constant 909.7 1,985* 1,802 2,755** 2,085** 2,414** 
 (1,011) (1,042) (1,159) (1,060) (1,046) (1,201) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.265 0.156 0.146 0.174 0.146 0.178 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 2.5: Probit Analysis of Investment in Hypothetical Bank 
Variable Model with SRRA Model with BVB 0RGHOZLWK7&1ı 0RGHOZLWK7&1Į 0RGHOZLWK7&1Ȝ Model with all 
TCN parameters  
SRRA 0.114**      
 (0.0455)      
Age 0.00995 0.0131 0.0122 0.0136 0.0120 0.0134 
 (0.0132) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0130) 
Male 0.915* 0.826 0.786 0.809 0.832* 0.816 
 (0.496) (0.505) (0.509) (0.498) (0.501) (0.520) 
Married -0.342 -0.301 -0.267 -0.292 -0.255 -0.297 
 (0.338) (0.333) (0.334) (0.333) (0.330) (0.341) 
Experience -0.0419 -0.0492 -0.0519* -0.0543* -0.0522* -0.0545* 
 (0.0315) (0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0319) (0.0314) (0.0320) 
Education -0.0240 -0.0311 -0.0318 -0.0283 -0.0303 -0.0276 
 (0.0333) (0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0326) 
Past_Weather_Shock -0.471 -0.422 -0.401 -0.343 -0.448 -0.378 
 (0.321) (0.311) (0.309) (0.312) (0.319) (0.324) 
Main Occupation -0.116 -0.131 -0.129 -0.208 -0.143 -0.219 
 (0.315) (0.313) (0.310) (0.316) (0.312) (0.317) 
Household Size 0.0215 0.0120 0.00789 0.0137 0.00588 0.0114 
 (0.0548) (0.0531) (0.0525) (0.0535) (0.0528) (0.0538) 
Own_house -0.514* -0.582** -0.588** -0.602** -0.589** -0.596** 
 (0.285) (0.280) (0.281) (0.282) (0.280) (0.284) 
Number of rooms -0.0638 -0.0909* -0.0815 -0.0879 -0.0778 -0.0844 
 (0.0555) (0.0547) (0.0532) (0.0538) (0.0535) (0.0543) 
Credit_Access -0.705 -0.683 -0.705 -0.775 -0.694 -0.750 
 (0.679) (0.653) (0.653) (0.656) (0.654) (0.661) 
Ashanti -0.568 -0.390 -0.332 -0.370 -0.335 -0.364 
 (0.507) (0.483) (0.475) (0.483) (0.473) (0.484) 
western -0.252 -0.171 -0.140 -0.125 -0.113 -0.103 
 (0.409) (0.400) (0.398) (0.397) (0.401) (0.399) 
Volta -0.519 -0.385 -0.377 -0.462 -0.373 -0.463 
 (0.454) (0.439) (0.439) (0.451) (0.440) (0.453) 
Christian 0.992* 0.936* 0.950* 0.978* 0.932* 0.947* 
 (0.538) (0.521) (0.526) (0.526) (0.520) (0.531) 
Freehold -0.130 -0.0286 -0.0625 -0.0330 -0.0509 -0.0404 
 (0.325) (0.321) (0.323) (0.322) (0.318) (0.328) 
FFA 0.656* 0.631* 0.611 0.655* 0.635* 0.674* 
 (0.389) (0.374) (0.374) (0.382) (0.380) (0.387) 
CRRA  0.0440     
  (0.0531)     
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH   -0.00304   -0.0620 
   (0.264)   (0.270) 
Įprobability weighting)    -0.687  -0.678 
    (0.438)  (0.443) 
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ     0.0333 0.0265 
     (0.0562) (0.0577) 
Constant -1.251 -0.558 -0.413 -0.0102 -0.497 0.0375 
 (1.077) (1.020) (1.114) (1.029) (1.004) (1.160) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Willingness to pay for hypothetical rainfall index insurance 
Since all but five farmers in the sample indicated that they will be willing to pay for 
hypothetical rainfall index insurance, the analysis of willingness to pay is based on the 
highest amount each farmer is willing to pay for this insurance (this provides some variation). 
The description of the insurance package is as follows: 
Given the risks you experience and are exposed to, imagine that a new insurance company is 
going to be set up to help manage some of these risks.  
Coverage: This is the risk-management product that covers the destruction of fish stock 
during excess rainfall (above 70 mm/month) measured at the district meteorological officer 
for a fixed term of three (3) years.  
Benefit: In the case of the destruction of fish stock during the selected period the 
policyholder will receive a fixed benefit of GHC5, 000. 
Claim Processing: Within one month of the event, the benefit will be transferred by cash to 
the policyholder.  
Provider: The service will be provided by a Fish Farmer Association that will act as an 
³DJHQW´IRUD*KDQDLDQLQVXUDQFHFRPSDQ\ 
Proximity: The service is available in the district where the respondent resides. 
Price: Initial bid price per period of premium payment is GHC 15 
Frequency of Premium Payment: To be paid every quarter (that is every 3 months) 
Q1: Will you be willing to take up such an insurance package?   Yes [  ]    No [   ]  
If Yes, go to question 2, otherwise go to question 3. 
Q2: How much money will you be willing to pay per quarter as premium for this insurance 
package? GHC[  ] 
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For interviewer: Ask if he/she is willing to increase this amount by another GHC 1; if the 
answer is Yes, keep bidding it up till respondent says no. Write this value as the HIGHEST 
BID. Highest bid in GhC [       ] 
Q3: Why will you not be willing to take up this insurance package? 
 ,GRQ¶WQHHGLQVXUDQFHIRUP\ILVKIDUP>@ ,GRQ¶WWUXVWLQVXUance companies [ ] 
   , GRQ¶W KDYH WKH PRQH\ WR SD\ TXDUWHUO\ SUHPLXP >  @      2WKHU >  @ 3OHDVH
VSHFLI\«««« 
Table 2.6 provides a summary of the outcomes when the highest amount a farmer is willing 
to pay for the insurance is used as the dependent variable and regressed on farmer and farm-
specific characteristics including the risk attitudes discussed earlier. 
The results show that there is no significant correlation between the willingness to pay for the 
hypothetical insurance and any of the risk attitude measures used. However, Christians have 
lower willingness to pay for the hypothetical insurance across all models. In the case of the 
model in which SRRA was included as an explanatory variable, farmers in the Volta Region, 
relative to farmers in the base region, Greater Accra, have lower willingness to pay for the 




Table 2.6: Willingness to pay for a hypothetical rainfall index insurance 
Variable Model with SRRA Model with BVB 0RGHOZLWK7&1ı 0RGHOZLWK7&1Į 0RGHOZLWK7&1Ȝ Model with all TCN parameters  
SRRA 1.935      
 (1.275)      
Age 0.0668 0.0475 0.0755 0.0608 0.0572 0.0718 
 (0.371) (0.376) (0.376) (0.376) (0.376) (0.381) 
Male 0.772 -1.263 0.776 -1.264 -1.070 0.858 
 (14.82) (14.91) (15.39) (14.93) (14.96) (15.56) 
Married -0.0414 1.354 1.533 0.813 0.973 1.626 
 (10.07) (10.22) (10.24) (10.17) (10.20) (10.37) 
Experience 0.600 0.333 0.387 0.372 0.377 0.390 
 (0.826) (0.824) (0.820) (0.821) (0.821) (0.829) 
Education -0.0389 -0.128 -0.0870 -0.114 -0.0971 -0.0822 
 (0.990) (0.999) (0.999) (1.001) (1.003) (1.014) 
Past_Weather_Shock 9.233 9.638 9.140 9.381 8.974 8.817 
 (9.447) (9.556) (9.551) (9.650) (9.811) (10.04) 
Main Occupation -5.503 -6.054 -5.974 -5.926 -6.034 -5.985 
 (9.548) (9.644) (9.639) (9.680) (9.667) (9.775) 
Household Size 1.418 1.349 1.473 1.417 1.404 1.460 
 (1.570) (1.593) (1.589) (1.589) (1.590) (1.609) 
Own_house -3.930 -5.415 -5.674 -5.319 -5.315 -5.653 
 (8.840) (8.884) (8.904) (8.893) (8.890) (8.994) 
Number of rooms 0.426 0.0378 -0.0874 -0.0639 -0.0293 -0.0616 
 (1.662) (1.660) (1.647) (1.650) (1.659) (1.678) 
Credit_Access -11.84 -13.97 -13.67 -13.24 -13.04 -13.50 
 (17.87) (18.09) (18.04) (18.06) (18.08) (18.28) 
Ashanti -13.70 -9.951 -11.15 -10.72 -10.69 -11.10 
 (14.37) (14.47) (14.40) (14.40) (14.40) (14.55) 
Western -12.36 -9.888 -10.82 -10.51 -10.16 -10.64 
 (12.43) (12.56) (12.50) (12.51) (12.64) (12.79) 
Volta -23.55* -21.43 -21.52 -21.64 -21.52 -21.41 
 (13.39) (13.47) (13.46) (13.49) (13.49) (13.63) 
Christian -40.00*** -38.91*** -38.33*** -39.27*** -39.38*** -38.40** 
 (14.29) (14.44) (14.53) (14.44) (14.45) (14.70) 
Freehold 8.629 8.927 10.56 9.662 9.797 10.54 
 (9.592) (9.784) (9.806) (9.747) (9.699) (9.963) 
FFA 16.73 17.11 17.51 17.48 17.54 17.53 
 (10.62) (10.74) (10.71) (10.72) (10.73) (10.82) 
CRRA  -0.804     
  (1.660)     
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH   4.329   4.234 
   (8.090)   (8.306) 
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ    0.0705  0.879 
    (13.30)  (13.56) 
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ     0.323 0.186 
     (1.749) (1.801) 
Constant 51.71 68.38** 58.21* 66.21** 65.54** 57.41 
 (31.35) (30.47) (33.69) (31.37) (30.43) (35.57) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.155 0.138 0.138 0.136 0.136 0.139 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.7 Discussion, summary and conclusion 
Smallholder fish farmers in a developing country face risky decisions in their daily 
operations, and the choices made by farmers are influenced by their individual risk attitudes. 
In order to better understand the behaviour of these farmers in different economic situations, 
it is imperative to measure their risk attitudes. However, the measurement of risk preferences 
is not a straightforward task. While recent advances in experimental and behavioural 
economics have developed many methods to elicit risk preference, a common drawback is the 
lack of consistency of risk attitude measures across different elicitation methods and contexts. 
This chapter elicits risk attitudes of smallholder fish farmers in southern Ghana using three 
different methods (BVB, TCN and SRRA) in a field survey; two of the methods involved 
lottery choices and the last method is a general self-reported risk attitude question. The 
evidence from this study suggests that the average fish farmer in this study may be risk averse 
(BVB), risk loving (TCN) or risk neutral (SRRA), depending on the elicitation method 
employed. Perhaps, this could be due to the differences in the nature of the two lotteries: the 
BVB is a gains-only lottery, while the TCN is mixed, involving both gains and losses. In 
spite of this, I find a significant correlation between the risk preferences in the two lottery 
experiments, implying that they are both capturing the same attribute of the fish farmers, but 
the two measures are significantly distinct from the SRRA. The objective of this chapter was 
to describe these methods used to elicit risk preferences of the farmers which are employed in 
the subsequent chapters of this thesis to investigate how risk attitudes affect production 
efficiency and technology adoption. The chapter also investigates how the risk attitude 
measures correlate with each other, how they vary with farmer characteristics, and whether 
they can predict farmer responses to questions on hypothetical economic choices.  
From the analysis carried out, it is found that the risk attitudes obtained from the two 
experiments could not provide sufficient explanation of the two hypothetical economic 
choices of the farmers in the context of investment and willingness to pay for a rainfall index 
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insurance. However, the SRRA showed some significant correlation with the choice of 
investment in the hypothetical bank: farmers with greater SRRA values are more likely to 
invest larger sums in the bank, an expected outcome. It is possible that the SRRA and WTP 
for the rainfall insurance are both subject to hypothetical bias derived by the hypothetical 
nature of the questions. Hypothetical bias is said to occur when responses that are elicited in a 
hypothetical context, such as a survey, deviate from those elicited in a real world context 
(Loomis, 2011). 
The results indicate that experimentally-elicited risk attitude measures do not sufficiently 
offer explanation for the two specific hypothetical economic decisions in the specific context 
presented. This could be explained by the nature of risk attitudes in general: they are 
domain/context-sensitive, and may well be able to explain real-life economic decision 
directly related to fish production. Evidence of this assertion is seen in Chapters 4 and 5 of 
this thesis, where significant correlation between the timing of technology adoption and the 
risk attitude measures is reported. Further evidence is found in the literature; risk attitudes 
from different lottery experiments have been used to predict a number of important risky 
agricultural decisions in developing country contexts. These studies include crop 
diversification in Peru (Engle-Warnick et. al. 2011), labour share in coffee production in 
Uganda (Hill, 2009), technology adoption among Vietnamese farmers (Nielsen et. al., 2013), 
and Bt technology adoption among cotton farmers in China (Liu, 2013). Specific to the use of 
hypothetical rainfall index insurance, there are suggestions that farmers may not adopt this 
insurance due to factors other than risk aversion. For example, better-off farmers who can 
afford insurance do not purchase the index insurance because they insure themselves through 
income diversification, their assets and networks. Poorer farmers, who are posited to benefit 
immensely from these insurance packages, do not use them because of credit constraints 
(Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012). Furthermore, it is recommended that farmers need better 
understanding of insurance packages and the benefits they promise to farmers. Thus, it is 
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clear that perhaps credit constraints, lack of understanding and other motivations, rather than 
risk attitudes influence the uptake of rainfall index insurance among smallholder farmers. 
This could explain why the risk attitude measures were not significantly correlated with the 
uptake of rainfall index insurance in this study.  
In summary, this study has attempted to provide some insight into the effectiveness of 
different elicitation methods in measuring the risk preferences of smallholder farmers in a 
developing nation context. It has been demonstrated that risk preferences are sensitive to the 
method of elicitation and that the risk preferences revealed in the lottery experiments do not 
offer significant explanation for two specific hypothetical economic choices made by fish 
farmers, at least in our context. These findings, however, do not imply that risk attitudes 
elicited with incentivised lottery experiments can never explain risky economic decisions of 
farmers. Given that an attempt was made to enhance comprehension of the farmers using 
coloured bingo balls in the field experiment, this study claims that risk attitudes elicited from 
smallholder farmers in the developing world context do not provide sufficient explanatory 
power for hypothetical economic decisions, possibly due to hypothetical bias. Nonetheless, 
there is overwhelming evidence that the elicited risk attitudes provide very good prediction of 
real domain-specific risky economic choices, such as the adoption of technologies. Therefore, 
it is imperative that when designing experiments to elicit risk preferences in developing 
world, participants should be engaged in appropriate and relatable risk domains and contexts 
specific to their field of operation. Perhaps, more farmers should be included in future studies 
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Table A1: TCN Lottery Series 
ROW Option A Option B Expected Payoff 
Difference (A-B) 
1 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 68 and 9/10 of 5 7.7 
2 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 75 and 9/10 of 5 7 
3 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 83 and 9/10 of 5 6.2 
4 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 93 and 9/10 of 5 5.2 
5 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 106 and 9/10 of 5 3.9 
6 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 125 and 9/10 of 5 2 
7 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 150 and 9/10 of 5 -0.5 
8 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 185 and 9/10 of 5 -4 
9 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 220 and 9/10 of 5 -7.5 
10 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 300 and 9/10 of 5 -15.5 
11 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 400 and 9/10 of 5 -25.5 
12 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 600 and 9/10 of 5 -45.5 
13 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 1000 and 9/10 of 5 -85.5 
14 3/10 of 40 and 7/10 of 10 1/10 of 1700 and 9/10 of 5 -155.5 
 
SERIES 2 
ROW Option A Option B Expected Payoff Difference 
(A-B) 
15 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 54 and 3/10 of 5 -0.3 
16 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 56 and 3/10 of 5 -1.7 
17 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 58 and 3/10 of 5 -3.1 
18 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 60 and 3/10 of 5 -4.5 
19 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 62 and 3/10 of 5 -5.9 
20 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 65 and 3/10 of 5 -8 
21 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 68 and 3/10 of 5 -10.1 
22 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 72 and 3/10 of 5 -12.9 
23 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 77 and 3/10 of 5 -16.4 
24 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 83 and 3/10 of 5 -20.6 
25 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 90 and 3/10 of 5 -25.5 
26 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 100 and 3/10 of 5 -32.5 
27 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 110 and 3/10 of 5 -39.5 
28 9/10 of 40 and 1/10 of 30 7/10 of 130 and 3/10 of 5 -53.5 
SERIES 3 
ROW Option A Option B Expected Payoff Difference 
(A-B) 
29 5/10 of 25 and 5/10 of -4 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -21 6 
30 5/10 of 4  and  5/10 of -4 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -21 -4.5 
31 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -4 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -21 -6 
32 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -4 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -16 -8.5 
33 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -8 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -16 -10.5 
34 5/10 of 1  and  5/10 of -8 5/10 of 30 and 5/10 of -14 -11.5 





Row ı  0.10 0.20 0.25 0.35 0.40 
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2 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
3 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
4 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
5 Ȝ 2.Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
6 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
7 Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ Ȝ 
NS ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLnfinity ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLQILQLW\ ȜLQILQLW\ 
 
Table A3: BVB lottery 
Row Option A Option B Expected Payoff 
Difference (A-B) 
Range of CRRA  
1 10/10 of 10 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 5 Infinity<r<6.579 
2 10/10 of 9 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 4 6.579<r<3.106 
3 10/10 of 8 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 3 3.106<r<1.943 
4 10/10 of 7 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 2 1.943<r<1.357 
5 10/10 of 6 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 1 1.357<r<1.000 
6 10/10 of 5 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 0 1.000<r<0.756 
7 10/10 of 4 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 -1 0. 756<r<0.576 
8 10/10 of 3 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 -2 0. 576<r<0.431 
9 10/10 of 2 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 -3 0. 431<r<0.301  
10 and no Switch 10/10 of 1 5/10 of 10 and 5/10 of 0 -4 0.301<r<infinity 
Table A4: Distribution of farmers by risk attitudes under the two lottery experiments 
Risk attitude  Percentage in Brick et. al. lottery Percentage in TCN lottery 
Risk Averse 53.33 48.33 
Risk-Preferring  46.67 51.67 






Effect of risk attitudes on economic efficiency of smallholder fish farmers in Ghana 
3.1 Introduction  
Many of the poor in developing countries depend primarily on agriculture and aquaculture for 
their livelihoods. However, farming as a primary source of livelihood is inherently risky. 
Extreme and unpredictable changes in weather conditions, as well as the adoption of new and 
improved agricultural technologies and the presence of diseases have the potential to cause 
fluctuations in yield. Fluctuations in yield could lead to dramatic changes in income of 
smallholder farmers (Key, 2005). In developing countries, where the markets for insurance 
and credits are absent, farmers are not able to transfer these risks to third party entities. 
Therefore, they are more likely to make production choices that are suboptimal in order to 
reduce their risk exposure, often at the expense of economic efficiency (Morduch, 1995). For 
example, evidence from the extant literature suggests that more risk averse farmers have a 
higher proclivity to plant conventional but less productive crops, and also use suboptimal 
levels of inputs in production. Owing to these suboptimal production choices risk averse 
farmers are more likely to be trapped in poverty (see review article by Hurley, 2010).  
Many factors affect the production decisions of farmers; prominent among these are output 
risk and risk attitudes of farmers (Chavas et. al., 2010). Therefore, for effective policy 
intervention to help farmers overcome poverty, and to make them more productive and food 
secure, it is important to understand the empirical correlation between their risk attitudes and 
production decisions (Hellerstein et. al., 2013). However, the investigation of how risk 
attitudes affect the production choices of farmers is not easy, because of modelling 




Over the years, technology adoption has been recognized by policy makers as an essential 
tool for increasing agricultural productivity, premised on the assumption that productivity 
increases with the adoption of a new technology. Thus, in many instances the main focus of 
governments and other agencies has centred on identifying and removing the constraints to 
technology adoption among resource-poor farmers (Obwona, 2006). Dhungana et. al., (2004) 
suggest that in order to attain productivity growth one of two steps must be taken. New and 
improved technologies must be adopted or existing technologies available to farmers must be 
used more efficiently, or a combination of these two must be pursued. In less developed 
countries, introduction of new technologies has often failed to achieve desired improvement 
in productivity (Xu and Jeffrey, 1998). This results from farmer-specific attributes (e.g. risk 
aversion) or institutional, cultural and environmental constraints, which prevent the 
adjustment of input levels to achieve optimal outputs (Ghatak and Ingerset, 1984). Therefore, 
if farmers are not improving productivity because they are using existing technologies 
inefficiently, it will be more cost effective to find ways to improve their efficient use of the 
technology than introducing newer technologies that farmers are less familiar with (Shapiro, 
1983; Belbase and Grabowski, 1985).  
Based on these recommendations, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether the 
economic efficiencies of smallholder fish farmers are consistent with their risk attitudes 
measured in a field experiment involving incentivised multiple price lotteries. This 
investigation is carried out among 120 smallholder fish farmers in southern Ghana. The 
economic efficiency analysis is carried out within the stochastic frontier framework. The 
stochastic frontier analysis posits that the deviation of farmers from the least possible cost of 
producing a given output is due to farmer inefficiency and stochastic or random factors, 
outside the control of the farmer. In addition, I also employ the deterministic corrected 
ordinary least squares (COLS) methodology. By using both deterministic and stochastic 
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approaches, the results of this study could provide relatively more precise measures of 
efficiency scores, which could lead to more accurate policy recommendations. 
The fish farming sector in Ghana faces risks in terms of price and yield variability, and 
therefore it serves as an appropriate testing ground to assess the overall economic efficiencies 
and how these are affected by the attitudes to risk of the farmers. The technical efficiency 
scores of smallholder fish farmers as well as socio-economic characteristics that drive 
observed variability in the efficiencies have been studied empirically in Ghana (e.g. Onumah 
and Acquah, 2010; Crentsil and Essilfie, 2014 etc.). Outcomes from these studies show that 
fish farmers are not 100% technically efficient. A shortcoming of these studies is that they do 
not conduct a necessary diagnostic test on the appropriateness of the stochastic frontier 
methodology on the dataset before carrying out the analysis. Also, most of these studies focus 
only on the technical efficiency of the farmers and not the overall economic efficiency. 
Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) suggest that it is by improving overall economic efficiency 
that major gains in output could be achieved. Furthermore, they ignore the influence of risk 
attitudes on the efficiency outcomes presented. This present study is an attempt to fill this 
gap, by testing whether, and if so how, the risk attitudes of farmers explain farm inefficiency. 
The results show that risk attitudes of farmers play no significant role in explaining 
inefficiency of fish production in the study area. Furthermore, some of the input prices and 
the output are positively related to the total cost of production of fish and that economies of 
scale prevails in the study area. Lastly, stochastic factors, beyond the control of the farmers 
(e.g. weather shocks, price shocks, government policies affecting fish farming and 
measurement errors) rather than inefficiency of farmers explain most of the observed 
differences in the economic efficiency of farmers. Based on these outcomes, the study 
recommends policies that would enable farmers to scale up their current production levels, as 
well as keep accurate records for future research data. This is because there is economies of 
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scale in the study area, and expanding the current scale of production will result in a decrease 
in per unit cost of output (Amewu and Onumah, 2015). Also, keeping accurate records will 
help reduce µQRLVH¶ LQ WKH GDWD IRU IXWXUH DQDO\VLV DQG PRUH DFFXUDWH RXWFRPHV DQG SROLF\
recommendations.  
After this introduction, the next section reviews the literature. This is followed by the 
hypotheses, skewness tests on residuals, theoretical framework of the study and empirical 
application. The data and data collection, empirical results, summary and conclusion follow 
in that order. 
3.2 Review of literature on efficiency 
3.2.1 Concepts of efficiency and frontier models 
The literature credits the commencement of the study of efficiency of production units to the 
early works of Koopmans (1951) and Debreu (1951); the former provided the definition of 
technical efficiency while the latter introduced the distance functions as a way to model 
inefficiency12. However, these two studies were theoretical, but Farrell (1957) extended these 
two studies by providing an empirical decomposition of economic efficiency into technical 
and allocative efficiencies.  
While the aim of this chapter is not to provide detailed discussion of efficiency, a brief 
discussion of technical inefficiency, allocative inefficiency and economic inefficiency are 
discussed here13. In terms of costs, a farmer is technically inefficient when, given the chosen 
inputs the output produced is less than the maximum possible, with a given technology. In 
other words, a farmer is technically inefficient if that farmer in unable to operate on the 
production frontier due to the less than optimal application of inputs and wrong timing of 
applying inputs. This inefficiency may arise from lack of appropriate information regarding 
                                                 
12
 A distance function is a function that defines a distance between each pair of elements of a set. 
13
 Greene (1993) provides a detailed discussion of the concepts. 
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the relevant skills necessary in the use of a technology or the untimely supply of inputs. On 
the other hand, a farmer is allocative inefficient when suboptimal input combinations are 
adopted given prices and outputs. In another sense, it is the inability of a farmer to use the 
input mix that maximises profits, given the output and prices. This inefficiency results from 
farmer-specific characteristics such as risk aversion and capital constraints. Other 
constraining factors include the interdependence of production and consumption decisions in 
farm households, and failures in input supply markets (Alene, 2003; Ellis, 1988; Ali and 
Byerlee, 1991). Economic inefficiency arises from both technical and allocative inefficiencies 
(Greene, 1993). Conversely, an economically efficient firm has the ability to produce a given 
output at minimum cost.  
Many theories have been propounded to explain why farmers may be inefficient in their 
operations. Among these is the efficiency hypothesis, advanced by Schultz (1964). This 
hypothesis essentially assumes that farmers are µSRRUEXWHIILFLHQW¶It also relates production 
of farmers to a static and steady state, where external factors do not create any uncertainty in 
the production process. But in reality, the environments within which farmers in developing 
countries operate is constantly changing, sometimes such changes are not predictable. This 
introduces risk into the production system, and the attitudes of the farmers to these risks 
determine their outcome. This is largely not taken into account in the efficiency hypothesis. 
Ali and Chaudry (1990) contend that disequilibrium in the production process arises from 
YDULDELOLWLHVLQLQSXWDQGRXWSXWSULFHV7KXVLWLVQRWVXUSULVLQJWKDWWKHµSRRUEXWHIILFLHQW¶
hypothesis is rejected by many economists, including Shapiro (1983). Shapiro (1983) carried 
out an empirical investigation of the production of cotton by farmers in Tanzania. He showed 
that output could increase by 51% if all farmers attained the levels of output obtained by the 
most efficient farmer in the same geographical area, using the same inputs and technologies.  
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Alternative models to Schultz hypothesis include the risk-averse peasant model (Ellis, 1988). 
This posits that smallholder farmers are risk averse and therefore have as their main objective 
the food security needs of their families rather than profit maximization. Another theory put 
forth to explain the economic behaviour of peasant farmers is the theory of utility 
maximization (Chayanov, 1966). This theory adduces that smallholder farmers have profit 
maximization as their key objective, and therefore are efficient producers. This theory 
considers the smallholder farm household as being producers and consumers, hinged on the 
assumptions that labour market is non-existent and that there is free access to agricultural 
land. In a similar fashion, Morduch (1995) considers farm households as entities that try to 
smooth their consumption over time, using their outputs and sales of produce.14  
Another theory advanced by Singh et. al., (1986) and later by Bardhan and Udry (1999) is the 
household model. This model, like the Chayanov model, couples production and 
consumption decisions of the household, but differs from the former model by relaxing the 
absence of the labour market and unlimited supply of land assumptions. 
While no single theory or model can proffer sufficient explanation of the production 
decisions of smallholder farmers under every circumstance, Ellis (1988) concludes that 
farmers are not homogenous in terms of resource allocation. Therefore, there is no 
justification for assuming that all smallholder farmers are efficient in their production 
choices. If all production units were fully efficient, there would be no need to study the 
relative inefficiencies of firms, but evidence from the extant literature suggests that some 
producers are not 100% efficient (Coelli et. al., 2005), justifying the study of efficiency of 
production units. 
                                                 
14
 Evidence in support of the hypothesis of profit maximization in traditional agriculture may be found in 
Hopper (1965), Welsch (1965) 
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The challenge with efficiency measurements is the fact that is almost impossible to know the 
absolute efficiency position of any farmer. This necessitates the measurement of the 
efficiency of each farmer relative to other farmers, usually, using the same technology 
(Dhungana et. al., 2004). Measurements of relative efficiencies of farm units have been 
carried out based on the original study of Farrell (1957). These studies broadly adopt 
parametric or non-parametric approaches, depending on whether or not a functional form is 
assumed. Studies that adopt the parametric approach (e.g. Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA)) assume a functional relationship (such as the Cobb Douglas or Translog) between 
output and inputs. Studies that adopt the non-parametric approach (e.g. Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA)) do not impose any functional relationship between output and inputs a 
priori. A common drawback of the parametric approach is the fact that there is no a priori 
justification for choosing a particular function form (Thiam et. al., 2001). Nevertheless, Koop 
and Smith (1980) conclude that the functional form of the production function chosen has a 
negligible effect on the estimated efficiency.  
Parametric frontier models are further distinguished into two categories depending on 
assumptions about the cause of deviation from the frontier: deterministic and stochastic 
frontiers. The former assumes that any deviation from the frontier is due to inefficiency 
related to the decision making unit, while the latter assumes that deviation from the frontier is 
not only due to inefficiency, but also statistical or measurement errors (outside the control of 
the decision maker). By attributing all deviations from the frontier to inefficiency, the 
deterministic models are sensitive to measurement errors or any other noise, and inefficiency 
scores would be overestimated in the presence of these errors which are not accounted for 
(Greene, 1993). The stochastic frontier methodology addresses some of the shortfalls in the 
deterministic models by making it possible to estimate standard errors and to make inferences 
(Schmidt, 1976). It also disaggregates the deviation from the frontier into inefficiency and 
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stochastic factors. A drawback of the stochastic frontier approach is that it provides only 
average, but not firm-specific efficiency measures for a sample, which may not be very useful 
from a policy perspective. This drawback was addressed by Jondrow et. al. (1982), with tools 
for estimating the firm-specific efficiency scores.  
The parameters in the parametric production or cost function are estimated with many 
econometric or non-econometric techniques, such as corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) 
or maximum likelihood (ML) methods (Ouattara, 2012). The Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) are the two main analysis tools in the non-
parametric and parametric domains, respectively. The COLS is a parametric procedure but it 
is similar in concept to the DEA, because they are both deterministic, they attribute all 
deviations from the frontier to farmer inefficiency. They are also different, in that the former 
imposes a functional form while the latter does not. In this study the COLS is employed in 
addition to the relatively more complex SFA, since it is easier to run the linear regression for 
the COLS. 
The literature on risks and risk attitudes and how these affect efficiency measures, as 
intimated, is scanty. 
3.2.2 Risk, risk attitudes and efficiency of production  
Risk may be defined as the state of imperfect knowledge, where the probabilities of the 
possible outcomes are known (Hardaker, 2000). Furthermore, Hardaker (2000) suggests three 
common meanings of risk: ³WKHFKDQFHRIEDGRXWFRPH´³WKHYDULDELOLW\RIRXWFRPHV´DQG
³WKHXQFHUWDLQW\RIRXWFRPHV´15. Farmers face a myriad of risks ranging from weather-related 
risks to diseases; from price fluctuations to policy and regulatory risks. The primary source of 
risks in most cases is production or yield variability. These risks come from stochastic factors 
                                                 
15
 See Hardaker, 2000 for in-depth discussion. 
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that affect the amount and quality of farm output, such as unpredictable weather, drought, 
diseases and insects (Dillon and Anderson, 1990; Hardaker, et. al., 2004). While risks may 
differ in terms of sources and impacts on farm households, they may not be independent, and 
may be linked to each other (Aimin, 2010). This necessitates the need for a holistic approach 
in addressing the risks faced by farmers, especially in developing countries where formal 
coping mechanisms may be lacking.  
The effects of risk attitudes on the production choices of farmers under uncertainty have long 
been recognized in the literature (e.g. Binswanger, 1980). Importance of this consideration 
stems from the fact that the variability and expected values of returns from production 
choices may be affected by the attitudes of farmers to uncertainty. Wolgin (1975) concludes 
that risk aversion plays a key role in the production choices of farmers. For instance, he finds 
that farmers are willing to adopt high risk cops only if they get a higher payoff in expected 
return. Furthermore, Tobin (1985) also adduces that risk aversion may explain why some 
farmers may choose to diversify their production. This, he explains, is due to the fact that 
farmers can obtain similar expected returns at lower risk from growing multiple crops, just as 
much as they can get from specializing in monocropping, which may entail higher risks. In 
assessing the impact of rainfall variability as a source of risk on the decision to invest in 
farming portfolios, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) show that risk averse farmers in 
riskier environments select portfolios that are less risky but also less profitable. Morduch 
(1993) also reports that subsistence farmers in India have a higher proclivity to use low-risk 
conventional seed varieties rather than high-yielding but risky varieties.  
These outcomes provide some evidence that IDUPHUV¶ ULVN Dttitudes affect their production 
choices, and thus could lead to efficiency losses when safety is the objective of the farmer 
(Mendola, 2007). This may explain why risk averse farmers may choose a low-risk 
conventional input mix which would result in low return rather than one with potential higher 
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returns, but with a higher risk (Mendola, 2007). Thus, risk averse farmers are expected to be 
less economically efficient under uncertainty.  
This present study is not the first to assess the effect of risk attitudes on the production 
choices of farmers. The consideration of production risks and estimation of a heteroskedastic 
model of production began with the seminal work by Just and Pope (1978). The authors 
assert that commonly used formulations of production functions are restrictive and lead to 
inefficient and biased outcomes. They also provide a production function formulation under 
ULVN+RZHYHUWKHLUPRGHOGRHVQRWDFFRXQWIRUWKHHIIHFWRIIDUPHUV¶RZQULVNDWWLWXGHVRQ
efficiency outcomes (Kumbhakar, 2002).  
Since inputs and outputs are both chosen by farmers, their attitudes to risk can affect these 
FKRLFHVKHQFHDPRGHOWKDWLQFRUSRUDWHVQRWRQO\SURGXFWLRQULVNVEXWDOVRIDUPHUV¶RZQULVN
attitudes in the estimation of efficiency of farm outcomes is very important (Kumbhakar, 
 7KH VKRUWIDOO LQ -XVW DQG 3RSH¶V (1978) analysis is addressed by Love and Buccola 
(1999): WKH\FRQVLGHUSURGXFHUV¶ULVNSUHIHUHQFHVLQDMRLQWHVWLPDWLRQRILQSXWDOORFDWLRQDQG
output supply decisions.16  
3.2.3 Estimating efficiency of production in agriculture in developing countries 
Tan et. al. (2011) assess the technical efficiency with which cage culture operators operate in 
four locations in the Philippines. They apply the stochastic frontier analysis in their 
estimation of the technical efficiency of the Genetically Improved Farmed Tilapia (GIFT) and 
GIFT-derived strains relative to conventional strains in the four locations. In all, four strain 
groupings are used in the analysis and their results showed that the average technical 
efficiencies ranged from 18.3% to 46.4% across all four locations. The variance parameter, 
JDPPD Ȗ IURP WKHLU HVWLPDWLRQ ZDV  DQG VLJQLILFDQW DW  LPSO\LQJ WKDW DOO WKH
                                                 
16
 For more literature on risk and efficiency, the reader is referred to Kumbhakar (2002). 
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deviation from the frontier output was due to technical inefficiency. The study fails to assess 
the technical efficiencies of the different strains of tilapia. This is because the performance of 
tilapia could be affected in different environments differently.  
Onumah and Acquah (2011) employ a single-stage Translog stochastic frontier to assess the 
technical efficiency of fish producers in southern Ghana. Their study focuses on the effects of 
family and hired labour on fish production. They show that the two labour types are not much 
different in terms of productivity and also found that the mean technical efficiency of the 
smallholder fish farmers in the study area was 78% and this was influenced negatively and 
significantly by age, experience and level of formal education. They conclude that 
smallholder operators were more technically efficient than farmers with large farms.  
Onumah and Acquah (2010) also apply the single stage stochastic frontier approach to study 
the technical efficiency and its determinants among fish farmers in 15 districts in southern 
Ghana. The interesting fact about this study is that is it explores the interactive effects of 
farm-specific variables on the technical efficiency of fish production. They find that the 
production technology of fish production in Ghana exhibits increasing returns to scale, and 
average technical efficiency is found to be about 81%. The study finds significant 
correlations between farm and farmer-specific characteristics such as age, gender, education 
and the interaction of age and experience; but finds no conclusive significant effect of 
regional location on efficiency of production. This study focuses only on the technical 
efficiency, and not the overall efficiency.  
To fill this gap Asamoah et. al. (2012) attempt to assess allocative efficiency of 74 
smallholder fish farmers in four regions in southern Ghana, in addition to a production 
function analysis, linking the output of fish to inputs such as feed, fingerlings, fertilizer and 
labour. They find stocking rate as the most significant physical determinant of the output of 
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fish in the study area17. Furthermore, they find that the technology used by the farmers 
exhibits increasing returns to scale. The study uses marginal physical productivity as proxy 
for allocative efficiency, and concludes that stocking rate should increase, while feed and 
labour should be decreased to increase productivity. They, however, do not provide estimates 
for individual farm-level allocative efficiency scores, which are very important from policy 
perspective in determining the overall economic efficiency.  
Thus, from the brief review of existing literature on fish production in Ghana it is evident that 
no single study addresses the overall cost/economic efficiencies of the same farmers, nor is 
there a study that considers the risk attitudes of farmers in their analysis of efficiency; this 
chapter is an attempt to fill the gap, using data from a sample of 120 smallholder fish farmers 
from southern Ghana. 
3.3 Hypothesis 
The key hypothesis tested in this study is Risk aversion has negative effect on economic 
efficiency. 
Risk preferences affect production decisions and need to be accounted for in efficiency 
analysis. Risk averse producers may choose to produce less than risk neutral or risk 
preferring individuals and be incorrectly deemed inefficient when it is only the risk 
preferences that differ (Robison and Barry 1987; Mester, 1996). 
3.4 A skewness test on OLS Residuals 
For economic efficiency estimation, it is expected that the residuals have a positive skewness; 
in other words, farmers are expected to operate above the frontier (i.e. they are operating at 
higher costs than the frontier firm) otherwise there is no justification for applying the 
stochastic frontier estimation. 
                                                 
17
 The stocking rate refers to the number of fishes stocked per unit area of pond. 
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Several distributions are assumed for the error terms in the composed error term, ߝ, including 
normal/half-normal, truncated normal, gamma, among others in the literature (see 
Kumbhakar et. al., 2015 for a review). However, as noted by Kumbhakar et. al. (2015), 
regardless of the choice of distribution, the likelihood function of a stochastic frontier model 
is highly nonlinear and estimation can be challenging. Given this potential challenge, it is 
recommended to perform a simple test on the validity of the stochastic frontier specification 
before attempting maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (Kumbhakar, 2015).  
This test on OLS residuals was proposed by Schmidt and Lin (1984). The intuition for this 
test is straightforward: for a production stochastic frontier model with the composed error, ݒ௜ െ ݑ௜, where ݑ௜ ൐  ? and ௜ distributed symmetrically around zero, the residuals from the 
corresponding OLS estimation should have negative skewness (skew to the left)18. According 
to Kumbhakar et. al., (2015), this is true regardless of the distribution function chosen for ݑ௜ in the model estimation after the pretesting. This argument is also applicable to the cost 
frontier, where the composed error, isݒ௜ ൅ ݑ௜. The distribution of the OLS residuals should 
skew to the right (positive skewness). Given that the slope coefficients of the OLS estimation 
are consistent estimates of those of the corresponding stochastic frontier model (Kumbhakar 
et. al., 2015), a test of the null hypothesis of no skewness as opposed to the alternative 
hypothesis can be constructed using the OLS residuals.  
Decision:  
If the estimated skewness has the expected sign, rejection of the ܪ଴ provides support for the 
existence of the one-sided error, ݑ௜.  
  
                                                 
18
 This is composed of the two components, ݒ௜ and ݑ௜ , where ݒ௜ is the stochastic production/noise effect, and ݑ௜; is the inefficiency component. 
65 
 
The Test Statistic:  
Schmidt and Lin (1984) proposed a simple sample-moment based static, commonly referred 
to as ඥܾଵ test and it is stated as ඥܾଵ ൌ ௠ଷ௠ଶ ?௠ଶ, Where m2 and m3 are respectively, the second 
and third moments of the OLS residuals19. The second and third sample moments of a 
random variable ݔ are  ?ሺ௫ି௫ҧሻమ௡  and  ?ሺ௫ି௫ҧሻయ௡  respectively. When the estimated value of the 
statistic above is less than 0 (at any significant level), it indicates that the residuals are 
skewed to the left, and if it is greater than 0, it shows the residuals are positively skewed. One 
may not be able to reject the null hypothesis of no skewness if the p-value is not significant at 
any level of significance. 
3.5 Stochastic frontier analysis and economic efficiency 
In deterministic models (e.g. DEA) all variation in farm outputs and performance is attributed 
to farmer inefficiencies, but this assertion is difficult to prove empirically (Forsund et. al., 
+RZHYHULWLVSODXVLEOHWKDWDIDUP¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLVDIIHFWHGE\IDFWRUVWRWDOO\RXWVLGH
the control of the farmer (e.g. bad weather condition, government policies etc.) and factors 
XQGHU WKH IDUPHU¶V FRQWURO LQHIficiency). Therefore, it is questionable to put the effects of 
external/exogenous shocks together with the effects of measurement errors and inefficiency 
into a single one-sided error term, inefficiency. The main strength of the stochastic frontier 
model is that the error term is composed of two elements: the symmetric component allows 
us to capture the random variation of the frontier across farms, as well as the effects of 
PHDVXUHPHQWHUURUDQGRWKHUVWDWLVWLFRUVWRFKDVWLFµQRLVH¶EH\RQGWKHFRQWURORIWhe farmer. 
In addition, a one-sided error term captures inefficiency among the farmers below the 
stochastic frontier (production function) or above the frontier (cost function).  
                                                 
19
 The second moment is the variance and the third moment is the kurtosis. 
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The cross-sectional stochastic frontier production function as originally proposed by Aigner 
et. al. (1997) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1997) is specified as 
௜ܻ ൌ ݂ሺݔ௜Ǣ ߚሻ ሺ߳௜ሻ ൌ ݂ሺݔ௜Ǣ ߚሻሺݒ௜ െ ݑ௜ሻ      (1) 
Where ௜ܻ is the level of output for farmer ݅, ݂ is a suitable functional form (Cobb-Douglas, 
for example), ݂ሺݔ௜Ǣ ߚሻ is the deterministic component, ݒ௜ is the stochastic production/noise 
effect, and ݑ௜; is the inefficiency component, ݔ௜ is a vector of inputs, ߚ is a vector of 
unknown parameters, ߳௜ is the composed error term, made up of two independent parts: ݒ௜ 
and ݑ௜; the former accounts for random and stochastic factors outside the control of the 
farmer ( e.g. measurement errors, weather conditions etc.) and the latter captures the 
inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier, associated with farm/farmer-specific 
characteristics; the error terms are generally related as ߳௜ ൌ ݒ௜ െ ݑ௜ (in a production function) 
or ߳௜ ൌ ݒ௜ ൅ ݑ௜ (for a cost function). It must be noted that ݒ௜ and ݑ௜ are assumed to be 
distributed independently of each other and of the regressors. 
Estimation of the parameters of the stochastic frontier is influenced significantly by 
assumptions underlying the distribution of the two elements of the composed error term 
described earlier. The error terms, ݒ௜ and ݑ௜ are assumed to be independently, identically and 
normally distributed (iid) with zero mean and constant variance, ߪ௩ଶሾݒ௜ ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪଶݒሿܽ݊݀ߪ௨ଶሾݒ௜  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪଶݑሿǡrespectively (Kumbhakar, 2000). 
The parameters may be obtained directly by either the maximum likelihood (ML) or 
corrected ordinary least square (COLS) methods, but the former is known to give more 
consistent estimates (Kumbhakar et. al., 2015) . An estimation of the stochastic frontier is 
accomplished following Battese and Corra (1977) as 
ߪଶ ൌ ߪ௩ଶ ൅ ߪ௨ଶ           (2)  
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Where ɐଶ is the total deviation from the frontier; ߪ௩ଶ is the variance arising from 
stochastic/noise factors; ߪ௨ଶ is the variance due to farmer inefficiency.  
An alternative measure of this parameter is obtained by expressing the deviation from the 
frontier due to inefficiency, ߪ௨ଶ, as a fraction of the total deviation from the frontier as 
follows: 
ߛ ൌ ఙೠమఙమ            (3) 
7KHYDOXHRIWKHSDUDPHWHUȖVKRZVWKHVKDUHRIWKHWRWDOGHYLDWLRQIURPWKHIURQWLHUGXHWR
inefficiency and stochastic noise. If the value of ߛ is close to one, it means the deviation from 
the frontier is mostly due to technical inefficiency; otherwise the stochastic random error 
dominates. Specifically, if ߛ ൌ  ?, the one-sided error component of the composed error term 
dominates the symmetric error component and the model is deterministic with no stochastic 
noise; conversely, if ߛ ൌ  ?, it implies that all the variation observed in the performance of 
farmers is attributable entirely to stochastic factors and measurement errors outside the 
control of the farmer. Where this is the case, then the ordinary least squares (OLS) is an 
adequate representation of the data. Furthermore, if  ? ൏ ߛ ൏  ?, the observed variation in 
output is due to both inefficiency and stochastic/random errors (Battese and Corra, 1977). 
The Cobb-Douglas production function is known to demonstrate self-dual properties 
(Thabethe, 2013; Amewu and Onumah, 2015), which means that it is easier to understand the 
nature of an alternative form of that function. Assuming duality, the corresponding dual cost 
frontier is expressed as: 
ܥ௜ ൌ ݃ሺ ௜ܲǢ ௜ܻǡ ߙሻሺݒ௜ ൅ ݑ௜ሻ         (4) 
Where ܥ௜ is the level of total cost of the ith farm, ௜ܲ is a vector of input prices for the ݅ݐ݄ 
farm, ௜ܻ, is the total output for the ith farm, and ߙ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. In 
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equation (4), ݑ௜ is indicative of cost inefficiency, and it shows how far above the cost frontier 
the farm operates, and ݒ௜ captures stochastic or random errors, outside the control of the 
farmer. The ݑ௜ is assumed to be independently distributed as truncation (at zero) of the 
normal distribution with mean ݖ௜ߜ and variance ߪଶݑ.  
The economic efficiency of the ith farm, ܧܧ, is obtained as the ratio of the observed cost of 
production of a given farm to the minimum/frontier cost, as 
ܧܧ ൌ ா൬ ಴೔ು೔ǡೠ೔൰ா൬ ಴೔ು೔ǡೠ೔൰ ൌ ሺሺݑ௜ȁܿ௜ ǡ ݌௜ሻሻ        (5) 
3.6 The corrected ordinary least squares approach to measuring economic efficiency  
In examining the economic efficiency of production units within the parametric framework, 
one may use the maximum likelihood procedure (for example SFA) or the COLS method. 
While the SFA is stochastic, the COLS is deterministic, therefore when both are estimated for 
the same dataset, they serve as a robustness check for each other.  
Two potential difficulties are noted with the use of the maximum likelihood (ML) procedures 
(Coelli et.al, 2005): the outcomes are affected by the size of the sample, and also there is no a 
priori justification for the assumptions underlying the distribution of the composed error 
terms20. The COLS, like the ML, is also sensitive to small sample size and outliers but it is 
easier to estimate and does not assume any distributional forms for the residuals, and also it is 
described as a consistent and efficient estimator for a frontier model (Kumbhakar et. al., 
2015). This study employs both the COLS and ML procedures to estimate the farm-specific 
economic efficiency. Before proceeding any further, a brief explanation for the COLS 
procedure is presented.  
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Theoretically, with the exception of the constant/intercept term, one can obtain consistent and 
reliable estimates for all the parameters of the model using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
procedure (Kumbhakar et. al., 2015). The OLS procedure yields an average function, 
therefore the estimates obtained would include outputs that are greater or less than the 
reference average output from the model. The COLS procedure for a production function is 
explained in greater depth in Greene (1993), and Kumbhakar et. al., (2015), but a brief 
summary for cost minimization using the COLS is provided here.  
For a cost minimization model, first, OLS is used to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates 
of the slope parameters and a consistent but biased estimated of the intercept parameter. Next, 
the entire function is shifted downwards to ensure that the adjusted function bounds 
observations above (Kumbhakar et. al., 2015). A step by step explanation of the procedure is 
provided below: 
1. At the first stage, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the standard cost 
function is run following Aigner et al., (1977) as  ݈݊ܥ௜ ൌ ݈݊ܥመכሺ ௜ܻǡ ݓ௜ሻ ൅ Ƹ݁        (6) 
Where  is natural logarithm; ୧ is the total cost of production of the ith farm; ୧ represents 
the output of fish (kg), ୧ represent the vector of input prices, and Ƹ݁ is the error term, which 
captures the departure of the cost of the ith farm from the frontier cost;   ൌ  ሺ୧ ൅ ୧ሻ 
From this estimation, one obtains consistent slope coefficients but biased intercept.  
2. One can obtain zero-mean OLS regression residual, as  Ƹ݁ ൌ ݈݊ܥ௜ െ ݈݊ܥመכሺ ௜ܻǡ ݓ௜ሻ        (7) 
3. The OLS intercept is adjusted downwards by the amount of the residual, ݉݅݊ሼ Ƹ݁ ሽ, so 
that the adjusted function now bounds observations from below. The residual 
therefore becomes  
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Ƹ݁௜ െ ݉݅݊ሼ Ƹ݁ሽǡ ൌ ݈݊ܥ௜ െ ሾ݈݊ܥመכሺ ௜ܻǡ ݓ௜ሻ ൅ ݉݅݊ሼ Ƹ݁ ሽሿ  ൒  ?     (8) 
4. An estimate of the inefficiency of the ith farmer is obtained as  Ƹ݁௜כ C? Ƹ݁௜ െ ݉݅݊ሼ Ƹ݁ሽ ൒  ?        (9) 
5. Economic efficiency, EE, of the ith farmer is thus ܧܧ෢ ௜ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሺെ Ƹ݁௜כሻ                  (10) 
This value ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates 100% cost inefficiency and 1 shows 100% 
cost efficiency.  
3.7 Explaining efficiency  
After estimating the cost efficiency, interest of researchers lies in finding and explaining the 
factors responsible for the differences in the predicted efficiencies of the farmers. Two main 
methods are used in this regard: the one-stage and two-stage approaches; the former assumes 
that the inefficiencies of farmers affect the production function outcome and therefore 
employs the stochastic frontier production function with composed error term in a single 
regression (Battese and Coelli, 1992).  
The latter method occurs in two stages:  
1. Inefficiency scores are predicted from production frontier estimation (without 
explanatory variables) 
2. The scores from (1) are regressed on explanatory variables posited to influence 
inefficiency.  
The two-stage method presumes that the explanatory variables influencing inefficiency are 
related to farmer-specific characteristics, but not the production function directly. The two-
stage approach has been criticized by Kumbhakar et. al. (1991) and Reifschneider and 
Stevenson (1991) on grounds that it gives statistically inconsistent outcomes and some of the 
assumptions of the error term, such as independent distribution are violated in the second 
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stage, and hence it is biased (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) and not as efficient as the single-
stage procedure (Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991). In spite of these criticisms, other more 
recent studies find similar or equivalent results with both methods (e.g. Kalirajan, 1991; 
Murillo-Zamorano, 2004). This study employs the two-stage approach predicated on the fact 
that we are able to prevent any possible measurement errors associated with the second stage 
from affecting the frontier coefficients (Ouattara, 2012). One important advantage of the two-
stage procedure is that is can be used for both the parametric and non-parametric models 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Therefore, this study employs the one-stage approach in the 
SFA procedure and the two-stage in the COLS procedure.  
Following Battese and Coelli (1995) I assess the influence of farm and farmer-specific 
characteristics on economic efficiency with the following inefficiency model: 
ݑ௜ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅  ? ߜ௪ܼ௜௪ ൅ ݁௜௡௪ୀଵ         (11) 
Where ߜ଴ and ߜ௪ are parameters to be estimated, ܼ௜௪ is a set of farmer-specific and farm-
specific variables explaining inefficiency; ݁ LVWKHµHUURUWHUP¶LQWKHLQHIILFLHQF\PRGHOZLWK
zero mean and finite variance, ߪఢଶ. The mean of ݑ௜, ߤ௜ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅  ? ߜ௪ܼ௜௪௡௪ୀଵ          (12) 
is farm-specific and the variances are assumed to be equal ሺߪ௨ଶ ൌ ߪఢଶሻ (Bukenya et. al., 2013).  
3.8 Empirical application 
Choosing an appropriate functional form that fits the data collected from the smallholder fish 
farmers in southern Ghana is difficult, but guided by literature (e.g. Karagiannis et. al., 2000; 
Onumah et. al., 2010) I employ the Cobb-Douglas functional form because of its duality 
property (Kumbhakar, 2000), and because it has also been used by other researchers (Amewu 
and Onumah, 2015; Coelli, 1996; Ogundari and Ojo, 2007) in similar settings.  
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The Stochastic cost function 
The empirical cost frontier is as shown below: 
݈݊ܥ௜ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ ௜ܻ ൅ ߙଶ݈݊ܲܣݎ݁ܽ௜ ൅ ߙଷ݈݊ܲܨ݅݊݃݁ݎ݈݅݊݃ݏ௜ ൅ ߙସ݈݈ܾ݊ܲܽ݋ݑݎ௜ ൅ ሺݒ௜ ൅ ݑ௜ሻ             (13) 
Where ln is the natural logarithm; ܥ௜ is total cost of production of ith farm; ௜ܻ is observed fish 
output (kg), ܲܣݎ݁ܽ௜ is the opportunity cost of pond area (GhC); ܲܨ݅݊݃݁ݎ݈݅݊݃ݏ௜ is the price 
of fingerlings (GhC); ݈ܾܲܽ݋ݑݎ௜ is the wage of labour per day (GhC), ݑ௜ is the measure of cost 
inefficiency; ݒ௜ captures stochastic/random errors. 
Determinants of cost inefficiency 
Following Lundvall and Battese (2000), the inefficiency scores, ݑ௜, are explained by farm and 
farmer-specific factors as: 
ݑ௜ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅  ? ߜ௪ܼ௜௪ ൅ ݁௜ଵଶ௪ୀଵ                    (14) 
Where ߜ and ݓ are parameters to be estimated;݁௜ are the error terms of the regression; the 
farmer/farm-specific characteristics, ܼଵȂ ܼଵଶ are respectively age, gender, marital status, 
household size, formal education, fish farming experience, main occupation, freehold tenure, 
risk attitude, and region21. These characteristics are described in some detail in Table 3.1 
(under empirical results section)  
All the parameters of the stochastic frontier cost function along with the inefficiency 
parameters are estimated simultaneously in single-stage maximum likelihood estimation. 
Economies of scale 
Since this study focuses on cost efficiency, the economies of scale becomes an important 
concept to explore. Economies of scale is the proportionate saving in cost gained by an 
increase in level of output or production. This generally results from the inverse relationship 
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between output and fixed costs per unit of output. The overall economies of scale is 
computed as the reciprocal of the total cost elasticity with respect to output as  
ܵܥܣܮܧ ൌ ଵങ೗೙಴ങ೗೙ೊ                     (15) 
Where ߲݈݊ܥȀ߲݈ܻ݊is the partial derivative of the natural logarithm of the total cost function 
with respect to the natural logarithm of output, ܻ.  
Three possible scale economies are notable: 
1. If the computed value of scale is greater than 1, it implies economies of scale 
(increasing returns to scale) exists, and that an equal proportionate increase in all outputs 
leads to a less than proportionate increase in total costs. 
2. If the computed value of scale is less than 1, it implies diseconomies of scale 
(decreasing returns to scale) exists: total costs increase more than proportionately with 
the increase in output.  
3. If the computed value of scale is equal to 1, it shows that neither economies nor 
diseconomies of scale (i.e. constant returns to scale) exists and that the farm operates 
at the optimal production level. 
3.9 Description of the data  
The data for this present study are obtained from two main sources:  
1. The data on input prices and quantities, as well as fish output are obtained from a 
survey of farmers, using face-to-face interviews involving structured questionnaires. 
2. The risk attitudes are obtained from choices of farmers in a field experiment with 
incentivised multiple price lotteries22.  
                                                 
22
 Details of this are in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
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The sampling procedure and survey techniques employed in gathering the data for this study 
are as described in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
3.9.1 Definition of variables  
Fish output in this study is the dependent variable in the stochastic frontier production 
function. It is the quantity of fish harvested by the fish farmers in kg.  
Production inputs23 
Pond Area: represents the total area of fish ponds operated by each farmer in hectares (ha). It 
is assumed that all ponds have identical depths (Onumah et. al., 2010). 
Fingerlings: The average number of fingerlings stocked in all ponds and/or cages for the 
2012/2013 season, measured as counts. 
Labour: The amount of hired and family labour employed during the production season, from 
stocking to harvesting. This is measured in man-hours. 
Input prices 
Price of land: This is the average opportunity cost of land for fish farming/ha (GhC/ha) 
Price of fingerlings: Average price of fingerlings per kg (GhC/ha) 
Wage rate of labour: Average wage rate for a day of working on a fish farm (GhC) 
Some explanatory variables for inefficiency model: 
Age is reckoned as the numerical age of the farmer in years, and it is included in the model to 
assess whether older farmer are more or less efficient. 
Education in this current study is the number of years of formal education attained by the 
farmer as of the 2012/2013 production season. The attainment of formal education of the fish 
                                                 
23
 Feed is an essential input in the production of fish, but it is excluded from here because it is not significant 
from previous regressions. 
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farmers is very important for many reasons, for instance it is positively correlated with the 
knowledge level and adoption level of improved technology (Singh, 2003). Technical 
efficiency of farmers in Ghana has also been known to positively correlate with the level of 
formal education (e.g. Onumah and Acquah, 2010), and therefore knowing the level of 
education makes it easier for appropriate programmes to be designed to improve the 
efficiency of fish farmers and subsequently the industry at large.  
Fish farming experience is the number of years a farmer has engaged in fish farming related 
activities. Like any other endeavour, the more years a farmer spends in fish production, the 
better he is expected to become and therefore more efficient.  
Household size in this study refers to the number of people who are related by family ties to 
the farmer and eat from the same pot. The size of households serves as proxy for source of 
labour for farmers.  
Fish production is main work is a dichotomous variable, taking on the value 1 if fish farming 
is the primary occupation of the respondent. Farmers may engage in other economic activities 
as a survival strategy or as a means of spreading risks. 
Access to credit is measured as a binary variable and was obtained by asking farmers if they 
had access to credit for the 2012/2013 production season; it does not distinguish between 
farmers who eventually accessed credit and those who did not. Lack of credit access has been 
linked to the inability of smallholder farmers to attain the efficient level of outcomes in their 
operations.  
Experienced past weather shocks is measured as a binary variable, taking on the value 1, if 
farmer experienced negative weather shocks in the past five years of their existence, 
especially floods. Past experiences could influence the decisions and choices made by 
farmers, such as the levels and timings of input use, and these could affect the final outcomes 
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of the farm. It is pertinent to assess how this attribute affects the efficiency of production 
among farmers in this study.  
Attitudes to risk is calculated based on the row of switch from the safe to the risky lottery, 
based on an adapted version of the CRRA utility function modelled after Tanaka et. al., 
(2010) and Brick et. al., (2012). The full elicitation and calculation are explained in Chapter 2 
of this thesis. In this chapter, I employ the calculated risk attitude measures as an explanatory 
variable for cost efficiency. Theoretically, risk attitudes could influence efficiency of 
production as it could affect the decisions farmers make in the choice of input/output mixes, 
therefore I included this variable to assess if and how it influences the cost efficiencies of the 
farmers in a developing country setting. 
3.10 Empirical results  
3.10.1 Descriptive statistics  
A summary of the data is presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below. The first table shows the 
variables that are posited to influence the efficiency of production, while the second table 
provides a summary of the production output, factors of production and factor prices. As may 
be seen in Table 3.1, the average age of farmers in the sample is about 41 years, about 73% of 
the farmers had experienced some weather shocks in the past five years, and the average 
farmer is risk averse (CRRA=2.35). About 92% of the fish farmers are males, marginally 
lower than 93% reported by Crentsil and Essilfie (2014), but slightly higher than 91% 
observed by Onumah and Acquah (2010) for fish farmers in Ghana. Fish farming in Ghana is 
a male-dominated enterprise, mostly because it is labour-intensive, however, it is observed 
that women participate significantly in this enterprise by selling the fish to the rural 
community and in markets on market days (Crentsil and Essilfie, 2014). The average farmer 
has 5.47 years of fish farming experience, which is lower than 8.31 years of experience 
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reported by Asamoah et. al. (2012). In terms of main occupation, fish production is the main 
work of 71% of the farmers.  
Shifting attention to production elements, the average output of fish for the sample was 
155kg, produced with an average of 0.16 ha of pond area, and 614 pieces of fingerlings. The 
average opportunity cost of land, fingerlings and labour wage were GhC3854.17/ha, 
GhC33.63/kg, and GhC26.50/day respectively.  
Table 3.1: Summary of determinants of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency 
Variable Description  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Age Years 41.93 13.19 19 72 
Married 1=Married  0.74 0.44 0 1 
Years of formal education Years 9.83 4.61 0 21 
Household size Number  6.08 3.02 1 15 
Fish farming experience Years  5.47 5.35 1 30 
Male 1= Male 0.92 0.28 0 1 
Christian 1= Christian 0.91 0.29 0 1 
Own House 1= Owns house 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Number of Rooms Number  4.23 2.67 1 15 
Credit Access 1= Had access 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Membership in FFA 1 = Member  0.29 0.45 0 1 
Freehold  1 = Freehold 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Fish Production is main work 1= Fish farming is main work  0.71 0.45 0 1 
Greater Accra Region 1=Operates in Greater Accra 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Volta Region 1=Operates in Volta 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Ashanti Region 1 = Operates in Ashanti 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Western 1= Operates in Western 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Experienced past weather shock 1= Experienced shock 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Risk attitude Measures      
CRRA Coefficient of relative risk aversion  2.35 2.45 0.30 6.58 
SRRA Self-Reported Risk Attitude  5.39 3.22 0.00 10.00 
TCN Parameters      
ı Risk Aversion (Utility curvature) 0.89 0.52 0.05 1.50 
Į Probability Weighting function 0.53 0.23 0.05 1.10 
Ȝ Loss Aversion Parameter 1.98 2.61 0.12 11.98 
Source: Survey results, 2014  
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Table 3.2: Description and summary of variables used in the efficiency analysis 




kg The total weight of fish harvested 
at the end of the 2012/2013 fish 
farming season. This included the 
fish sold, consumed, and given as 
gift to family and friends. 
65 13170 1556.69 2113.95 
Pond area ha This is the total size of all active 
ponds and/or cages, originally in 
m2 but converted to ha by dividing 
by 10,000 
0.01 2.88 0.16 0.32 
Fingerlings Count The average number of fingerlings 
stocked in all ponds and/or cages 
for the 2012/2013 season 
23 4320 614.86 716.42 
Labour Man-
hours 
The amount of hired and family 
labour employed during the 
production season, from stocking 
to harvesting 
576 188894 5490.38 4239.53 
Price of 
land24 
GhC25 This is the average opportunity 
cost of land for fish farming  
3300.00 4700.00 3854.17 585.09 
Price of 
fingerlings 
GhC Average price of fingerlings per kg  30.00 40.00 33.63 3.66 
Wage rate 
of labour  
GhC Average wage rate for a day of 
working on a fish farm 
17.50 32.50 26.50 5.01 
Source: Survey results, 2014  
                                                 
24
 This is similar to values obtained from Nunoo et al., 2012. 
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3.10.2 Hypothesis testing 
1. OLS regression outcome: 
The first step in the skewness test is to run an OLS regression. The results from the OLS 
regression are as shown below. It shows that all but the price of fingerlings were significant 
in the cost of production. These results are discussed in more depth in the results section.  





ln Price of Labour 2.623* 
(1.406) 
ln Price of Fingerlings 2.557 
(2.739) 
ln Price of Land -1.223** 
(0.470) 




R-squared  0.301 
Prob>F 0.000 
Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. There are 120 farmers in 
the analyses. Here, the Cobb-Douglas cost function is linearized with natural logarithm. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of total cost of production. Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors.  
2. Skewness test outcome 
The point estimate of the statistic, ඥܾଵ is obtained from the summary statistic of the OLS 
residuals, ݁. The test statistic,ඥܾଵODEHOOHGDVµVNHZQHVV¶LQWKHRXWFRPHEHORZKDVDYDlue of 
-0.139. The negative sign shows that the distribution of the residuals skews to the left, which 




Table 3.4: Results from Skewness Test 
Variable Value 
Mean -4.81x10-10 




Number of Observations 120 
Notes: This table summarises the outcome of the skewness test on the residuals from the OLS 
regression 
3. Statistical test: 
The test returns a p-value (0.515) that is greater than 0.10, therefore I am not able to reject the 
null hypothesis of no skewness at any level of significance. This means the data is normally 
distributed. This may affect the results obtained, as explained later in this chapter.  
Table 3.5: Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
Variable Value 
Pr (Skewness) 0.515 
Pr (Kurtosis) 0.373 
Chi Square (df=2) 1.22 
Prob>Chi Square 0.544 
 
4. Graph for showing skewness  
The graph below gives some visual evidence to the absence of skewness in the residuals of 
the error term in the data. It may be seen that the distribution of the residuals is not skewed to 




Figure 3.1: Distribution of OLS residuals from cost estimation 
3.10.3 SFA and COLS model estimates of economic efficiency 
7KH VLJQ RI WKH µVNHZQHVV¶ VKRZV WKDW WKH UHVLGXDOV DUH QHJDWLYHO\ VNHZHG FRQWUDU\ WR
expectation for a stochastic frontier cost model. This wrong skewness is not unique to this 
dataset. Hafner et. al. (2016) indicates that this is a common phenomenon with the classic 
stochastic frontier model, and especially magnified for smaller samples, such as in this study. 
Hafner et. al. (2016) posit that the wrong skewness may persist even when the model is 
accurately specified26. This current study focuses on finding out if any variation in the cost of 
production can be explained by the risk attitudes of the farmers, and the correction of the 
skewness of the data is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is acknowledged that the 
wrong skewness in the data could affect the results; therefore the results should be interpreted 
taking this into account. The justification for using the SFA in spite of the above concerns 
stated is that ³stochastic models are more reliable than deterministic models because the 
former accounts for statistical noise´%UDYR-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993).  
                                                 
26
 For alternative tests and solutions suggested in the literature the reader is referred to Ahmad and Li (1997), 







-.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Model 2: OLS Cost
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Table 3.6 presents a summary of the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of the 
cost functions for both the SFA and COLS. All the variables in the cost frontier for the SFA 
model have positive and significant effects on the total cost of production, except opportunity 
cost of pond area, which has a negative coefficient. The positive coefficients show that total 
costs increase monotonically with an increase in the prices of the inputs, as well as the output.  
The negative coefficient of price of pond area suggests that an increase in the opportunity 
cost of pond area leads to a reduction in the total costs of fish production.  
Notable of mention is the coefficient of the ݈ܻ݊ variable: the positive coefficient shows that 
as output of fish increases, the total cost of fish production also increases, which is as 
expected.  
The estimate of the variance parameter, ߛ, shows that only about 19.30% of the variation in 
the total cost of production of fish farmers is due to cost inefficiency27, hence the deviation 
from the frontier cost frontier is dominated by noise or stochastic factors, outside the control 
RIWKHIDUPHUV7KHORZYDOXHRIȖPHDQVWKDWPRVWRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVREVHUYHGLQWKHFRVWRI
production of the farmers in this current study are attributable to potential measurement 
errors, and other factors not under the control of the farmer.  
The resultant estimated Cobb-Douglas cost function is: 
݈݊ܥ௜ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܮ݊ܲܣݎ݁ܽ௜ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܲܨ݅݊݃݁ݎ݈݅݊݃ݏ௜ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?݈݊ ܲܮܾܽ݋ݑݎ௜ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?݈݊ ௜ܻ (16) 
The outcome from the COLS estimation is as seen in the fourth column of Table 3.6. This 
RXWFRPHLVUHSRUWHGDVDµFKHFN¶RQWKH6)$)RUWKHDYHUDJHIXQFWLRQVLPLODUUHVXOWVWRWKH
SFA are observed: the variables have the same signs as reported for the SFA, except that the 
values are smaller in magnitude, and the coefficient of the price of fingerlings is not 
                                                 
27
 This implies that 80.7% of the variation is due to stochastic factors 
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significant. In general, the results from the COLS are very similar to those obtained with 
SFA.  
Economic efficiency arises from optimizing behaviour relating to both outputs and inputs 
ZKHUHDIDUPHU¶VREMHFWLYHLVWRPLQLPL]HWKHFRVWRIDXQLWRIILVKRXWSXW'RQJHWDO
Economies of scale exist in fish production in the study area; the value 4.56 (i.e. ଵ଴Ǥଶଵଽ) is 
greater than one (1). This means that on average, the farmers can save operating costs by 
scaling up their current production. 
3.10.4 Economic efficiency analysis 
To better understand the factors driving the differences in the economic efficiency among the 
fish farmers, this study explores the determinants of economic efficiency. The outcome of 
this exploration is found in the lower section of Table 3.6 below.  
For the COLS model, Age and Married (marital status) have significant positive and negative 
effects respectively on the economic efficiency of the farmers28. These show that while 
economic efficiency improves with age (possibly to experience over time), it decreases with 
marital status, that is, married people are less cost efficient in fish production.  
Before discussing the inefficiency outcomes for the SFA, it is pertinent to point out that the 
diagnostic tests show that most of the observed variation (over 80%) in the cost of production 
of the farmers is due to stochastic errors, rather than farmer inefficiency29. Furthermore, the 
residual test indicates that this data exhibits the wrong skewness, and therefore the 
implication is that stochastic/random errors dominate the composed error term. The 
efficiency model outcome from the SFA shows that none of the variables hypothesized to 
influence efficiency has any significant coefficients. 
                                                 
28
 As previously indicated, this model is deterministic and assumes that all deviations from the frontier are due 
to farmer inefficiencies, and therefore may be sensitive to outliers and measurement errors. 
29
 This is derived from the Ȗ value of 0.193, i.e. 1-0.193=0.807 
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Table 3.6: Estimates of the SFA and COLS cost frontier function and inefficiency model 
Variable Parameter Stochastic Frontier COLS  
 Average Function   










































































Sigma-6TXDUHGı2) ı2 0.483 
(0.143) 
 
Gamma Ȗ 0.193 
(0.212) 
 
R-Squared (R2) R2  0.079 
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. There are 120 farmers in the 
analyses. The dependent variable in the single-stage SFA is the total cost of production; for the COLS 





The efficiency model outcome from the SFA shows that none of the variables hypothesized 
to influence efficiency has any significant coefficients. The hypothesis of interest, as far as 
this chapter is concerned, is the effect of risk attitudes on the efficiency of fish production. As 
confirmed by the outcome of the hypothesis testing, there is no significant effect 
(coefficient=-0.127, t-ratio=-1.437) of risk attitudes on economic efficiency from the 
maximum likelihood estimation. This outcome suggests that the variation in the total cost of 
production among the fish farmers in the sample is not significantly affected by the 
differences in the risk attitudes of the farmers at any significant level. This means that 
IDUPHUV¶ REMHFWLYH RI Fost minimisation is affected by factors other than risk attitudes. 
However, this must be explained with caution, as most of the variance in the observed total 
costs is due to stochastic factors outside the control of the farmers, rather than famer-specific 
inefficiency. While none of the explanatory variables was significant in explaining 
in(efficiency) in the SFA, Age and Married (marital status) are significant in the COLS 
estimation. In both models, the coefficient of risk attitudes has no significant effect on the 
cost of production among farmers in this study. In other words, the fact that similar outcomes 
are obtained for risk attitudes from both the SFA and COLS may suggest that the effect of 
risk attitudes on cost of production is not sensitive to the method of analysis.  
3.10.5 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter investigates the effect of risk attitudes on the economic efficiency of 120 
smallholder fish farmers in southern Ghana using both SFA and COLS estimation 
procedures. Both the single-stage and two-stage maximum likelihood estimation procedures 
are employed in this study. The risk attitudes of the fish farmers are elicited through a field 
experiment, composed of incentivised multiple price lotteries.  
Before analysing the data using the stochastic frontier cost procedure, the skewness of the 
error terms is assessed, since this gives an indication as to the appropriateness of the 
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estimation procedure, given the data. The outcome of this assessment reveals that the 
residuals are normally distributed, contrary to the expectation of a positive skewness for cost 
frontier estimation. This may have resulted from the small sample size as well as possible 
measurement errors arising from data collection.  
The variable of interest is the risk attitude; but there is no significant effect of this variable on 
economic efficiency of the fish farmers. If this outcome was sensitive to the method of 
analysis, then it is expected that the SFA outcome will be different from that from the COLS. 
This is because while the COLS is deterministic and attributes all deviations from the cost 
frontier to the inefficiency of farmers, the SFA disaggregates the deviation into inefficiency 
(farmer-specific) and stochastic factors (outside the control of the farmers). The results show 
that risk attitudes provide no significant explanation for the differences in economic 
efficiency among the fish farmers; therefore it is possible to conclude that this outcome is not 
sensitive to the method of estimation.  
In terms of the elasticity of total cost of production with respect to total output of fish, the 
result shows that economies of scale exists in the production of fish in the study area. This 
result suggests that regardless of their farm sizes, farmers experience on average, a decrease 
in total operating costs given the available technology and the underlying functional form 
assumed for the cost function (Cobb-Douglas). Furthermore, the derived scale outcome 
shows that there is increasing returns to scale in the production of fish in the study area, and 
thus scaling all inputs of production will result in more than proportionate increase in the 
output of fish. From a policy perspective, if the government aims to improve the production 
of fish in the study area, efforts should be geared towards equipping the farmers with the 
necessary assistance to scale up their current levels of production to benefit from the 
increasing returns to scale.  
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Most of the farmers did not have written down and up-to-date records of all their 
expenditures, outputs and even prices, therefore they relied on their memories to recall some 
of the vital information (recall bias). Recall bias, usually resulting from faulty memory, has 
been cited in the literature as a potential source of reporting error that leads survey estimates 
to deviate from actual values (Beegle et. al., 2012). It is possible that some of the data given 
by the farmers were either overstated or understated and these could impact the outcome of 
the analysis. The evidence of this assertion is seen in the economic efficiency estimation, 
where none of the farmer/farm-specific characteristics significantly affects the estimated 
efficiencies of the farmers.  
)XUWKHUPRUHWKHYDOXHRIȖ (see Table 3.6), which shows the proportion of the total variance 
in the cost of production attributable to inefficiency of the farmers, shows that less than 20% 
of the observed variance is due to inefficiency. The implication is that most of the variation 
observed in the total cost of production is due to stochastic factors, beyond the control of the 
farmer, rather than inefficiencies of the farmers. 
Overall, the findings of the study indicate that stochastic factors, for instance weather shocks, 
input price shocks and measurement errors account for greater proportion of the variation 
observed among farmers in terms of cost efficiency; farmer-specific characteristics have on 
average no significant impact on the performance of the farmers. Therefore, improvement in 
the overall economic efficiency of fish production in the study area may depend more on 
government policies and interventions rather than farmer-specific characteristics, such as risk 
attitudes. Also, to improve outcomes of future research in the study area, there is a need to 
educate and equip fish farmers on proper records keeping to ensure that more accurate 
records are obtained from them for analysis. This may be facilitated by extension outreach 
efforts through practical demonstration and providing incentives to ensure farmers keep 
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record of all transactions and production outcomes in log books that would be inspected and 
tracked by extension agents. Another recommendation will be to increase the number of 
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Effect of Risk Attitudes on the Speed of Adopting Aquaculture Technologies in Ghana 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter combines experimental data and survey information to investigate how risk 
attitudes affect the speed of technology adoption among smallholder fish farmers in a 
developing country context. Policy makers and development agencies are often confronted 
with the objective of speeding up the growth of the agricultural sector in order to ensure food 
security (Dadi et al., 2004). Speeding up technology adoption is important because when 
adopted at the right time, an improved technology could lead to improvements not only in the 
productivity of farms, but also the livelihoods of farmers and their families (Fuglie and 
Kascak, 2001; Batz et al., 2003). Furthermore, policy makers may choose to invest in a 
technology that is more readily adopted because production increases in the early years of 
adoption have a much greater impact on the rate of return on capital investment than 
increases in later years (Hazell and Anderson, 1986). Also, the speed of adopting a 
technology may have a bearing on the survival of farms: if more farmers adopt the 
technology early, it is likely to result in lower output prices and conversely lead to increases 
in input prices. Where this is the case, marginal farmers who delay their adoption may be 
adversely affected (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001).  
Given the documented vast benefits of adopting new and improved technologies speedily, it 
is puzzling that there is slow and sometimes incomplete adoption of agricultural technologies. 
This may be explained by differences in farm and farmer-specific characteristics, such as risk 
attitudes (Ward and Singh, 2015). This chapter therefore seeks to answer the question how do 
risk attitudes affect the speed with which smallholder fish farmers adopt technologies? To 
address this question, risk attitude measures of 120 farmers are elicited with multiple price 
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lottery experiments in the field. This is then combined with information on the actual 
technology adoption choices of the same farmers obtained through a field survey. The speed 
of technology adoption is then analysed using duration models. 
Generally, new farming technologies present more uncertainty than do conventional 
technologies (Engle-Warnick et. al., 2011; Liu, 2013); therefore risk-averse farmers would be 
less likely to adopt new technologies or may adopt technologies later. As to whether this 
assertion holds true for all technologies requires empirical exploration (Barham et. al., 2014). 
Furthermore, some previous studies of technology adoption consider the adoption decision as 
a static binary choice, without considering time (e.g. Feder et. al., 1985). However, the 
decision to adopt a technology is a dynamic process, which may change with time; therefore, 
the static analyses, usually carried out with probit or logit models have limitations in terms of 
inferences that are drawn from the outcomes. Thus, to overcome this limitation, this present 
study uses duration/survival models, which acknowledge the length of time it takes to adopt a 
technology and the factors that drive these choices. A key advantage of the duration models 
over static binary model (such as logit and probit) is that they account for the influence of 
time in the uptake of new technologies and therefore they provide better information for 
policy promulgation (Burton et. al., 2003).  
Contextually, this study focuses on the adoption of Floating Cages, Extruded Feed and 
Akosombo Strain of Tilapia (AST) technologies in southern Ghana. For the past two decades, 
aquaculture has gained much attention, because it is perceived as a way to bridge the gap 
between the demand and supply of fish (Onumah and Acquah, 2011). In Ghana, fish 
production is a significant contributor to the economy; the sector contributes about 5% to the 
gross domestic product (GDP), and annual per capita fish consumption is about 20-25 kg, 
which is higher than the world average of 18 kg. Additionally, 60% of animal protein in the 
diets of Ghanaians is from fish (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2012). Over the years, 
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the government of Ghana and other development agencies have introduced improved 
technologies to enhance the productivity and profitability of the sector, but not much is 
known about the adoption of these technologies and how long it takes before farmers adopt 
the technologies and the factors driving such adoption decisions.  
A novel result from this chapter is that contrary to most existing literature on speed of 
technology adoption (e.g. Liu, 2013), I find that risk averse farmers are more likely to adopt 
the AST, Extruded Feed and Floating Cage technologies earlier. The findings are also 
consistent with the assumption that the Extruded Feed and the AST are substitutes in the 
production process in the study area. There is no significant correlation between the decision 
to adopt Floating Cages and any of the other two technologies.  
One possible reason the main result from this study differs from other adoption studies (e.g. 
Liu, 2013) may be the nature of the technologies in question, as perceived by the farmers. For 
instance, Liu (2013) focuses on the adoption of cotton modified genetically with Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) bacteria, which enables the cotton plants to produce phytotoxins to kill 
pests. The subjective risks posed by these phytotoxins to the farmers themselves may be a 
source of uncertainty and a likely reason for the delayed adoption by risk averse farmers. 
However, in this present study, the AST is also genetically modified, but it produces no 
toxins and yet it is more disease-resistant than the local breeds, therefore it may be perceived 
by the farmers as risk-reducing and hence it may not be surprising that risk averse farmers 
adopt this technology earlier. A possible explanation for why the Extruded Feed is also 
adopted earlier by risk averse farmers may be because it reduces the risk of water pollution 
and contamination associated with the sinking conventional feed, which could pose a threat to 
the health of the fish and the environment. In like manner, the Floating Cage technology 
reduces the risk of fish mortality in conventional ponds since they are enclosed in nets and 
therefore not easily accessible to possible natural predators in other water bodies. Thus, I 
99 
 
believe this may explain why risk averse farmers are likely to adopt these technologies 
earlier.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section is a review of the literature, 
followed by a discussion of the duration model of technology adoption. The next main 
section presents the empirical application of the duration model in technology adoption. After 
that, the data and variables are described, followed by the results, summary and conclusion. 
4.2 Review of literature  
In this section, I examine the literature on technology adoption, and I present some general 
definition of adoption, determinants of the speed of adoption, empirical application of 
duration analysis in the adoption of technology and conclude with a summary of the section. 
4.2.1 Definition and concept of technology adoption 
Technology refers to some knowledge, information acquired or applied to accomplish a given 
objective, such as a service or product (Enos and Park, 1988). The decision to use such 
knowledge or information or the outcome of accepting such a decision is generally termed 
adoption (Haillu Beyene, 2008). A more synthesised definition of the term adoption is as 
provided in the review by Feder et. al. DV³a mental process an individual passes from 
first hearing about an innovation to final utilization´7KLVGHILQLWLRQVKRZVWKDWDGRSWLRQLV
not a one-point-in time event, but a series of thought processes that yield the final decision to 
use or not use a given innovation, after the innovation has become available and accessible to 
the farmer. Technology use begins with an individual or a group of individuals (adoption) 
and then spreads within a region or population (diffusion or aggregate adoption) (Haillu 
Beyene, 2008).  
For policy considerations, a distinction is often made between rate/speed of adoption and 
intensity of adoption. The former relates to the relative speed with which farmers adopt a 
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technology and therefore has a temporal element embedded, while the latter refers to the level 
of use of a given technology in any period. The only justification for the introduction of or 
the adoption of a new technology is when it does or is perceived to have an advantage over 
the conventional practices (Rogers, 1995). For instance, in this present study, Extruded Feed 
is posited to result in relatively faster rate of fish growth (up to 100%) because of its 
bioavailable protein content.  
Final adoption decision may be seen as an outcome of many preceding decisions, beginning 
with awareness of the technology (Rogers, 1983), followed by interest, evaluation, 
acceptance, trial, and eventual adoption (Lionberger, 1960). These stages are not mutually 
exclusive events, but rather occur concurrently; however, it is difficult to distinguish one 
stage from another, and in some cases not all stages actually occur before adoption. Diffusion 
of a technology on the other hand involves learning (by observing or doing) over time 
(Rogers, 1995), and the average time lapse from awareness to adoption is influenced 
negatively or positively by heterogeneity arising from person, place or practice. 
4.2.2 Measurement of technology adoption  
The measurement of adoption is essentially a measurement of choices of people at a given 
point or over a period of time. Adoption can be measured by estimating the rate or the 
intensity of use of the technology, depending on the nature of the data. The technology 
adoption decision also involves the choice of how resources, like land, should be allocated to 
the new improved and old technologies if the technology is not divisible (e.g. mechanization, 
irrigation) (Feder et. al., 1985). Conversely, if the technology is divisible (e.g. improved seed, 
feed, fertilizer, agronomic practices and herbicide), the decision process involves area 
allocations as well as levels of use or rate of application. Therefore, the adoption decision 
includes the simultaneous choice of whether to adopt a technology or not, and the rate and 
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intensity of its use. The current study focuses on the rate of adoption or the length of time it 
takes before a farmer uses a technology, given that the technology is available. 
4.2.3 The roles of risk and risk aversion in technology adoption 
Farm households face many risks, which are even greater in developing countries where risks 
are either production-related (mostly environment and weather-related variability) or price-
related (input and output prices) (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). These risks influence many 
economic decisions of farmers, including technology adoption. This is because the 
livelihoods of farmers, from consumption and sales of their outputs, depend on the yields 
from their farms. When farmers adopt a new technology, they are exposed to uncertain 
returns on their investment in that technology. Therefore, switching from a conventional to an 
improved technology (mostly more expensive) is an inherently risky decision, especially 
where the new technology entails greater risks. In developing countries where the markets for 
insurance, credits and savings are absent or inefficient, a bad farming outcome can potentially 
have very serious and sometimes long-term impacts on the welfare of the farmers and their 
families. Thus, under such circumstances, farmers are more likely to make suboptimal 
farming choices that reduce their risk exposure at the expense of productive efficiency 
(Morduch, 1995). This may explain why risk averse farmers are more likely to continue to 
use conventional technologies with low profitability rather than risk adopting new and 
improved technologies. But this could thrust them into permanent food insecurity conditions 
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011).  
A number of studies have found significant correlation between risk attitudes and technology 
adoption (Binswanger, 1980; Feder, 1980, Feder et. al, 1985; Engle-Warnick et. al., 2007; 
Liu, 2013; Holden, 2015). Vast empirical evidence suggests that farmers are risk averse 
(Binswanger, 1980; Saha et al, 1994; Kim and Chavas, 2003). Risk aversion is the aversion to a 
set of outcomes with a known probability distribution (Pratt, 1964).  
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Despite the vast number of articles published in this field, there seems to be different 
outcomes in the measurement of risk attitudes, and how they influence technology adoption 
GHFLVLRQV7KHUHDVRQIRU WKLV ODFNRIFRQVHQVXVFRXOGEHGXH WR WKHµFRPSOH[G\QDPLFVRI
WHFKQRORJ\ DGRSWLRQ SURFHVV¶ 0RVHU DQG %DUUHWW  in Mukasa, 2016), as well as the 
structural differences in agriculture around the globe. Another reason stems from different 
methodological approaches adopted by the researchers (Mukasa, 2016). 
4.2.4 Speed and determinants of technology adoption  
The speed of adoption is usually measured by the length of time required for a farmer to use a 
given technology, from the time the farmer learns about the existence of the technology (Dadi 
et. al., 2004). Since the decision to adopt or not adopt a technology is subjective, the 
perception of prospective farmers regarding the attributes of the new technology influences 
the speed with which adoption takes place (Haillu Beyene, 2008). If a technology is 
perceived as being risk-reducing (such as drought-resistant varieties in a drought-prone area), 
it is likely that that the speed of adoption will be faster. Thus, a key determinant of the rate of 
adoption is the technology itself. As noted by Rogers (1983), for instance, five characteristics 
of technology that can influence the rate of adoption include relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, divisibility, and observability. In addition, Supe (1983) identifies 
two other characteristics, which are variations in the cost of adoption and group action 
requirements of the technology. Supe (1983) explained further that technologies which 
require group actions for adoption (e.g., drainage and watershed management) are adopted 
slowly compared to technologies that are taken up entirely on individual basis (e.g. feed, 
fertilizer). 
The speed of technology adoption is also affected by the interaction of factors inherent in the 
technology and external factors. For instance, the speed of adopting more profitable or less 
103 
 
risky technologies is expected to be faster, but profitability could be a function of other 
factors such as commodity prices and agro-climatic conditions, thus rainfall and prices may 
have indirect influences on the speed of adoption of a given technology (Bulti, 2013). 
4.2.5 Explaining the trend of adoption of technologies 
Researchers have tried to explain the process of technology adoption and diffusion by 
propounding many theories. One of these strands of theory in the literature is the epidemic 
theory of diffusion. This theory suggests that diffusion is the disequilibrium/epidemic process 
resulting from asymmetry of information between potential users (e.g. Mansfield, 1968). 
Another strand of theory contrary to the epidemic theories is the equilibrium theory, which 
assumes perfect information regarding the existence and nature of new technologies. A 
IDUPHU¶VGHFLVLRQWRRUQRWWRDGRSWDQHZWHFKQRORJ\GHSHQGVRQWhe perceived costs and 
benefits from using or not using the technology; in other words a farmer will adopt a 
technology if the perceived net benefit from adopting the technology is positive (Abdulai and 
Huffman, 2005). 
Karshenas and Stoneman (1995) group these equilibrium theories into three main categories, 
namely rank or probit, stock or game theoretic, and order effects. In the rank models, firm-
level heterogeneity among potential users of a new technology means that some firms can 
achieve greater profits from using the new technology than others, and as such, they will 
adopt earlier (Ireland and Stoneman, 1986).  
The stock (game theoretic) effect posits that the benefits from a technology adoption by a 
marginal firm is negatively related to the cumulative number of previous adopters; when the 
technology is novel, early adopters have a competitive advantage, but as the technology 
becomes more commonly used by other firms, no firm has an advantage, because as the 
number of adopters increases the overall industry output increases affecting the process and 
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SURILWDELOLW\ $EGXODL DQG +XIIPDQ  ,Q WKH RUGHU HIIHFWV D ILUP¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH
succession of adopters (later or early) determines its net return: earlier adopters obtain a 
greater return than later adopters do. 
In addition to the above, the general literature on technology adoption is moving in three 
identifiable directions: one strand focuses on the econometric and modelling techniques (e.g. 
Besley and Case (1993), Staal et. al. (2002)). Another strand looks at learning and social 
networks in adoption choices (e.g. Conley and Udry, 2010), and the last strand is mainly 
based on context-specific micro-level studies with special emphasis on local data for policy 
reasons (Doss, 2006).  
The adoption of technology is multi-faceted, and not just a single point in time decision. To 
adopt a technology a farmer goes through three simultaneous choices: to adopt components 
of the technology or the full package, the allocation of different technologies across his farm 
and how much of complementary inputs to apply (Smale, 1995). 
Technology adoption decisions are generally dynamic in nature, and therefore panel data is 
best suited for such studies; however, cross-sectional analysis at the micro-level can answer 
important questions about technology use (Doss et. al., 2003); for instance these studies help 
XVWRNQRZZKDWFURSVIDUPHUVDUHDFWXDOO\JURZLQJLQWKHLUILHOGVIDUPHUV¶GHFLVLRQ-making 
SURFHVVHV IDUPHUV¶ SUHIHUHQFHV SUHYDLOLQJ ZHDWKHU FRQGLWLRQV LQ VSHFLfic areas as well as 
IDUPHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRI WKHFRQVWUDLQWV WKH\ IDFH LQ WKHLU VSHFLILF ORFDWLRQV ,QRWKHUZRUGV
WKHVH VWXGLHV H[SODLQ µZKDW IDUPHUV DUH FXUUHQWO\ GRLQJ¶ DQG WKH IDFWRUV LQIOXHQFLQJ VXFK




4.2.6 Modelling technology adoption  
Generally, empirical models used in adoption studies that examine farm-level behaviour are 
logit or probit; these explain the probability of a farm adopting a new technology at a given 
time. These models do not explicitly address the effects of explanatory variables on the time-
path of adoption, which is an important aspect of the adoption process, especially for 
technologies for fish production. Furthermore, most adoption studies (e.g. Bandiera and 
Rasul, 2006; Teklewold et. al., 2013) in developing countries fail to consider the timing to 
adoption. However, including the time it takes to adopt a technology in adoption analysis 
furnishes us with very important information (Beyene and Kassie, 2015) such as how risk 
attitude affects the decision to adopt technologies. 
By employing a hazard/survival model to examine the factors affecting the timing of 
adoption of technologies in fish production this study bridges the gap between empirical 
studies that analyse adoption with discrete choice models (logit/probit models), and the time-
path of diffusion (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005) as well as the factors that influence the 
choices of the farmers (Matuschke and Qaim, 2008). How soon farmers adopt technologies is 
crucial from the perspective of productivity and survival of farms (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). 
This is because greater impact on the rate of return on capital results from earlier adoption of 
technology, thereby justifying policy intervention.  
Thus, by using duration analysis to explore the determinants of the length of time required for 
smallholder fish farmers to adopt improved technologies this present study contributes to the 
existing literature in three ways. First, most empirical studies on the adoption and diffusion of 
high-yielding technologies in developing countries focus on the crop sector (e.g. Liu, 2013, 
cotton, China; Suzuki, 2014, pineapple, Ghana). Therefore the study of the timing of adoption 
of technologies related to fish farming is essential to the profitability and sustainability of the 
industry. Secondly, unlike many others, this study focuses on three improved technologies 
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posited to enhance productivity of fish farmers30. These technologies are the AST, 
floating/Extruded Feed and Floating Cages. By focussing on three technologies, one is able to 
assess whether different factors influence the adoption of different technologies differently; 
as well as the complementarity or substitutability among technologies.  
Finally, in addition to the many factors usually considered in the analysis of adoption 
decisions I include risk attitudes of fish farmers. These risk attitude measures are obtained 
from incentivised field experiments involving multiple price lotteries. Risk and risk attitudes 
influence decisions of farmers, and farmers are generally thought to be risk averse 
(Binswanger, 1980), and that risk averse farmers adopt technologies later (Liu, 2013). 
Therefore, by including risk attitude measures in the duration analysis it is possible to 
determine the possible channels through which risk attitudes influence the time to adoption of 
the three technologies. Here, the risk attitude of farmers is posited to influence the timing to 
adopt three technologies in the production of fish. 
4.2.7 Related empirical literature 
Since the review of the technology adoption literature by Feder et. al. (1985) many studies 
have been carried out to study adoption decisions; the literature in this area is vast. However, 
the literature on technology adoption decisions of fish farmers, particularly in developing 
countries is scanty (Ansah et. al., 2014). In this section, I will focus on three studies that are 
of most significance to my current study. The first two papers were selected because they 
measure risk attitudes of farmers and use these measures to explain various technology 
adoption decisions, in developing countries. The third paper was selected because it 
                                                 
30
 Fuglie and Kascak (2001) also study the duration of adoption of three technologies-conservation 





characterises the adoption of environmental best management practices in pond aquaculture 
in Ghana, the study area for this present chapter.  
Liu (2013) elicits the risk attitudes, as well as the loss aversion and probability weighting 
parameters from a utility function, and examines how these traits affect the speed of adoption 
of cotton genetically modified with Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) among cotton farmers in 
China. Unlike most prior studies which mostly measure adoption as a dichotomous variable 
at a point in time (e.g. Knight et. al., 2003), Liu (2013) models adoption as the time lapse 
from knowing about the technology and actually using the technology. This study also 
expands the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility to incorporate prospect 
theory. She finds that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt Bt cotton 
later. Farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt Bt cotton earlier.  
Ward et. al. (2014) conduct a series of field experiments in rural India in order to measure 
preferences related to risk, potential loss, and ambiguity. They find that on average women 
are significantly more risk averse and loss averse than men, though the higher average risk 
aversion arises due to a greater share of women who are extremely risk averse. Coupling 
these behavioural parameters with a discrete choice experiment designed to study preferences 
for drought-tolerant (DT) rice, they observe thDWIDUPHUV¶ULVNDQGORVVDYHUVLRQLQWHUDFWZLWK
their perceptions about the potential risks and losses associated with the new seeds. They find 
that both risk aversion and loss aversion significantly increase the probability that farmers 
will choose the newer seeds: farmers are more likely to experiment with new seeds that 
provide some form of yield benefit, whether it is a reduction in variability or protection 




Ansah et. al. (2014) employ ordered logistic framework to assess the determinants of the 
simultaneous adoption of two environmental best management practices (BMP): water reuse 
and commercial Extruded Feed on pond fish farms in Ghana. In addition, they determine the 
rate of adoption and effectiveness of three techniques for diffusing the BMP to nonusers. 
They show that awareness, perceived relative profitability of the water reuse technology and 
years of experience have the strongest influence on the simultaneous adoption of the BMPs, 
and that the most effective channels for disseminating the technologies are workshops, 
demonstrations and peer influence. Furthermore, they find that the maximum adoption rate of 
the Extruded Feed is higher (58.2%) than the water reuse technology (27.4%).  
The first two studies are similar to the present study in terms of the measurement of risk 
preferences. They both elicit risk preferences within the prospect theory framework; they also 
measure the loss aversion and probability weighting parameters of the same sample. The two 
studies differ in their key findings: while risk averse farmers delay adoption of Bt cotton in 
China (Liu, 2013), they are more likely to adopt drought-tolerant rice early in India (Ward 
and Singh, 2014).  
Of the first two studies, Liu (2013) is the closer to the present study in terms of the 
methodology: it employs duration analysis rather than modelling adoption as a discrete 
choice. However, the present study differs from the previous studies in a number of ways. 
Instead of analysing the adoption of a single technology, this study studies the adoption 
decision of three technologies. Additionally, the other studies focus on crops, but this present 
study focusses on technologies in fish farming. Fish farming differs from crop farming in 
terms of the challenges and risks farmers face in their operations, therefore applying the 
techniques used in the previous studies in this present study is an attempt to bridge this gap in 
the literature and to provide an empirical evidence of the effect of risk attitudes on the 
adoption of fish farming technologies in a developing country context. 
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The last paper reviewed in this chapter is by Ansah et. al. (2014). This study is conducted in 
the same study area as this present study, and it focuses on some aspects of fish farming, as 
well. Just like this present study, their study models the adoption of Extruded Feed 
technology among the fish farmers, but their study differs from the present study in terms of 
analysis. They assume that the two technologies are adopted together, or are complementary, 
and therefore model them as bundled technologies. Furthermore, they model the adoption 
decision as a binary static choice, within a logistic framework. The present study, however, 
employs duration/survival analysis, taking into account the effect of time on the decision to 
adopt a technology. Lastly, while not imposing complementarity on the technologies, this 
chapter assesses possible relationships among the technologies (complementarity and 
substitutability) via the model outcome.  
This present chapter investigates some potential determinants of the speed of technology 
adoption by incorporating a wide range of variables, including an experimentally obtained 
measure of risk aversion, using duration analysis. It is an attempt to fill the void in the 
literature regarding the length of time fish farmers take to adopt AST, Extruded Feed and 
Floating Cages.  
4.2.8 Complementarity and substitutability among technologies and hypotheses 
Complementarity or substitutability among technologies could also influence the rate of 
adopting a given technology. The benefits of using improved seed (hybrid),for instance, are 
enhanced by fertilizer application under favourable environmental conditions in high 
potential areas measured by rainfall potential, soil fertility and other agro-ecological factors, 
such as altitude, etc. (Byerlee and Hesse de Polanco, 1986). However, one would expect that 
the prior adoption of pest-resistant crop varieties would lead to a reduction in the adoption of 
pesticides. Therefore, in examining the rate of adoption of a given technology it is imperative 
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to consider how the adoption of other technologies could influence the decision to adopt a 
given technology.  
The three technologies described above (AST, Extruded/Floating Feed and Floating Cages) 
are distinct, can, and have been used in different mixes by different farmers for different 
reasons. There is no predefined sequence of adopting one technology before or after another. 
However, there is potential complementarity or substitutability among the technologies. For 
instance, Floating Cages rely on extruded/floating feed for the optimum output from the fish 
stocked in it. This means that farmers who own Floating Cages are also more likely to use 
floating feed, and vice versa. Thus, Extruded Feed and Floating Cages are expected to be 
complementary, in other words, adoption of Floating Cages increases the likelihood of 
adopting extruded feed. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
1. Floating Cages and Extruded Feed are complementary technologies: prior adoption 
of Floating Cages speeds up the adoption of extruded/floating feed 
Extruded Feed and AST serve similar purposes. AST is a fast-growing breed of tilapia which 
offers farmers the economic potential of harvesting twice a year compared to the locally 
available breed. Extruded Feed also enhances the growth of stocked fish and offers farmers 
the chance of early harvest of their fish. However, this feed is the most expensive input used 
by farmers in the industry. While the joint use of Extruded Feed and the AST is 
recommended, some farmers adopt either, only a few adopt both. This suggests a possible 
substitutability between the Extruded Feed and the AST; in the presence of credit constraints 
a farmer may adopt one or the other. If this is the case, then it is expected that the adoption of 




2. AST and Extruded Feed are substitute technologies: prior adoption of 
extruded/floating feed delays the adoption of AST.  
There is no direct relationship between use of the Floating Cage technology and the AST. 
The Floating Cage can be used to stock any species of fish, including, but not limited to the 
AST. Farmers have the flexibility of moving the cages to a new body of water if the need 
arises. Thus, the decision to adopt a Floating Cage may not necessarily have any direct 
bearing on the decision to stock AST or vice versa, in the absence of credit constraints. 
However, AST stocked in Floating Cages yield higher outputs and mature faster than if 
stocked in conventional ponds, thus they could be regarded as complementary. Nevertheless, 
the initial high cost of the Floating Cages could mean that its acquisition could lead to the 
delay in the adoption of the AST, since conventional tilapia stocked in Floating Cages yield 
greater outputs than in other fishponds. Thus the third hypothesis is: 
3. The relationship between Floating Cages and AST is indeterminate: prior adoption 
of Floating Cages may or may not speed up the adoption of AST and vice versa.  
However, in spite of the above, it is possible that there is no correlation between the adoption 
of one technology and another and that adoption choices might simply be because certain 
farmers are more likely to adopt new techniques in general and the complementarities may 
not be significant. 
4.3 Duration model of technology adoption  
Survival analysis or commonly, duration analysis, has been applied in the medical and 
engineering fields for a long time but in recent years, it has been applied in the social 
sciences. For instance in labour economics, duration analysis is applied to analyse the 
duration of unemployment and jobs (see the survey article by Devine and Kiefer, 1991). 
Duration analysis has also been used in macroeconomics to study business cycles (e.g. 
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Diebold and Redebusch, 1990); it has also been applied in marketing to analyse the timing of 
household purchases (e.g. Vilcassim and Jain, 1991) and in consumer economics to assess 
how long it takes for individuals to buy a durable item (Robin and Visser, 1997). A few 
studies have applied this technique in the study of technology adoption decisions in 
agriculture, including Fuglie and Kascak (2001) (natural resource conserving agricultural 
technology), Burton et. al., (2003) (organic horticulture), Abdulai and Huffman (2005) 
(crossbred cows), but not in fish farming. 
The purpose of duration analysis is to identify the factors that influence the length of time to 
a spell, where a spell in this chapter is adoption of technology. A spell starts at the time when 
a farmer becomes aware of the existence of a technology for the first time and ends when 
adoption takes place. Probability is a fundamental component of duration analysis; therefore, 
one can focus on the probability of a spell ending rather than the length of the spell itself. I 
seek to address the question: what is the probability of a smallholder fish farmer adopting a 
given technology at time t, given that s/he has not adopted by that time? 
The dependent variable, Duration, is denoted by T, which is a random variable, assumed to 
have a continuous probability distribution, f (t). The probability that the duration will be less 
than t is  
ܨሺݐሻ ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾሺܶ ൑ ݐሻǢ ݐ ൒  ?         (1) 
Equivalently, the distribution of ܶ can be expressed in terms of the survival function, ܵሺݐሻǡ 
which is the probability that the spell will be at least ݐ, implying the probability of surviving 
beyond time ݐǤ Therefore, the ܵሺݐሻ can be expressed as  
ܵሺݐሻ ൌ  ? െ ܨሺݐሻ ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾሺܶ ൐ ݐሻ        (2) 
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The hazard function/rate is the probability that the duration will end after time ݐǡ given that 
it has lasted until time ݐ. In other words, it is the probability that a farmer will adopt the 
technology at time ݐ while the individual is at risk of adopting the technology. The hazard 
function is specified as  
݄ሺݐǡ ܺሻ ൌ  ?՜  ?୔୰ሺ௧ஸ்ஸ௧ା ?௧ȁ்ஹ௧ǡ௑ሻ ?௧ ǡ ݐ ൒  ?       (3) 
The hazard function provides the instantaneous rate of failure at time ݐ and it is the 
continuous time version of sequence of conditional probabilities of adoption, in this context. 
A higher hazard rate indicates the likelihood of an earlier adoption.  
Thus from the above, one may see that a clearly defined relationship between the hazard and 
survival functions is 
݄ሺݐሻ ൌ ௙ሺ௧ሻଵିிሺ௧ሻ ൌ ௙ሺ௧ሻௌሺ௧ሻ          (4) 
The three functions, ݂ሺݐሻǡ ܵሺݐሻ and ݄ሺݐሻ are mathematically equivalent specifications of the 
distributions of the survival time,ܶ, therefore knowing any one of them could lead to the 
deduction of the others (Ahsanuzzaman, 2014). Thus, duration models estimate one of these 
functions as the basis for statistical analysis. Even though they have similar properties, the 
survival function is most suited for comparing the survival progress of two groups, whilst the 
hazard function describes the risk (likelihood) of failure (adoption) at any point in time 
(Ahsanuzzaman, 2014).  
The underlying data-generating process determines the shape of the hazard function. Since 
non-parametric models do not assume any generating process, it is important to specify a 
functional form, either parametrically or semi-parametrically before estimation. However, the 
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choice of a specific model is usually based on theoretical and empirical evidence, especially 
regarding the distribution of the data (Allison, 1984; Lapple, 2010). 
There are many functional forms used in the parametric estimation of the distribution of ܶ, 
including exponential, Weibull, Gompertz and Log-logistic; however, for ease of comparison 
to Liu (2013), and to incorporate time dependent variables, this study adopts the Weibull 
baseline hazard specification. The exponential model in duration model is the baseline model 
as it has a constant hazard rate, which is independent of time (Lapple, 2010). Where the 
hazard function is assumed or known to have duration/time dependence, the Weibull model 
can be used to represent the effect of time. In the Weibull model, the hazard is expressed as  ݄଴ሺݐሻ ൌ ݌ݐ௣ିଵሺߚ଴ሻ         (5) 
Where ݄଴ሺݐሻ is the baseline hazard and depends only on time (t), ߚ is the vector of 
parameters to be estimated. This is a more flexible model than the exponential model and it 
allows for hazard rates that are non-constant but monotonic. The parameter, ݌, is the shape 
parameter because it determines whether the hazard is increasing, decreasing or constant over 
time. The shape parameter shows the following possibilities: 
1. If ݌Ƹ ൏  ?ǡthen the hazard is monotonically decreasing with time 
2. If ݌Ƹ ൐  ?ǡthen the hazard is monotonically increasing with time 
3. If ݌Ƹ ൌ  ?ǡthen the hazard is flat or is independent of time, and this would be the same 
as the exponential model. This means that the Weibull model actually nests the 
exponential.  
In specifying duration models, the proportional hazard (PH) model is often adopted 
(Ahsanuzzaman, 2014), as it is suitable in cases of exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz 
distributions (e.g. Lapple, 2010; Addison and Portugal, 1998). In the PH specification, 
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covariates are related multiplicatively with the baseline hazard and the hazards are 
independent of time: 
݄ሺݐȁܺǡ ߚሻ ൌ ݄଴ሺݐሻ݌ሺܺǡ ߚሻ         (6) 
where ݄଴ሺݐሻ is the baseline hazard and depends only on time, ݐǡ and ݌ሺܺǡ ߚሻ is the hazard that 
depends on covariates determined by economic theory, and ߚ is the vector of parameters to 
be estimated.  
Equation (6) can be estimated using two approaches: semi-parametric and fully parametric. 
The Cox PH specification estimates equation (6) without any parametric specification of the 
baseline hazard ݄଴ሺݐሻ, while the alternative, PH model, which uses any of the distributions, 
such as exponential, Weibull or Gompertz etc. specifies the baseline hazard function.  
The sign of the parameter of the model or the magnitude of the hazard ratio (greater than or 
less than unity) implies the direction of the effect and each parameter summarizes the 
proportional effect on the hazard of absolute changes in the corresponding covariates 
(Jenkins, 2005). Moreover, this effect is independent of survival time (Ahsanuzzaman, 2014). 
Estimation of the parametric models in duration analysis follows the maximum likelihood 
procedure, although the estimation is complicated because of right censoring. 
Focusing on the Weibull distribution in (6), the density function can be expressed as  
ሺߚ଴ ൅ ܺ௜ߚ௜ሻݐ௣          (7) 
If we let ܦ௜ be the censoring dummy, taking a value of 1 indicating that the farmer has 
adopted the technology and 0 otherwise, then the likelihood contribution is written as: 
ܮ௜ୀሾ݂ሺݐሻሿ஽೔ሾܵሺݐሻሿଵି஽೔          (8) 
The likelihood function L is then given by  
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ܮሺߚǡ ݌ሻ ൌ  ? ܮ௜ே௜ୀଵ           (9) 
The values of ȕ and p that maximize the likelihood function are the estimators of the Weibull 
hazard model. 
4.4 Empirical application of duration analysis 
The time to adoption or survival model discussed above is employed to assess how long it 
takes for smallholder fish farmers to adopt Extruded Feed, Floating Cages and AST in Ghana. 
I model these adoption decisions premised on the availability of these technologies and 
household, farmer and location-specific characteristics. Thus the hazard rate for adoption is 
defined as the probability that a farmer will adopt a given technology at time t conditional on 
him not having adopted the technology before ݐ. 
For this study, the hazard function of adopting a technology for an individual farmer at time ݐ 
is ݄ሺݐȁܺǡ ߚሻ ൌ ݄଴ሺݐሻ݌ሺܺǡ ߚሻ, where the parameters are as described in (6).  
Where the dependent variable, ݐ, is the time to adoption (adoption spell, ݐ) and is defined as 
the length of time (in years) the farmer took from the initial exposure to the possibility of 
adoption of the technologies to the actual time when the farmer started using a particular 
technology; X is a vector of farmer characteristics such as ࢇࢍࢋ (the age in the period of 
observation), ࢓ࢇ࢒ࢋ (is the male gender), ࢋࢊ࢛ is years of formal education, ࢋ࢞࢖ is years of 
experience in fish farm-related activities, ࢝ࢋࢇ࢚ࢎࢋ࢘ (dummy) is experience of past weather 
shocks, ࢓ࢇ࢏࢔࢕ࢉࢉ࢛ is the main occupation of farmer (=1 if fish farming), ࢎࢎ࢙ is the 
household size, ࢕࢝࢔ࢎ࢕࢛࢙ࢋ (dummy) is ownership of a house, ࢘࢕࢕࢓࢙ is number of rooms 
owned, ࢌ࢘ࢋࢋࢎ࢕࢒ࢊ is freehold tenure (dummy), ࢋ࢚࢞ࢋ࢔࢙࢏࢕࢔ is access to extension contact 
(dummy), ࢉ࢘ࢋࢊ࢏࢚ is access to credit (dummy), ࢌࢌࢇ is membership in fish farmer association 
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(dummy), ࢇ࢙ࢎ is Ashanti Region, ࢝ࢋ࢙࢚ is Western Region (dummy), ࢜࢕࢒࢚ࢇis Volta Region 
(dummy), and married is marital status (dummy, =1 if married).  
4.5 Data and description of variables  
The data used in this chapter come from a field survey, which gathered information about the 
adoption of technologies by the fish farmers. Additionally, the risk attitudes of the farmers 
were elicited through the use of incentivised lottery experiments conducted in the field. Full 
details of the elicitation and measures of risk attitudes are described in Chapter Two of this 
thesis.  
The actual future outcome of a new technology is not known with certainty, and due to these 
associated uncertainties, farmers are expected to exhibit different behaviour to adoption 
because of their different levels of risk aversion (Ansah et. al., 2014). The differences in 
attitudes and characteristics of farmers are likely to influence the length of time it takes to 
adopt a technology. In this empirical study, I analyse a number of potential determinants of 
the adoption decision, which are broadly categorized as farmer characteristics, household 
characteristics, access to services and regional characteristics. It must be noted that the 
characteristics of farmers described here were gathered from the survey conducted in 2014, 
but I assume that these characteristics were potentially time-invariant and were comparable to 
the characteristics of the farmers prior to the adoption of the technologies. While this may 
hold for some farm characteristics such as number of ponds, especially given the short 
duration, some other features may vary over time. For instance, the membership in fish 
farmer associations, access to extension services, marital status could change over time; a 
farmer may have been single prior to adoption but could be married at the time of the survey. 
However, since in this survey I did not ask for information on the long-term history of each 
farm it is not possible to assess potential impact of this assumption. Perhaps a better approach 
to assess the influence of these variables is with a panel survey of the farms (Fuglie and 
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Kascak, 2001). I acknowledge that time-variant variables such as input and output price 
changes, as well as the cost of the technologies could affect the adoption decision, but I am 
not able to include these in the model due to lack of data. Table 4.1 presents a summary of 
the variables included in the empirical model. 
4.5.1 The dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the time to adoption of technology, hence for each 
farmer there is a different value for the time to adoption for each of the three technologies, 
since some of them do not adopt the technologies at the same time. The three technologies 
are described in detail in an earlier section. Farmers were asked to recall the year they first 
learnt/heard about each technology, and the year they started using each technology, as well 
as the reasons for doing so. The obvious challenge with such data is the likelihood of 
measurement errors, since farmers may state these dates incorrectly. If this is the case it will 
imply that variance of the parameters are biased, however coefficients of the variables remain 
unbiased if the errors in responses are not correlated with farmer characteristics (Matuschke 
and Qaim, 2008; Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). The earliest time a farmer indicated having 
knowledge of the availability of any of the three technologies was 1994, and the year of data 
collection was 2014, implying a time lapse of 20 years31. However, from Figures 4.1 to 4.3 
most of the adoption of the three technologies occurred from 2009 onwards, therefore since 
most adoption occurred fairly recently, I am fairly confident about the relative accuracy of 
the recall data. This minimizes possible errors that could result from recalling historic events, 
in this case year of adoption. 
                                                 
31
 Not aware of the actual years the technologies were available to the farmers; therefore I used the earliest time 




Figure 4.1: Distribution of farmers by year of adoption of Extruded Feed 
 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of farmers by year of adoption of Akosombo Strain 
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4.5.2 Explanatory variables 
Explanatory variables included in this study were chosen based on existing duration adoption 
literature and economic theory (e.g. Fuglie and Kascak, 2001, Burton et. al., 2003, Dadi et al, 
2004, Beyene and Kassie, 2015, Nazli and Smale, 2016), and are summarised in Table 4.1. 
This section describes a few of the variables as they relate to this study. 
The age of the respondent responsible for adoption decisions was measured in years; this is a 
time-varying covariate so I use the age in the period of observation for each farmer. 
Human capital is measured by the number of years of formal education attained. I assume the 
farmers concluded their formal education before learning about the technologies, hence this 
variable is considered as time-invariant. Farmers who were more formally educated were 
expected to adopt technologies earlier since they are able to comprehend information 
regarding the pros and cons of each technology, and therefore would adopt if they perceived 
the technologies to be more beneficial than the existing technologies.  
Capital and social networks have been shown to be important determinants of adoption 
decisions (Burton et. al., 2003, Bandiera and Rasul, 2006, Beyene and Kassie, 2015, Nazli 
and Smale, 2016). Access to adequate sources of information and functional markets is 
limited and therefore social networks such as membership in fish farmer associations and 
extension services could potentially facilitate exchange of information and overcome credit 
constraints, leading to earlier adoption. However, Di Falco and Bulte (2011) note that social 
capital can, to some degree, discourage investment or adoption, therefore the influence of 
social capital is indeterminate a priori (Beyene and Kassie, 2015). Less than 50% of the 
farmers had access to extension services in the year of the survey, but it was impossible to 
verify if this was the same situation prior to the adoption of the technologies, this is because it 
is possible that extension access could be a result of adoption, and not always the cause. For 
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instance extension contact is reported to enhance adoption (Cavane and Donovan, 2011), but 
in some cases there was no significant effect of extension contacts (Krishnan and Patnam, 
2014). Extension contact alone may not lead to adoption of technology, but the trust farmers 
have in the extension agent could tilt the decision in favour of adopting a new technology or 
otherwise (Beyene and Kassie, 2015).  
A variable of key interest to this study is risk aversion32. In a developing country like Ghana 
and in the fish farming sector risks abound due to a number of factors such as extreme 
weather shocks such as floods and drought, diseases and fluctuating input and output prices 
as well as yield variability. Thus, farmers are generally expected to delay adoption of new 
technologies owing to such uncertainties and risks. However, if technologies are risk-
reducing farmers may be incentivised to adopt these improved technologies that promise 
higher and more assured returns, even if these are perceived to be risky (Beyene and Kassie, 
2015). 
Ownership of house and number of rooms are used as proxies for wealth of the household. 
The inclusion of asset ownership and household size in duration analysis is inferred from the 
poverty trap hypothesis, which posits that poor households remain low-income households 
for a long time (Matushcke and Qaim, 2008; Beyene and Kassie, 2015). Since most farmers 
adopted the three technologies from 2009 onwards, it is likely that they may not have 
changed their asset ownership simply through adoption within the period.  
I include dummy variables to capture region-specific characteristics not captured by the other 
variables. The Greater Accra Region is the reference region, so it is left out of the regression 
and the values of the coefficients of the three remaining regions compare to that of the left 
                                                 
32
 The elicitation and estimation the risk attitudes variable is explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis. In this chapter 
I employ the calculated risk attitude measures obtained from Chapter 2 here as an explanatory variable. 
122 
 
out region33. For example, if the hazard ratio of the dummy variable Ashanti Region is 
greater than one (1), it implies that farmers in the Ashanti Region adopt more quickly than 
farmers in the reference region, Greater Accra; similar interpretation apply to the other 
dummy variables.  
Separate hazard models are estimated for each technology but adoption information of the 
other two technologies is included in the adoption of a given technology. I achieve this by 
including among the explanatory variables a time varying dummy variable, which captures 
the effect of the adoption of other technologies in previous periods on the adoption of a 
technology in a given period (Butler and Moser, 2010; Colombo and Mosconi, 1995; 
Stoneman and Kwon, 1994). As an illustration, in the estimation of the hazard model for 
extruded feed, AST is included as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 if AST was adopted at 
least a year before the adoption of extruded feed, and equals 0 otherwise; Floating Cage is 
included in the equation for Extruded Feed in the same manner. Conversely, in the estimation 
of AST, Extruded Feed and Floating Cage each take a value of 1 if adopted at least a year 
prior to the adoption of AST, and 0 otherwise. Table 4.1 shows that many farmers (39%) 
adopt the extruded feed, for example, before Floating Cages, possibly because of the 
differences in costs. Risk attitude measures and how they influence the speed of technology 
adoption are discussed later in section 4.8.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of variables used in the analysis (N=120) 
Variable Definition  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Dependent  Variables    
Time to adoption of Extruded Feed  Number of years from date of knowing about to date of 
first use of extruded feed 
16.62 2.28 
Time to adoption of Floating Cages Number of years from date of knowing about to date of 
first use of Floating Cages  
17.76 2.53 
Time to adoption of Akosombo 
strain of tilapia  
Number of years from date of knowing about to date of 
first use of Akosombo strain of tilapia 
17.11 2.79 
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Independent Variables    
Farmer characteristics    
Age of farmer at adoption of 
technology 
Age of respondent at the time of adopting technology 38.55 13.15 
Gender of farmer =1 if farmer is male  0.92 0.28 
Education Years of formal education attained by farmer 9.83 4.62 
Marital Status = 1 if farmer is married  0.75 0.44 
5LVNDYHUVLRQıIURP7&1 Risk attitude obtained from TCN lottery experiment 0.89 0.52 
Risk aversion (CRRA)  Risk attitude obtained from Brick et. al. lottery  2.35 2.45 
/RVVDYHUVLRQȜ Loss aversion from TCN lottery experiment 1.92 2.40 
Probability ZHLJKWLQJĮ Probability weighting from TCN lottery experiment 0.74 0.30 
Experience Number of years a farmer has engaged in fish production  5.47 5.37 
Past weather shocks = 1 if farmer experienced flooding in the past 0.73 0.44 
Main occupation = 1 if fish farming is main occupation  0.71 0.46 
Prior adoption dummies    
Akosombo before extruded =1 if Akosombo strain is adopted prior 0.1 0.30 
Akosombo before Floating Cage =1 if Akosombo strain is adopted prior 0.28 0.45 
Extruded before Akosombo  =1 if Extruded Feed is adopted prior 0.28 0.45 
Extruded before Floating Cages =1 if Extruded Feed is adopted prior 0.39 0.49 
Floating Cage before extruded =1 if Floating Cage is adopted prior 0.04 0.20 
Floating Cage before Akosombo =1 if Floating Cage is adopted prior 0.13 0.33 
Household characteristics    
Household size Number of people with whom farmer eats from the same 
pot 
6.08 3.03 
Own House = 1 if farmer owns his house 0.63 0.48 
Number of rooms  1XPEHURIURRPVLQIDPHUV¶KRXVHKROG 4.23 2.68 
Freehold tenure =1 if farmer owns the farm land 0.33 0.47 
Access to services     
Access to extension services  =1 if farmer has access to extension services 0.48 0.50 
Access to credit = if farmer has access to credit 0.78 0.42 
FFA34 membership = 1 if farmer is DPHPEHURIILVKIDUPHUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQ 0.32 0.47 
Region level variables     
Western = 1 if farmer is resident in the Western Region  0.22 0.41 
Ashanti = 1 if farmer is resident in the Ashanti Region  0.17 0.37 
Volta = 1 if farmer is resident in the Volta Region 0.23 0.41 
 
4.5.3 Description of the technologies  
Most forms of conventional aquaculture practices are perceived to have adverse effects on the 
environment, including eutrophication of water bodies, through the deposition of remnant 
nutrient-rich feeds from the feeding of farmed fish. The traditional feed and feeding regime 
among resource-poor farmers in the farmed-fish industry involves the use of left-over foods 
from homes and harvests from farms, which do not provide balanced feed to the fish and 
therefore fish do not reach marketable sizes in time and harvests are generally carried out 
                                                 
34
 FFA= Fish Farmer Association.  
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once in a year on average. Thus, apart from negative environmental impacts, most existing 
conventional technologies do not provide enough economic returns for farmers in time. 
However, as previously mentioned, the aquaculture sector has seen much improvement in 
recent years with the introduction of more improved and modern technologies, which are 
considered as practical solutions to reducing negative effects of farmed fish production on the 
environment and to improve the economic wellbeing of farmers. Therefore, voluntary of 
adoption of these technologies in time could ensure the profitability and sustainability of the 
industry, especially in a developing country like Ghana.  
Many improved aquaculture technologies exist; and they may be broadly categorised into two 
types: nutrient management and effluent management (Louisiana State University, AgCenter, 
2003). The former type includes technologies that are related to feeding and fertilizer 
applications, which minimize waste and prevent deterioration of water quality (Tucker et. al. 
1996). The latter refer to cage culture and other pond types that minimize the leaching of 
chemicals and nutrients into the environment. This present study focusses on the adoption of 
three technologies from each of the two broad categories: the use of extruded/floating feed 
and AST (nutrient management) and Floating Cages (effluent management)35. These will 
enable the assessment of whether the decision to adopt a given technology is influenced by or 
influences the adoption of other technologies, and how the speed of adoption of different 
technologies is affected by farmer/farm-specific characteristics; which cannot be achieved by 
studying a single technology in isolation.  
The Extruded/Floating Feed is a commercial feed formulated with essential nutrients for fish 
growth and development. It is prepared with a good balance of macro and micronutrients 
needed by fish for growth (Bell and Waagbo, 2008). The commercial processing of this feed 
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removes anti-nutritional factors and makes Extruded Feed more utilizable to fish (Drew et. 
al., 2007; Hardy, 2010). It is extruded and palletized, allowing it to float on the water surface 
for long periods and remain available to feeding fish. This helps to reduce food waste and 
save costs (Engle and Valderrama, 2004). For best outcome from farmed fish, the appropriate 
feeding regime in terms of frequency and quantity must be adhered to. This is only achieved 
with the use of pelleted or extruded feed, unlike the conventional feed, which is usually 
prepared with mixture of agricultural and food industry waste, such as corn meal, wheat or 
rice bran, and peanut husks. The mixture is milled into powder, which quickly sinks to the 
bottom of the pond when administered. Fish growth is hampered by not only the unavailable 
feed and nutrients, but sinking feed accumulates on the pond bottom, where it decomposes to 
set off physico-chemical reactions that degrade the quality of the pond and could result in 
disease outbreaks. The use of Extruded Feed results in relatively faster rate of fish growth 
resulting from the bioavailable protein contents. Even though it is relatively more expensive 
costing almost seven times the unit cost of the local alternative, it results in fish twice the size 
of fish fed the conventional sinking feed (Frimpong et. al., 2014)36. Furthermore, from an 
enterprise budget analysis, Ansah et. al (2014) find that the use of the Extruded Feed result in 
about seven times higher net returns than the conventional feed. The rate of adoption of the 
Extruded Feed between 2011 and 2013 was 58.2 % among fish farmers in Ghana (Ansah, et. 
al., 2014). 
The AST is a relatively newer and improved strain of tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) 
developed by the Aquaculture Research and Development Centre (ARDEC), and has about 
30-50% higher growth rates than tilapia in the region (Lind et. al., 2012). On average, it takes 
six months for this strain to reach a weight of 420g from an initial stocking weight of 15g. 
                                                 
36
 The extruded feed costs GhC40/20kg bag and the local (sinking) feed costs on average GHC 13/50 kg/bag. In 
terms of feed conversion ratios, the extruded feed is on average 2.06; while the local alternative is about 4.18 
(total feed/ total weight gain) Analysis of profits indicated that extruded feed results in up to 45% profitability of 
fish production (Frimpong et al., 2014). 
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The implication of the situation means that instead of eight months for the traditional breed to 
reach market size, a farmer who cultivates the new breed is sure to harvest twice in the year, 
ceteris paribus. Apart from its fast-growing properties the AST also has a higher survival rate 
and disease-resistance. Most hatcheries have adopted the AST as their brood stock and are 
producing fingerlings for the whole industry. The cons of this technology lie mostly in 
institutional factors, such as inadequate access to urban and ready markets due to poor road 
networks and unreliable electricity supply leading to absence of cold storage in the rural 
tilapia value-chain and therefore inefficient and risky post-harvest handling.  
The third technology is the Floating Cage. These cages are used mostly on the Volta Lake, 
and rely on commercial Extruded Feed and these systems account for about 90% of *KDQD¶V 
aquaculture production (Ainoo-Ansah, 2013; Awity, 2013). Tilapia are stocked at an average 
rate of 103 fish per cubic metre and fed locally with available pelleted feed for approximately 
six months. Advantages of cages over other rearing systems include low capital costs, 
relatively simple management, better quality of fish, and use of existing water bodies 
(Beveridge, 2004). They can also be relocated if unfavourable weather or other 
environmental conditions occur (Pillay and Kutty, 2005) and also reduces mortality as the 
fish are protected in an enclosure from predators that may exist in the wild. The cage system 
operates best on extruded feed, which is more expensive and in the absence of credit, this 
may be a challenge for the resource-poor farmer to adopt this technology.  
For all the three technologies described above, there exist elements of uncertainty regarding 
actual yields and prices, both of inputs and outputs. Nonetheless, given the compelling 
advantages of the three technologies it is still puzzling as to why it takes a long time for 
farmers to adopt some of the technologies. Also, existing adoption studies have focused on 
either a single new technology (improved water and irrigation system, modern fertilizer, or 
improved seeds) or a set of modern technologies treated as a unique bundle. In other words, 
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the adoption decision may be described more like a multivariate adoption than a univariate 
process; this is why this investigation focuses on the decision of the farmers to adopt these 
three technologies.  
Estimation consideration 
To ascertain whether the risk attitude measures used in this study capture real economic 
choices of the farmers this study employs two multiple price lotteries: the BVB lottery which 
is a gains-only lottery, and the TCN lottery which involves both gains and losses37. It is 
possible that farmers treated the gains-RQO\ORWWHU\H[SHULPHQWDVµMXVWDJDPH¶ZLWKRXWPXFK
thought since they had nothing to lose in the process. Thus, it may seem this lottery may not 
capture the real economic risky choices fish farmers face in their operations which involve 
losses and gains. If this intuition is true, then the introduction of losses should make farmers 
take the lottery experiment more seriously and the second lottery experiment should capture 
this real risk attitude38. The results show that more farmers (53.3%) are risk averse under the 
former lottery than the latter (48.3%), but the difference is only marginal. To ascertain that 
both lottery experiments actually captured the same attributes (risk attitudes) of the farmers, I 
conducted a Spearman rank correlation test between the two risk attitude measures (CRRA 
DQGıIRUHDFKIDUPHUI find that the two measures of risk attitudes are not independent, in 
other words the null hypothesis that the two measures of risk preferences are independent is 
rejected, in favour of the alternative hypothesis that they are both capturing the same attribute 
(risk attitudes) of the farmers (see results in Table 4.2). This gives credence to the measures 
of risk attitudes used in modelling the speed of adoption of the technologies.  
  
                                                 
37
 The lotteries have been described in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
38
 It was explained to the farmers that the losses from the lottery experiment would only be from the payment 
they were given for showing up. 
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4.6 Results  
4.6.1 Outcomes from lottery experiments  
A summary of the risk attitude measures used in this investigation is provided in Table 4.2. 
Based on the mean values of the BVB risk attitude measure (2.4), the average farmer is 
classified as risk loving. The values of the TCN parameters (ıĮȜ) are 0.9, 0.7, 1.9 and they 
respectively imply that the average farmer is risk averse, overweights small probabilities and 
is loss verse. The value of 5.4 obtained from the self-reported risk attitude (SRRA) shows 
WKDWWKHDYHUDJHIDPHU¶VULVNDWWLtude is somewhat in the middle of the Dohmen et. al. (2010) 
scale39.  
Table 4.2: Summary of Risk Attitude Measures 
Risk Attitude Measure Mean Standard Deviation 
BVB (CRRA) 2.4 2.5 
7&1ı 0.9 0.5 
TCN (Į) 0.7 0.3 
TCN (Ȝ) 1.9 2.4 
SRRA 5.4 3.2 
4.6.2 Correlation among risk aversion measures 
A Spearman correlation test was performed among the three parameters from the TCN lottery 
and the CRRA parameter from the BVB lottery (Table 4.3). It is not possible to reject the null 
K\SRWKHVLV WKDW Į DQG ı DUH LQGHSHQGHQW PHDVXUHV DV DUH Į DQG Ȝ )RU WKH SXUSRVH RI WKH
study it is reassuring to find that the two measures of risk aversion are positively correlated, 
LQ RWKHU ZRUGV WKH WZR PHDVXUHV RI ULVN DYHUVLRQ &55$ DQG ı Dre measuring the same 
attribute of the farmers. 
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 This is explained in more detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
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Table 4.3: Correlations among TCN parameters, SRRA and CRRA 
 SRRA CRRA Sigma Alpha Lambda 
SRRA 1.000     
CRRA 0.053 1.000    
Sigma -0.016 0.524*** 1.000   
Alpha 0.020 0.102 0.285*** 1.000  
Lambda 0.010 -0.125 0.075 0.046 1.000 
 
4.7 Duration analysis: empirical results 
4.7.1 Nonparametric results  
In duration analysis, prior to rigorous parametric analysis, it is usual to perform some 
summary of the survival times or the lengths of time to adoption of all the individuals in the 
sample. These summaries help us to choose appropriate functional forms for parametric 
analysis (Kiefer, 1988); the Kaplan-Meir estimate of the survival function is employed here 
because some of the observations are censored (Burton et. al., 2003). The Kaplan-Meir 
estimation is a non-parametric approach, making no assumptions about the distribution of the 
length of time it took to adopt a given technology. This estimation process is carried out by 
dividing the period of observation into a series of intervals, each containing one or more 
adoptions at its beginning. The function can only be identified at times when adoption occurs. 
The estimated survivor function between time periods ݐଵ and ݐଶ is calculated as the number of 
farmers who have not adopted a given technology at time ݐଵ, divided by the number of 
IDUPHUV µDW ULVN¶ RI DGRSWLQJ DW WLPH ݐଵ. This estimate changes only when in the next time 
period a farmer adopts the technology, otherwise it is a constant horizontal line. 
The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor functions for the three technologies are plotted in 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6,QHDFKILJXUHWKHKRUL]RQWDOD[LVLVVFDOHGLQµDUWLILFLDOWLPH¶%XUWRQet. 
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al., 2003), from 0 to 20, representing the 20 years or periods since the technologies became 
known or available to the fish farmers (1994) and the year of data collection (2014). It must 
be noted that for ease of analysis and following other researchers (e.g. Burton et. al., 2003) all 
cases enter at ݐ ൌ  ?, regardless of which point in calendar time they begin to be observed. 
Therefore, a farmer who starts using a given technology in April of a particular year is 
reckoned as entering the analysis at the same time as a farmer who adopts that technology in 
December of the same year. In 1994 (t = 0), the value of the function is 1, since none of the 
farmers in our sample had adopted any of the technologies prior to this year.  
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 are the graphs for the Kaplan Meier survival functions for the three 
technologies, using the categories of fish farmers according to the BVB and TCN lotteries 
respectively. It may be seen that there is a general lag between the first period of the Extruded 
Feed technology being available and the 9th period when the first adoption takes place. The 
rate of adoption of this technology is not uniform over time. This shows that the hazard rate 
increases over time. The value of the function falls steadily after the 9th period since only one 
farmer adopted the Extruded Feed in the 9th period. The function falls sharply after the 14th 
period when 7 (5.8%) farmers adopt the technology and subsequently the number of adopters 
increases over the rest of the period. Comparing the survival rates of the risk averse and risk 
preferring farmers shows that risk averse farmers adopt Extruded Feed earlier than risk 
preferring farmers in all figures. Where there are no adopters in a given period the function 
does not change. As of the time of data collection, five farmers had not adopted Extruded 
Feed and they were all risk preferring. Similar interpretations hold for the survival functions 
for AST and Floating Cages, as depicted in the remaining figures. 
In Table 4.4, the technology that has been adopted by the largest number of farmers in our 
sample is the Extruded Feed technology.  
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Table 4.4: Technologies and adoption 
Technology adopted Yes No 
Floating Cage 69 51 
Akosombo Strain 90 30 
Extruded Feed 115 5 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Length of time to adoption of technologies for risk averse and risk preferring 
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Figure 4.5: Length of time to adoption of technologies for risk averse and risk preferring 
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for Floating Cages using categories from TCN lotteries
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4.7.2 Parametric results 
The hazard ratios for the estimation of the three technologies are summarized in Tables 4.5 - 
4.7. The first column in each table shows the outcome when no risk attitude variable is 
included, the remaining columns are labelled according to the key variable that is added in 
the regression, with parameters reported as hazard ratios in each case, except for the shape 
parameter,ܲ. The standard errors of the hazard ratios are reported in parentheses, where the 
significance level is with respect to the null of no effect, i.e., the hazard ratio equals one 
(Burton et. al., 2003). A hazard ratio greater than one (1) indicates that the variable in 
question accelerates the adoption of the technology. A hazard ratio less than one (1) denotes 
that the variable slows the adoption of technology. For each technology I report the hazard 
ratios for six regressions, assuming a Weibull distribution. 
Based on the results in Tables 4.5- 4.7, I reject the hypotheses that the shape parameter, P=1 
(or ln p=0) for all three technologies. This is because in these cases the values of P for AST, 
Floating Cages and Extruded Feed are respectively 8.49, 7.77, and 12.05 and highly 
significant (p-value=0.000), implying that there is a positive duration dependence and 
therefore the baseline hazard is monotonically increasing and not constant over time.  
4.7.3 Adoption of technologies in the absence of risk attitudes 
In the absence of risk attitudes, very similar results are obtained in terms of the factors that 
influence the speed of adoption for all three technologies. For instance, age (in the year of 
observation), experience, and access to credit are significant and accelerate the adoption of all 
three technologies. Education and experience of past adverse weather conditions (particularly 
flooding) are used as measures of human capital. Experience of past weather shocks is not 
significant in the decision to adopt AST, but it significantly accelerates the adoption of 
Extruded Feed and Floating Cages. Conversely, access to extension services delays the 
adoption of Floating Cages and Extruded Feed but has no significant effect on the speed of 
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adoption the AST technology. The results also show that where significant, region of 
operation has very little effect on the speed of adoption. For instance, all things being equal, a 
farmer in the Volta Region has a lower probability of adopting the Extruded Feed and AST 
technologies at a point in time than their colleagues in the Greater Accra Region (reference 
region). However, there is no significant relationship between the region of operation and the 
speed of adopting Floating Cages.  
In terms of the effect of the prior adoption of one technology on the speed of adopting 
another technology, the results in Tables 4.5-4.7 show that a farmer who adopts the Extruded 
Feed technology in a prior period has a lower probability of adopting the AST in a given time 
(hazard ratio =0.034, significant at 1%). This suggests a substitutionary relationship between 
these two technologies, and this may be attributable to the cost of the extruded feed. It may 
be adduced from the description of the technologies that Extruded Feed and AST give similar 
outcomes: increased and faster yields of fish. The cost of feed is the highest cost (up to 70%) 
faced by farmers in their production (Ainoo-Ansah, 2013), therefore in the absence of 
adequate liquidity, farmers, upon having adopted one technology may be constrained to adopt 
another technology like the AST. Though not a directly related study, Butler and Moser 
(2010) find a positive influence on the adoption of system of rice intensification (SRI) on the 
adoption of off-season crops (OSC) in Madagascar. The prior adoption of Floating Cages also 
shows a negative effect on the speed of adoption of AST, but this is not significant at any 
level of significance.  
Differences in regional characteristics are found to play some role in the length of time to 
adoption of AST: farmers in the Volta Region, compared to those in the Greater Accra 
Region are likely to adopt this technology; no significant effect of Ashanti and Western 
Regions on the speed of adoption of this technology is observed. This shows that the speed of 
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adopting the Akosombo strain of tilapia may not be influenced to any significant extent by 
the regional location of the farmers.  
4.7.4 Effects of risk attitudes on speed of technology adoption  
For all the three technologies investigated in this study, the hazard ratios show that risk 
averse farmers have a higher probability of adopting the AST, Extruded Feed and Floating 
Cage technologies at a point in time, ceteris paribus. For instance in columns 3, 5 and 6 of 
Table 4.5, the hazard ratios of risk attitude variables, ı578 and 0.510) and CRRA (0.875), 
are less than and significantly different from one (1), respectively. These hazard ratios show 
that farmers who are risk averse have a higher proclivity to adopt the AST technology. 
The results showing the effect of risk attitudes on the speed of adopting Extruded Feed 
WHFKQRORJ\DUHSUHVHQWHGLQ7DEOH7KHKD]DUGUDWLRVRIWKHYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUHı
(0.488 and 0.502) and the CRRA (0.883) show that all things equal, a risk averse farmer has a 
higher probability of adopting the Extruded Feed technology at a point in time. 
The hazard ratios for the Floating Cage technology are summarized in Table 4.7.The 
inclusion of risk attitudes in the model for Floating Cage technology show similar results to 
the other two technologies: the hazard ratios show that ceteris paribus, a risk averse farmer 
has a higher probability of adopting this technology at a point in time.  
These findings corroborate the findings of Koundouri et. al. (2006). They find that risk 
aversion plays a significant role in the time to adoption of modern irrigation technology in 
Crete, Greece and conclude that farmers who are more sensitive to the risk of extreme events 
have a higher probability of adopting a modern irrigation technology. Other studies have 
shown that risk aversion will increase the probability of adopting a technology if the 
technology is risk-reducing (Isik and Khanna, 2003; Koundouri et al, 2006). In their study on 
the dynamic modelling of innovation process adoption with risk and learning, Tsur et. al., 
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(1990), find that risk aversion positively affects adoption of technology. They argue that as a 
result of learning which, in turn, depends on present adoption decisions, higher risk aversion 
increases the appreciation of future declines in risk. This is because risk averse agents do not 
want to take the risk of not trying the innovation in time. However, some studies also find 
negative correlations between risk aversion and technology adoption. Knight et. al., (2003) 
study the influence of risk attitudes on technology adoption among Ethiopian farmers. They 
use a general hypothetical question to obtain the risk attitudes of the farmers and based on 
IDUPHUV¶UHVSRQVHVWKH\ZHUHFDWHJRUL]HGLQWRULVN-averse and non-risk-averse groups. They 
find that risk aversion is associated with lower probabilities of technology adoption. Liu 
(2013) also finds that risk aversion significantly affects the speed of adoption of a new 
biotechnology among cotton farmers in China, and concludes that risk and loss averse 
farmers are more likely to delay the adoption of the Bt cotton.  
Table 4.5: Estimates of Duration Model of the adoption of AST (Weibull Model) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
No Risk     ı   Į Ȝ ıĮȜ CRRA 
CRRA _ _ _ _ _ 0.875** 
       (0.0471) 












 ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ _ _ _ 1.071 1.106* _ 
  
   
(0.054) (0.059) 
 Age40 1.057*** 1.058*** 1.057*** 1.056*** 1.057*** 1.052*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Male 1.292 1.065 1.321 1.282 1.068 1.010 
  (0.559) (0.481) (0.578) (0.563) (0.498) (0.435) 
Education 1.056 1.059 1.056 1.071* 1.078* 1.068* 
  (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) 
Married 0.988 0.897 0.989 1.053 0.959 1.095 
  (0.301) (0.280) (0.301) (0.327) (0.305) (0.336) 
Experience 1.068*** 1.065*** 1.065*** 1.065*** 1.058** 1.063*** 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Experience of past  
weather shocks 1.302 1.369 1.302 1.215 1.254 1.519 
  (0.373) (0.399) (0.374) (0.355) (0.376) (0.446) 
                                                 
40
 This is the age in the period of observation. 
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Main occupation 1.255 1.317 1.268 1.262 1.326 1.309 
  (0.380) (0.404) (0.385) (0.381) (0.406) (0.400) 
Household size 1.045 1.048 1.046 1.040 1.043 1.043 
  (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) 
Own House 1.393 1.503 1.390 1.480 1.663* 1.500 
  (0.372) (0.395) (0.372) (0.406) (0.455) (0.407) 
Number of rooms 1.067 1.057 1.065 1.080 1.068 1.072 
  (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) 
Freehold Tenure 1.002 0.894 0.999 1.036 0.908 0.95 
  (0.300) (0.271) (0.300) (0.307) (0.273) (0.278) 
Access to extension services 0.641 0.493* 0.632 0.572 0.389** 0.551* 
  (0.225) (0.189) (0.223) (0.206) (0.156) (0.199) 
Access to credit 4.154*** 3.840*** 4.290*** 4.264*** 4.105*** 3.742*** 
  (1.483) (1.368) (1.578) (1.518) (1.501) (1.360) 
Extruded Feed  0.034*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
  (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
Floating Cages 0.829 0.849 0.817 0.769 0.717 0.846 
  (0.507) (0.501) (0.500) (0.467) (0.421) (0.512) 
FFA 0.634 0.656 0.647 0.640 0.686 0.580 
  (0.259) (0.257) (0.268) (0.265) (0.275) (0.234) 
Ashanti 0.742 1.082 0.755 0.774 1.268 0.993 
  (0.408) (0.625) (0.419) (0.422) (0.735) (0.550) 
Western 0.650 0.724 0.646 0.627 0.707 0.624 
  (0.239) (0.276) (0.238) (0.231) (0.271) (0.231) 
Volta 0.370* 0.448 0.378* 0.405* 0.544 0.472 
  (0.202) (0.243) (0.206) (0.222) (0.294) (0.258) 
P 8.490*** 8.678*** 8.483*** 8.555*** 8.815*** 8.802*** 
  (0.785) (0.802) (0.785) (0.788) (0.812) (0.817) 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,064 2,064 2,064 2,064 2,064 2,064 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; standard errors are in 
parentheses. Each column presents the hazard ratios from the inclusion of the variable of interest, 
using the Weibull model in each case.  















No Risk ı Į Ȝ ıĮȜ CRRA 
CRRA  _  _ _  _  _  0.883*** 
            
(0.042) 
(value function curvature)  _ 0.488***  _  _ 0.502***  _ 
  
(0.110)     (0.115)   
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ _  _ 1.670  _ 1.397  _ 
      (0.606)   (0.486)   
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ  _  _  _ 1.002 1.012  _ 
        (0.045) (0.046)   
Age  1.075*** 1.074*** 1.074*** 1.075*** 1.074*** 1.070*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Male 0.448*** 0.376*** 0.442*** 0.448*** 0.377*** 0.394*** 
  (0.124) (0.110) (0.123) (0.125) (0.110) (0.113) 
Education 1.087*** 1.079** 1.090*** 1.088*** 1.084** 1.090*** 
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  (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) 
Married 0.616** 0.585** 0.593** 0.617** 0.575** 0.650* 
  (0.140) (0.136) (0.136) (0.142) (0.136) (0.150) 
Experience 1.096*** 1.094*** 1.104*** 1.096*** 1.100*** 1.090*** 
  (0.0219) (0.0216) (0.0229) (0.0219) (0.0227) (0.0220) 
Experience of past 
weather shocks 2.538*** 2.431*** 2.419*** 2.536*** 2.333*** 2.903*** 
  (0.683) (0.668) (0.651) (0.685) (0.647) (0.801) 
Main occupation 1.010 1.183 1.037 1.009 1.192 1.024 
  (0.231) (0.280) (0.237) (0.231) (0.280) (0.234) 
Household size 0.976 0.980 0.975 0.975 0.978 0.980 
  (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) 
Own House 2.107*** 2.102*** 2.016*** 2.110*** 2.055*** 2.104*** 
  (0.470) (0.458) (0.457) (0.474) (0.455) (0.465) 
Number of rooms 1.067 1.042 1.077 1.067 1.053 1.076 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) 
Freehold Tenure 1.152 0.961 1.084 1.153 0.941 1.024 
  (0.295) (0.258) (0.283) (0.296) (0.252) (0.263) 
Access to extension 
services 0.353*** 0.247*** 0.374*** 0.351*** 0.256*** 0.324*** 
  (0.104) (0.080) (0.113) (0.108) (0.088) (0.096) 
Access to credit 2.432*** 2.588*** 2.351*** 2.433*** 2.515*** 2.209*** 
  (0.682) (0.742) (0.654) (0.683) (0.718) (0.628) 
Floating Cages 0.912 0.730 0.803 0.915 0.707 0.742 
  (0.503) (0.402) (0.457) (0.507) (0.393) (0.417) 
Akosombo Strain  0.559 0.535 0.577 0.561 0.556 0.578 
  (0.215) (0.209) (0.223) (0.218) (0.220) (0.222) 
FFA 0.800 0.792 0.778 0.802 0.779 0.721 
  (0.225) (0.218) (0.221) (0.228) (0.219) (0.202) 
Ashanti 0.526 1.047 0.523 0.527 1.008 0.660 
  (0.230) (0.511) (0.228) (0.231) (0.492) (0.287) 
Western 0.596 0.650 0.588* 0.596 0.643 0.596 
  (0.190) (0.217) (0.189) (0.190) (0.216) (0.190) 
Volta 0.209*** 0.300*** 0.202*** 0.210*** 0.296*** 0.275*** 
  (0.079) (0.116) (0.078) (0.080) (0.117) (0.105) 
P 12.05*** 12.32*** 12.13*** 12.05*** 12.38*** 12.47*** 
  (0.903) (0.925) (0.907) (0.904) (0.930) (0.937) 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 1,994 1,994 1,994 1,994 1,994 1,994 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; standard errors are in 
parentheses. Each column presents the hazard ratios from the inclusion of the variable of interest, 




Table 4.7: Estimates of Duration Model of the adopting Floating Cages (Weibull Model) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
 
No Risk  ı Į Ȝ ıĮȜ CRRA 
CRRA  _  _  _ _   _ 0.874** 
            (0.0550) 
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH  _ 0.447**  _  _ 0.393***  _ 
    (0.144)     (0.132)   
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ  _  _ 0.653  _ 0.716  _ 
      (0.296)   (0.351)   
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ  _  _  _ 1.073 1.078  _ 
        (0.0525) (0.0619)   
Age 1.056*** 1.059*** 1.058*** 1.062*** 1.067*** 1.052*** 
  (0.0130) (0.0136) (0.0133) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0128) 
Male 3.620** 2.389 3.900** 4.026** 2.822 2.227 
  (2.094) (1.514) (2.273) (2.401) (1.839) (1.322) 
Education 1.098*** 1.091** 1.105*** 1.103*** 1.101*** 1.089** 
  (0.0371) (0.0385) (0.0379) (0.0385) (0.0401) (0.0377) 
Married 0.788 0.560 0.742 0.823 0.537 1.044 
  (0.299) (0.232) (0.283) (0.317) (0.234) (0.424) 
Experience 1.084*** 1.082*** 1.079*** 1.083*** 1.076*** 1.080*** 
  (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0238) (0.0233) (0.0243) (0.0237) 
Experience of  
past weather shocks 2.585*** 2.801*** 2.792*** 2.439** 2.913*** 2.657*** 
  (0.947) (1.058) (1.040) (0.910) (1.186) (0.986) 
Main occupation 1.878 1.829 2.088* 1.952* 2.098* 1.876 
  (0.723) (0.708) (0.836) (0.758) (0.851) (0.745) 
Household size 0.947 0.922 0.939 0.932 0.897* 0.923 
  (0.0516) (0.0531) (0.0522) (0.0526) (0.0544) (0.0505) 
Own House 0.472** 0.601 0.435** 0.425*** 0.514* 0.503** 
  (0.150) (0.202) (0.143) (0.141) (0.179) (0.164) 
Number of rooms 1.088 1.083 1.103* 1.113* 1.125* 1.110* 
  (0.0603) (0.0641) (0.0627) (0.0644) (0.0708) (0.0636) 
Freehold Tenure 0.897 0.807 0.975 0.883 0.810 0.742 
  (0.321) (0.292) (0.356) (0.315) (0.298) (0.271) 
Access to extension services 0.449** 0.346*** 0.426*** 0.401*** 0.274*** 0.379*** 
  (0.146) (0.121) (0.139) (0.135) (0.103) (0.128) 
Access to credit 2.258** 2.574*** 2.374*** 2.445*** 3.015*** 2.345** 
  (0.737) (0.902) (0.788) (0.811) (1.107) (0.797) 
Extruded Feed 0.206 0.220 0.196 0.153 0.197 0.209 
  (0.238) (0.244) (0.228) (0.192) (0.227) (0.237) 
Akosombo Strain  0.688 0.500 0.860 0.772 0.635 0.591 
  (0.549) (0.417) (0.720) (0.648) (0.560) (0.490) 
FFA 0.231*** 0.348** 0.258*** 0.263*** 0.464* 0.251*** 
  (0.0903) (0.144) (0.105) (0.106) (0.204) (0.0974) 
Ashanti 1.97e-08 2.83e-08 1.70e-08 2.35e-08 2.92e-08 3.03e-08 
  (3.13e-05) (4.50e-05) (2.67e-05) (3.65e-05) (4.57e-05) (4.87e-05) 
Western 1.91e-08 1.88e-08 1.58e-08 2.27e-08 1.54e-08 2.16e-08 
  (2.63e-05) (2.54e-05) (2.14e-05) (3.06e-05) (2.00e-05) (2.97e-05) 
Volta 1.367 1.120 1.235 1.203 0.885 1.331 
  (0.605) (0.509) (0.554) (0.549) (0.416) (0.594) 
P 7.772*** 7.824*** 7.784*** 7.721*** 7.819*** 7.912*** 
  (0.797) (0.801) (0.797) (0.791) (0.799) (0.809) 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
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  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,120 2,120 2,120 2,120 2,120 2,120 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; standard errors are in 
parentheses. Each column presents the hazard ratios from the inclusion of the variable of interest, 
using the Weibull Model in each case.  
4.7.5 Robustness check on the functional form of the hazard 
To check the robustness of the findings of this study to allowing for a hazard model that is 
not Weibull, Table 4.8 shows the outcome with the Cox Model. It may be seen that the 
hazard ratios of the main variable of interest, risk aversion (CRRA, and ı) remain stable, for 
all three technologies. Therefore, this confirms the robustness of the findings reported earlier. 





Table 4.8: Robustness check with Cox Hazard Model 
 Extruded Feed  Akosombo Strain Floating Cage 
 
CRRA ı ıĮȜ CRRA ı ıĮȜ CRRA ı ıĮȜ 
 
         
CRRA 0.909** 
(0.042) 
  0.889** 
(0.047) 



















  1.416 
(0.496) 
  0.829 
(0.348) 
  0.731 
(0.360) 
ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ   0.984 
(0.046) 
  1.083 
(0.058) 
  1.065 
(0.062) 








































































































































































   






















































































































































































Observations 1,994 1,994 1,994 2,064 2,064 2,064 2,120 2,120 2,120 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; standard errors are in parentheses. Each column presents  




4.8 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter models the effect of risk attitudes on the time it takes for smallholder fish 
farmers in Ghana to adopt (with duration models) three improved technologies believed to 
enhance the productivity of fish production. These technologies also present uncertainties-
mainly variabilities in outputs and prices. The study also investigates the effects of other 
farmer-specific, household, farm-specific, access to services and location-specific factors on 
the timing of adoption of the technologies. A number of findings emerge from this study.  
First, the path of adoption is similar for all the three technologies. From Figures 4.4 and 4.5 
initially, there is a slow rate of adoption, followed by a rapid increase in the rate and then a 
decline: rate of technology adoption changes over time. This is confirmed by the value of the 
P- parameter in the parametric regressions which is greater than unity, implying that rate 
adoption of the technologies changes over time.  
Secondly, risk aversion has a positive effect on the timing of adopting the AST, Extruded 
Feed and Floating Cage technologies: risk averse farmers have a higher probability of 
adoption. The AST is a genetically modified breed of tilapia and disease-resistant and 
Extruded Feed poses no known disease-threat to fish, less risky than the existing conventional 
technologies, therefore the earlier adoption by risk averse farmers is as expected. Extruded 
Feed reduces the risk of water pollution and contamination associated with the sinking 
conventional feed, which could pose a threat to the health of the fish and the environment. In 
like manner, the Floating Cage technology reduces the risk of fish mortality in conventional 
ponds since they are enclosed in nets and therefore not easily accessible to possible natural 
predators in other water bodies. Thus, I believe this explains why risk averse farmers are 
likely to adopt these technologies earlier.  
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Another find from this study is that the two risk attitude measures obtained from different 
incentivized multiple price lottery field experiments were positively correlated, and had 
similar effects on the speed of adoption of all three technologies. This is may be an important 
outcome because there are mixed outcomes in the literature regarding the measurement and 
influence of different measures of risk attitudes on the adoption of technologies. So this 
empirical finding gives support to the main findings in this study.  
Furthermore, similar conclusions are drawn from both the nonparametric and parametric 
results from the analysis in this chapter. The Kaplan Meir Survival curves in Figures 4.4 and 
4.5 and the results in Tables 4.4-4.6 show that risk averse farmers adopt all the technologies 
earlier.  
Finally, the results from this empirical chapter show that the prior adoption of Extruded Feed 
delays the adoption of the AST but this has no significant effect on the speed of adopting the 
Floating Cages. The prior adoption of the other two technologies has no significant effect on 
the speed of adopting extruded feed. This suggests a possible substitutability particularly 
between the AST and extruded feed. This is also seen from the Kaplan Meir survival curves 
in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 above, where the graphs of Extruded Feed and AST are very similar. 
This shows that even though the best outcome is obtained when technologies are adopted as a 
bundle, it seems rare for the farmers to adopt all the three technologies simultaneously.  
These findings have policy implications. Since risk aversion matters in the adoption of the 
three technologies, it is necessary for policy makers in the study area to promulgate ex-post 
policies, like making credit accessible to enhance adoption of the technologies. This is 
evidenced from the fact that access to credit is the variable with the highest hazard ratio in all 
estimations. This means that if credit is accessible to the farmers it could accelerate the 
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Effect of ambiguity attitudes on the adoption of technology: the case of smallholder fish 
farmers in Ghana 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to unravel how ambiguity attitudes influence the production choices of 
smallholder fish farmers in a developing country context, citing the adoption of technology as 
an example of such a choice. Understanding ambiguity preferences is crucial because 
ambiguity preferences influence the decision-making process of farmers (Barham et. al., 
2014). Seasonally, and on daily basis, fish farmers make decisions and the decisions they 
make under uncertainty result in different outcomes at the end of the production season. For 
instance, the yields and prices from the use of a technology - low or high - may not be known 
with absolute certainty at the beginning of the production season. In some instances, the 
realization of the payoffs and the probability with which the payoffs occur may be unknown 
or ambiguous. Ambiguity averse farmers dislike being uncertain about the probability with 
which events will take place (Ellsberg, 1961), hence the presence of ambiguity may affect the 
decisions they make. Particularly, when the likelihoods of good and bad outcomes from a 
choice are not known with certainty, ambiguity averse farmers are more likely to evaluate 
such choices assuming the worst possible outcome and therefore this could lead to 
suboptimal production choices. This may explain in part, why ambiguity aversion may limit 
the take up of insurance (Bryan, 2010), the investment in stocks (Zhang, 2015), 
diversification of crops (Engle-Warnick et. al., 2009), and the adoption of new technologies 
(Barham et. al., 2014). The problem is that development economists have often observed that 
such suboptimal choices contribute to the persistence of rural poverty in developing countries 
(Barham et. al., 2014).  
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While it is generally expected that an ambiguity averse farmer will not adopt a new 
technology, insurance, or investment as readily as an ambiguity neutral agent, it remains 
unclear whether attitudes toward ambiguity work in every context (Barham et. al., 2014). 
Empirically, it is essential to understand the ambiguity attitudes of farmers, to enable policy 
makers promulgate appropriate policies to reduce or eliminate any negative effects of 
ambiguity on the economic welfare of rural smallholder fish farmers. )DUPHUV¶ DPELJXLW\
attitudes influence their utility function, and therefore may result in suboptimal economic 
decisions. When ambiguity preferences result in suboptimal choices, policy makers can 
employ ex-ante schemes, such as education or agricultural extension services, to reduce 
IDUPHUV¶DPELJXLW\Engle-Warnick et. al., 2011).  
Farmers learn from other farmers by observing the practices, experiences and outcomes from 
their neighbours (Engle-Warnick et. al., 2014), and the behaviour of farmers in the same 
village can influence or be influenced by the decisions of others. In terms of technology 
adoption, for instance, interaction with other farmers reduces the ambiguity associated with a 
new technology and this may acceleraWH DGRSWLRQ ,Q YLHZ RI WKLV , LQWURGXFH ³Number of 
prior adopters in the same village´DVDYDULDEOHWKDWFDSWXUHVWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHSUHVHQFHRI
other adopters in the same village on the decision of neighbours to use the technology. In a 
village setting, proximity between farmers ensures that as more farmers adopt a given 
technology, more information about the technology is made available to other farmers. If 
ambiguity is a limiting factor to the use of the technology, the presence of prior adopters 
should eliminate or at least diminish the ambiguity associated with the technology and 
therefore reduce the cost associated with information gathering (Alpizar et. al., 2011) and this 
can potentially accelerate the adoption of the technology.  
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This chapter addresses three main issues. First, it measures the ambiguity aversion of fish 
farmers through a field experiment, and a survey in a developing country context. It also 
seeks to assess how demographic or socio-economic characteristics affect the ambiguity 
measures of the farmers. The second issue is the investigation of whether ambiguity attitudes 
matter in explaining fish farming choices, particularly their technology adoption decisions. 
The third issue addressed is the study of the effect of the number of prior adopters of a 
technology on the speed with which a farmer adopts a technology.  
Contextually, this chapter enhances our understanding of the effect of ambiguity preferences 
on the decision-making processes of fish farmers in a developing country setting. It combines 
experimental data on ambiguity attitudes, as well as survey data to answer the question: how 
do ambiguity attitudes affect the production choices of smallholder fish farmers? This chapter 
is an attempt to answer this question by focusing on the effect of ambiguity attitudes on the 
decision to adopt a genetically modified strain of fish, the Akosombo Strain of Tilapia (AST) 
technology in southern Ghana41. This technology offers a fitting platform to assess the effect 
of ambiguity attitudes on technology adoption: it is a genetically modified strain of tilapia, 
which promises faster growth, disease-resistance and larger-sized fish for the market. 
However, the genetic modification presents some uncertainty, as farmers do not know with 
certainty what the distribution of yields of fish would be season after season. Additionally, 
this chapter also highlights how the presence of prior adopters in the same village could 
influence the adoption of this technology. I obtain measures of ambiguity attitudes from 
incentivised experiments conducted in the field, following Ellsberg (1961).  
The results of the analysis show that ambiguity preferences differ from risk preferences 
among the farmers in this study42. Furthermore, the results show that ambiguity preferences 
                                                 
41
 This technology is described in greater detail later in Chapter 4.  
42
 Risk preferences are described in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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do not matter in the speed of adopting the AST technology among smallholder fish farmers in 
Ghana, even though other behavioural parameters, such as risk attitudes, are found to play 
significant roles in this respect. In addition, the number of prior adopters in the same village 
has a positive effect on the speed of adopting the technology. The lack of any significant 
impact of ambiguity attitudes in determining the speed of adopting this technology suggests 
that there are other important determinants of adopting this technology, rather than lack of 
information about it, that affect other technology adoption decisions. 
The reset of this chapter is arranged as follows. After this brief introduction, section 5.2 
summarises the role of ambiguity attitudes in farming choices, especially technology 
adoption. Related empirical literature is discussed in section 5.3, followed by the statements 
of hypotheses in section 5.4, description of the AST technology in section 5.5, and 
explanation of technology adoption in section 5.6. The data collected and the process of 
obtaining the data to unravel the influence of ambiguity attitudes on the decision to adopt the 
technology is the subject of section 5.7. How the ambiguity preferences are elicited is 
discussed in section 5.7.1. The results, summary and conclusion follow in sections 5.8, 5.9 
and 5.10 respectively. 
5.2 The role of ambiguity attitudes in farming decisions 
While new technologies and innovations promise increases in outputs, productivity, and 
profit, many new technologies only perform optimally under certain conditions (which may 
not be easily replicated by farmers in their respective farmlands), such as with precise 
additions of complementary inputs (Ward and Singh, 2015). Deviations from these conditions 
may result in not only lower yields than from existing technologies, but also increased 
variation in yields. Ambiguity in this scenario is due to the fact that the new technologies are 
unknown and unproven by farmers who generally do not know the yield distribution of the 
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new technology. Therefore, in the presence of ambiguity, farmers may make suboptimal 
production choices, depending on the IDUPHUV¶DWWLWXGHVWRDPELJXLW\ 
Fish farmers in developing countries face various uncertainties, and the absence or limited 
access to functioning coping mechanisms such as insurance and credit facilities could hamper 
the productivity of farmers. However, it has been shown that even where insurance facilities, 
such as rainfall index insurance, are present, the uptake is usually low. This low uptake is 
generally attributable to factors including ambiguity aversion (Platteau et. al., 2017, Elabed 
and Carter, 2015; Bryan, 2013). While farmers know what to expect if they do not buy an 
insurance package, they have to grapple with ambiguity if they decide to purchase insurance; 
for instance can they trust the insurance provider? What is the exact coverage of the 
insurance contract? Index insurance is most likely to be affected by ambiguity aversion since 
this type of insurance is prone to suffer from basis risk (Elabed and Carter, 2015)43. For 
instance, rainfall index insurance will not pay out if there is drought and the farmer loses fish 
due to the drought, and not a flood, for example. Thus, when deciding whether to buy the 
insurance package, a farmer faces two levels of uncertainty: having losses from unpredictable 
extreme weather conditions and not receiving a pay out in the event of losses (Platteau et. al., 
2017). Therefore, the presence of these uncertainties will most likely discourage an ambiguity 
averse fish farmer from taking up this insurance.  
Climate change is known to affect agriculture (e.g Schlenker et. al., 2005; Alpizar et. al., 
2011). Changes in weather patterns, such as rainfall, relative humidity, winds and 
temperature, among others, have direct and indirect effects on ecosystems that support fish 
production (Asiedu et. al., 2017). Directly, drastic changes in climatic conditions in an area 
affect the growth, reproduction and mortality of fish (IFAD, 2014). In Ghana, a large number 
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of fish farmers depend on rainfall for their operations, but erratic changes in rainfall patterns 
result in extreme floods or drought in some cases, leading to mortality of the fish in ponds 
(Asiedu et. al., 2017). With the effects of climate change expected to continue, adaptation is 
critical to the survival of the small scale fish farms. However, farmers and policy makers 
alike do not know the probability that risks associated with changes in climate will happen 
with certainty (Alpizar et. al., 2011). The decision to adapt to climate change may be 
influenced by the ambiguity attitudes of farmers. If farmers are ambiguity averse they will 
more likely adapt to climate change when the risk of disaster is unknown to them, compared 
to a similar situation with known risk (Alpizar et. al., 2011). Fish farmers in a village may 
know the pattern of weather conditions from experience but extreme weather conditions such 
as extreme flooding which could destroy fish farms is unpredictable, therefore ambiguity 
averse farmers may invest in adaptations such as planting of trees to control strong wind and 
also to provide shade as well as the creation of dykes to protect ponds from flooding and 
constructing bore hole to supply water during dry season. Sometimes, this might lead to too 
much investment in avoiding ambiguous situations (Alpizar, et. al., 2011), which may be 
economically inefficient.  
In terms of technology adoption, the literature extensively cites risk aversion as a factor that 
influences the decision to adopt a new technology (e.g. Liu, 2013, Ward et. al., 2014); 
however, ambiguity aversion may also play a role in the decision to adopt new and relatively 
less familiar technologies. Prior to adopting a new technology, farmers, especially in 
developing countries have limited knowledge about the distribution of outputs as well as the 
prices that would be received for the produce post-harvest. Therefore, following Ross et. al., 
(2010), this chapter seeks WR ILQG RXW ZKHWKHU IDUPHUV¶ DPELJXLW\ DQG Uisk aversion are 
sufficiently different so that their effects on farming decisions can both be estimated.  
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Contextually, this investigation examines the effect of ambiguity attitudes in the field of 
aquaculture in a developing country setting. Traditional/conventional and new technologies 
present differing levels of both risk and ambiguity to the farmer. In fish farming, ambiguity is 
present when probability assessments prove more difficult, due to say, lack of information 
(Barham et. al., 2014). Since ambiguity is likely to exist in the field of aquaculture, ambiguity 
attitudes may influence the choices of fish farmers in technology adoption. If the new 
technology presents greater level of uncertainty to the farmer, aversion to risk or ambiguity 
could deter adoption. Conversely, if the technology is ambiguity-reducing, for instance, by 
reducing mortality or diseases, I anticipate that more ambiguity averse farmers may be 
incentivised to adopt the technology early (Barham et. al., 2014). This is plausible, for 
instance in a situation where fish mortality in the study area is difficult to predict. If the new 
technology could reduce ambiguity exposure by making the outcomes more predictable, then 
more ambiguity averse farmers would have a higher proclivity to adopt the new technology. 
Engle-Warnick et. al., (2011) study the influence of ambiguity aversion as well as risk 
aversion on the choice of portfolio of crops and diversification in rural Peru among small 
scale farmers. They elicit ambiguity aversion from the choices farmers made in an 
H[SHULPHQWLQYROYLQJPXOWLSOHJDPEOHVDQGDVLQJOHFHUWDLQSULFH7KHDXWKRUV¶FKRLFHRIWKLV
measure was based on the ease of derivation and the similarity between this measure and 
their risk preference measure. They used the calculated risk and ambiguity aversion measures 
in the assessment of the adoption of farming technology portfolios. They find a high and 
significant correlation between risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. The results of their 
study also show that ambiguity aversion, but not risk aversion, significantly influence the 
choice of diversification among varieties of crops by Peruvian farmers. This study does not 
focus on any specific technology, but a farmer is classified as an adopter if he plants any 
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modern crop in the production season. In this present chapter, I focus on a specific 
technology, the AST.  
Akay et. al., (2012) investigate and compare the risk and ambiguity preferences of Western 
University students and Ethiopian farmers with the same decision task. They find that both 
groups are risk and ambiguity averse; but farmers are more risk and ambiguity averse than 
students. They conclude that risk and ambiguity aversion could influence agricultural 
decisions. This study justifies the use of field experiments to elicit their ambiguity and risk 
attitudes among fish farmers in a developing country context. 
In another study, Barham et. al. (2014) study the impacts of risk and ambiguity aversion on 
the speed of adoption of genetically modified (GM) corn and soy seeds among Midwestern 
grain farmers in America. They elicit the risk and ambiguity preferences of the farmers 
through experiments with the farmers. The outcome of their study suggests that risk aversion 
has only a small impact on the timing of adoption of GM soy, while ambiguity aversion has a 
large impact speeding up farmer adoption of GM corn. Their study highlights the importance 
of considering both risk and ambiguity when studying the effects of behavioural parameters 
on the adoption of new technologies. 
Ward and Singh (2015) measure preferences related to risk, loss, and ambiguity through a 
series of experiments among farmers in rural India. With these measures, they investigate 
KRZWKHGHFLVLRQVWRDGRSWQHZWHFKQRORJLHVDUHLQIOXHQFHGE\IDUPHUV¶attitudes to risk and 
ambiguity. Specifically, they focus on a discrete choice experiment over new and familiar 
rice seeds, and show that these behavioural parameters affect decisions to adopt the 
technologies, especially when the new technologies are risk-reducing. They find that risk 
averse and loss averse individuals are more likely to adopt the new seeds (risk-reducing), but 
contrary to expectations, ambiguity averse individuals seemed indifferent between the new 
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seeds and the traditional varieties. The FXUUHQWVWXG\GLIIHUV IURP:DUGDQG6LQJK¶V 
study because I model adoption as a continuous variable-time lapse before adoption-not a 
discrete choice variable.  
The varied outcomes from previous studies clearly demonstrate that there is no consensus 
outcome regarding the effect of ambiguity attitudes on adoption choices. This present 
empirical study contributes to the existing debate by focusing on ambiguity attitudes in fish 
production. First, fish farming differs from crop farming in terms of the challenges and risks 
farmers face in their operations, therefore applying some of the techniques used in the 
previous studies in this present study is an attempt to bridge the gap in the literature and to 
provide an empirical evidence of the effect of ambiguity attitudes on the speed of adopting 
fish farming technologies in a developing country context. Secondly, unlike most studies on 
adoption (except Barham et. al., 2014) the adoption decision in this chapter is modelled as a 
time-varying variable, using the hazard models 44. 
5.3 Hypotheses  
Guided by the findings in the literature and the available data, two main hypotheses are tested 
in this chapter: 
1. Ambiguity attitudes and technology adoption: More ambiguity averse farmers adopt the 
AST later.  
The AST is a relatively new technology, it is a genetically modified strain and is relatively 
less known and therefore farmers may not be able to assign accurate probabilities to the yield 
distribution from adopting the technology. For instance, they may not be certain if they will 
always produce lower or higher yield from adopting the relatively more expensive new 
technology. Furthermore, this technology is optimal in the presence of complementary 
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technologies such as the Extruded Feed technology. What will happen to the yield if a farmer 
is not able to afford the Extruded Feed throughout the season? Will the yield be less than that 
from the traditional breed of fish? This uncertainty could cause farmers who are averse to 
ambiguous situations to be less likely to adopt the technology or may adopt it late. Therefore, 
one might expect ambiguity aversion to be important in determining the speed of technology 
adoption. 
2. Ambiguity aversion, number of prior adopters in the same village and technology 
adoption: In the presence of ambiguity aversion and the number of prior adopters in the 
same village, ambiguity aversion will become less important in the adoption of 
technology. 
For a given farmer, ambiguity about a technology may be eliminated or minimized when at 
least one other farmer in the same village adopts the technology. This is because the farmer 
may be able to gain information about the yield distribution from the adopter in the course of 
time, and therefore this may enhance adoption of the technology, if ambiguity is a limiting 
factor. The number of prior adopters in the same village is generated for a farmer as follows.  
Consider a farmer who lives in Atasvanya, a village in the Greater Accra Region, who learnt 
about the technology in 2005 but started using it in 2009. For every year the farmer could 
have adopted the technology, I count how many other farmers in the same village adopted the 
technology. However, for the first year, 2005, the adoption of the other farmers will not have 
any effect on the adoption decision of the farmer in the same year, until the next season, 
2006, when the farmer could have observed the distribution of yield from the farmers in 
2005. The number of adopters whose adoption decisions could have an effect on the choice of 
the farmer in 2007 will be the number of adopters in 2005 as well as those who adopted in 
2006. Thus for every year from 2006, the number of adopters whose yield distribution could 
provide information to the farmer is a cumulative number (as illustrated in Table 5.1 below).  
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Table 5.1: Cumulative Number of adopters from the same village 











1 2005 0 2 0 
1 2006 0 5 2 
1 2007 0 4 7 (2+5) 
1 2008 0 1 11 (7+4) 
1 2009 1 2 12 (11+1) 
5.4 Data sources and experimental procedures 
The data for this chapter is cross-sectional, drawn from a field experiment involving 
incentivised multiple lotteries (for risk attitudes)45, a versiRQRI(OOVEHUJ¶VWZR-colour 
urn46 experiment (for ambiguity attitudes) and survey data on technology adoption 
decisions47. The data is part of a larger random survey data, and since only a subsample was 
interviewed for their adoption choices, I do not have full information about the adoption of 
the AST technology among all the farmers in the study area. Furthermore, since the data is 
cross-sectional and collected post-adoption, I acknowledge the likelihood of endogeneity 
arising from the ex-post measurement of the explanatory variables (Besly and Case, 1993; 
Ahsanuzzaman, 2014), especially ambiguity attitudes. However, it may be unlikely that the 
adoption of the AST would affect ambiguity attitudes of farmers to any significant level 
(Barham et. al., 2014). There is evidence in the literature that suggests that risk preferences 
among some farmers could be stable over a two (2)-year period of time (e.g. Love and 
Robinson, 1984); therefore I assume same for ambiguity preferences. Another likely concern 
with the present data is multicollinearity, arising from the possible correlation between risk 
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 A detailed description of this experiment and the measurement of risk attitudes used in this chapter are 
summarized in Chapter 2 of this thesis. In this chapter I focus on the measurement of ambiguity attitudes. 
46
 In the field, I used bags of coloured bingo balls instead of urns. The bags were more visually appealing to the 
farmers and something they could easily identify with. 
47
 The survey and field experiments to elicit risk attitudes are explained in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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and ambiguity preferences of the farmers, or some other explanatory variables. To address 
this concern, I perform a test of correlation (Spearman correlation) among the risk attitude 
measures and ambiguity attitudes. 
5.4.1 Eliciting ambiguity attitudes 
(OOVEHUJ¶V  H[SHULment on ambiguity attitudes has been studied over the years, 
especially in laboratory settings (for example Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Bowen and Zi-lei, 
1994), but elicitation of ambiguity attitudes with field experiments in developing country 
settings is scarce (Ross et. al., 2010). This study obtains the ambiguity preferences of the 
IDUPHUV WKURXJK WKH XVH RI (OOVEHUJ¶V WZR-colour urn experiment. Ellsberg (1961) showed 
that a paradox exists when two choices, which should be indifferent according to expected 
utility, will often not be indifferent if one of them is perceived to have unambiguous 
probabilities and the other ambiguous probabilities (Keller et. al.  ,Q (OOVEHUJ¶V
demonstration of ambiguity, ambiguity is created by the uncertainty regarding the number of 
balls of each colour there were in an urn. In practical decisions, a probability can be 
ambiguous due to vagueness, imprecision, conflicting or lack of information (Keller et. al., 
2007). In this experiment, farmers were presented with two-colour balls in two different bags; 
one bag with a known number of balls of each colour and the other with the same number of 
balls, but an unknown composition of each colour of balls. It is expected that this present 
research will be able to unravel the ambiguity aversion of the farmers based on their 
willingness to pay to play either the unambiguous (risky) or ambiguous lottery. Ambiguity 
averse farmers are expected to pay higher amounts to play the lottery with known number of 
balls of each colour. Empirically, I elicited the ambiguity aversion of the farmers by 
presenting them with the following two scenarios and their responses were recorded: 
Imagine the following game and tell us what your response is: 
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a) Risky Gamble 
A sack is filled with 10 white balls and 10 black balls. I will ask you to pick a colour-black or 
white- and then let you pick one ball out of the sack without looking. If the ball turns out to 
be the colour you picked earlier, then I will give you GHC100. However, if the colour is 
different from what you picked earlier, you get nothing. 
Would you be willing to pay some money in advance to play this game?   Yes [ ]   No [  ] 
If yes, how much would you be willing to pay to play this game? GHC [  ] 
,IQRZK\QRW"««««««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
Now imagine another game: 
b) Ambiguous Gamble 
$ VDFN LV ILOOHG ZLWK  EDOOV D PL[ RI ZKLWH DQG EODFN EDOOV <RX GRQ¶W NQRZ WKH H[DFW
number of each colour of ball in the sack. I will ask you to pick a colour-black or white- and 
then let you pick one ball out of the sack without looking.  If the ball turns out to be the 
colour you picked earlier, then I will give you GHC100. However, if the colour is different 
from what you picked earlier, you get nothing. 
Would you be willing to pay some money in advance to play this game?   Yes [ ]   No [  ] 
If yes, how much would you be willing to pay to play this game? GHC [  ] 
,IQRZK\QRW"«««««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
5.4.2 Ambiguity aversion measure  
Generally, the most standard and the simplest way to measure ambiguity aversion in the 
ODERUDWRU\LVWRHOLFLWVXEMHFWV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRSD\:73IRUWKHDPELJXRXVJDPEOHDQG the 
WTP for the unambiguous gamble separately, then the difference between the two valuations 
is reckoned as the measure for ambiguity aversion (Keller et. al., 2007). This study measures 
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ambiguity aversion as the difference between the willingness to pay for the risky 
(unambiguous) gamble and the willingness to pay for the ambiguous gamble (Keller et. al., 
2007). For instance, if a farmer indicates the willingness to pay for the risky lottery and the 
ambiguous lottery as GHC10 and GHC5 respectively, the ambiguity aversion of this farmer is 
reckoned as 5 (݅Ǥ ݁Ǥ  ? ?െ  ? ൌ  ?)48. 
There are a few points to note regarding the measure of ambiguity attitudes employed in this 
study compared to other measures of ambiguity attitudes in the literature. Most of the few 
studies that measure ambiguity attitudes in an experimental setting use multiple rows of 
ELQDU\ ORWWHU\ DQG WKH SDUWLFLSDQW¶V DPELJXLW\ SUHIHUHQFH LV PHDVXUHG DW WKH SRLQWURZ DW
which a participant switches from the unambiguous to the ambiguous prospect (Lauriola and 
Levin, 2001, Barham et. al., 2014; Akay et. al., 2012). Specifically, these approaches make 
subjects reveal their certainty equivalents for the lotteries. The certainty equivalent is the 
certain amount that makes subjects indifferent between receiving the prospect or the sure 
amount (Ahsanuzzaman, 2014). Eggert and Lokina (2007) and Akay et. al., (2012), calculate 
the certainty equivalent as the midpoint between the lowest certain payoffs for which the 
agent chooses the sure amount and the highest certain payment for which the agent chooses 
to play the lottery. The relative location of the switch-over in the ambiguous lottery compared 
WRWKHXQDPELJXRXVORWWHU\UHYHDOVWKHDJHQW¶VDPELJXLW\SUHIHUHQFHV 
Particularly, Akay et. al.FDOFXODWHDPELJXLW\DYHUVLRQșas  
஼ாೃି஼ாಲ஼ாೃା஼ாಲ           (2) 
Where ܥܧோ is the certainty equivalent amount of money for the risky prospect, ܥܧ஺ is the 
certainty equivalent for the ambiguous prospect. Their measure of ambiguity preference 
ranges from -1 (ambiguity loving) to 0 (risk neutral) to 1 (ambiguity averse).  
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 GHC is Ghana Cedis, and it is the official currency of Ghana. 
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The measure of ambiguity preferences used in this chapter is more simplistic than the above, 
but the classification of the outcomes is the same as those of Akay et. al. (2012). The data in 
this study does not permit the elicitation of certainty equivalent. This is because instead of 
rows of lotteries and a sure amount in the experiment, the farmers were presented with two 
scenarios, one describing a risky gamble and the other an ambiguous gamble (Ellsberg, 
1961). However, it is still possible to measure ambiguity preference as the difference in 
willingness to pay to play the unambiguous lottery and the ambiguous lottery. This procedure 
is more appealing in the field setting as it is easier for the farmers to comprehend, and easily 
reveals the relative preference of the farmers for the unambiguous and ambiguous lottery. 
This survey was carried out immediately after the risk attitude elicitation with incentivised 
multiple price lottery, therefore it is most probable that the farmers understood the process to 
elicit their ambiguity attitudes through prior experience. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Summary of data 
Table 5.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the farmers surveyed for this chapter49. About 
75% of the farmers had adopted the AST technology at the time of this survey. On average, it 
takes 17.55 years from the time of knowing about the technology till a farmer adopts the 
technology. The average age of the participants is about 41 years, with about 9.8 years of 
formal education, and household size of 6 persons. In terms of experience in fish farming, the 
average farmer had been in fish-farming related activities for about 5.5 years. When asked if 
they had encountered any negative weather shocks (especially flooding) in the past five years, 
73% of the famers responded in the affirmative. The average number of prior adopters in the 
same village of a typical farmer is about one (1), which may suggest that most farmers had at 
least one other farmer adopting the technology in the same village before adopting the 
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 Most of the variables are described in the previous chapter, only a few are discussed here. 
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technology. In terms of the primary occupation of the farmers, about 71% indicated fish 
farming as their primary occupation. This suggests that they are involved in diversified 
enterprises or are involved in other ventures aside fish farming. I find that only 48% of the 
farmers had had some extension contact in the past production season, while 78% had access 
to credit.  
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of smallholder fish farmers in Ghana 
Variable Definition     Mean Standard 
deviation 
Dependent Variables    
Adoption of AST  =1 if farmer had used the AST 0.75 0.435 
Time to adoption Time lapse to adoption 17.55 2.39 
Independent Variables    
Farmer characteristics    
Age of farmer  Age of respondent in the period of observation, in 
years 
41.93 13.24 
Gender of farmer =1 if farmer is male  0.92 0.28 
Education Years of formal education attained by farmer 9.83 4.62 
Marital Status = 1 if farmer is married  0.75 0.44 
Ambiguity Attitude Ambiguity preference measures as difference in the 




Risk attitude obtained from TCN lottery experiment 0.89 0.52 
Risk attitude (CRRA)  Risk attitude obtained from Brick et. al. lottery  2.35 2.45 
/RVVDYHUVLRQȜ Loss aversion from TCN lottery experiment 1.92 2.40 
3UREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJĮ Probability weighting from TCN lottery experiment 0.74 0.30 
Experience Number of years a farmer has engaged in fish 
production  
5.47 5.37 
Past weather shocks = 1 if farmer experienced flooding in the past 0.73 0.44 
Main occupation = 1 if fish farming is main occupation  0.71 0.46 
Household 
characteristics 
   





Own House = 1 if farmer owns his house 0.63 0.48 
Number of rooms  1XPEHURIURRPVLQIDPHUV¶KRXVHKROG 4.23 2.68 
Freehold tenure =1 if farmer owns the farm land 0.33 0.47 
Adopters in same village Number of farmers from the same village who 
adopted the AST up each year up to the year of 
adoption by a given farmer  
0.85 2.74 
Access to services     
Access to extension 
services  
=1 if farmer has access to extension services 0.48 0.50 
Access to credit = if farmer has access to credit 0.78 0.42 
FFA50 membership  LIIDUPHULVDPHPEHURIILVKIDUPHUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQ 0.32 0.47 
Region level variables     
Western = 1 if farmer is resident in the Western Region  0.22 0.41 
Ashanti = 1 if farmer is resident in the Ashanti Region  0.17 0.37 
Volta = 1 if farmer is resident in the Volta Region 0.23 0.41 
5.5.2 Ambiguity attitudes 
A summary of the ambiguity attitudes of the farmers is presented in Table 5.3. As expected, 
there is evidence that farmers have a higher willingness to pay for the risky lottery (GhC 
7.07) than for the ambiguous lottery (GhC 5.87), therefore the calculated average ambiguity 
attitude measure is 1.20. This difference is statistically significant (p-value=0.013). This 
outcome shows that the farmers are more averse to the ambiguous gamble and were therefore 
willing to pay less to participate in this gamble than the other lottery with known 
probabilities. This positive value indicates that the average farmer is generally ambiguity 
averse. This outcome is corroborated by Keller et. al., (2007), who indicated that people pay 
less under ambiguous situations relative to a corresponding unambiguous situation, and the 
more ambiguous the gamble, the less people were willing to pay for it. From a technology 
adoption point of reference, if the outcome from the experiment could be extrapolated to their 
technology adoption decisions, it may be inferred that they would be more likely to invest in 
the relatively familiar technologies than newer technologies with ambiguous outcomes.  
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Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the farmers according to their ambiguity attitude 
classifications. Even though the average farmer is ambiguity averse, it may be seen from the 
figure that majority (59%) of the farmers are ambiguity neutral. This means many of them are 
generally indifferent between the risky and ambiguous lottery choices. 
Table 5.3: Willingness to Pay (WTP) for gambles and ambiguity aversion 
Variable  Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
WTP for risky (unambiguous) 
gamble  
7.07 9.87 0 50 
WTP for ambiguous gamble 5.87 9.29 0 50 
Ambiguity Measure 1.20 5.86 -40 30 
5.5.3 Correlation among risk aversion and ambiguity aversion measures 
Table 5.4 summarizes the test of correlations among the ambiguity measure and the risk 
attitude scores of the farmers. The Spearman correlation test was performed among the three 
parameters from the TCN51 lottery, the CRRA52 parameter from the Brick et. al. (2012) 
lottery, and the ambiguity aversion measure. The Spearman correlation procedure tests the 
null hypothesis of no association between variables. The main interest in this aspect of the 
study is to answer the question: is a risk averse farmer also ambiguity averse? The null is 
rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis that ambiguity aversion and utility curvature 
(Sigma) are related measures. In other words, a typical risk averse farmer (at least according 
to the TCN measure) may also be ambiguity averse. However, apart from correlation with the 
sigma parameter, the ambiguity aversion measure is not correlated with any of the other risk 
aversion parameters. Since the ambiguity measure is not correlated with CRRA at any level 
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 7KLV LV WKH 7DQDND &DPHUHU DQG 1JX\HQ  ORWWHU\ IURP ZKLFK WKUHH SDUDPHWHUV ı Į DQG Ȝ are 
obtained, and described in detail in Chapter 4. 
52
 This is the Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function  
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of significance, it indicates that the ambiguity and risk attitude measures may be measuring 
different attributes of the farmers. This outcome contradicts the findings of Ahsanuzzaman 
(2014). He finds positive, high and statistically significant correlation between risk and 
ambiguity attitudes. This could be due to the fact that they obtain both the risk and ambiguity 
measures from the same lottery experiment and calculated the certainty equivalent for both 
the risk and ambiguity attitudes from the row the participants switched in the lottery, which is 
quite different from the procedure in this study. In this study, risk and ambiguity attitudes are 
obtained from two separate experiments, and therefore that may account for the differences in 
the observed attitudes of the farmers. It is essential to highlight the fact that if risk and 
ambiguity attitudes are found to be significantly correlated, it is possible that if only 
ambiguity attitudes are used in the hazard model, the ambiguity attitude variable could pick 
up the effect of the risk attitude measure. However, ambiguity could be eliminated or at least 
minimized in the presence of at least one prior adopter in the same village, but risk aversion 
will persist in the presence or absence of other adopters. Therefore, interacting ambiguity 
attitudes with number of prior adopters provides a better test of whether ambiguity aversion is 
affecting farming decisions. 
Table 5.4: Correlations among Risk and Ambiguity Aversion Measures 
 Ambiguity Aversion CRRA Sigma Alpha Lambda 
Ambiguity Aversion 1.000     
CRRA -0.024 1.000    
Sigma 0.219** 0.524*** 1.000   
Alpha 0.201** 0.102 0.285*** 1.000  
Lambda 0.070 -0.125 0.075 0.046 1.000 




5.5.4 Demographic characteristics and attitudes towards ambiguity  
One objective of this study was to investigate the farmer/farm specific characteristics that 
affect the attitudes to ambiguity53 of the farmers. To accomplish this objective, I estimate a 
simple linear regression model relating each specified measure of ambiguity attitude to 
specified characteristics of each farmer as follows: 
ܣ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛܺ ൅ ፴௜          (3) 
Where ܣ௜ is the ambiguity of the ith farmer; ߛ is a vector of parameters to be estimated; ܺ is 
WKHVHWRIWKHIDUPHU¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVVXFKDVDJHPDULWDOVWDWXVHWF፴࢏ is the error term of 
the linear regression. 
The results from these regressions are summarized in Table 5.5 below. The results from these 
estimations show that some socio-economic characteristics of the farmers are significantly 
correlated with the measures of ambiguity attitudes. For instance, characteristics such as age, 
household size, freehold tenure and the Ashanti Region relative to the base region, Greater 
Accra, are significant at the 5% level of significance. While age and freehold tenure have 
negative effects on ambiguity aversion, household size and Ashanti Region have positive 
effects. The negative coefficient of age suggests that older farmers are less ambiguity averse. 
This assertion confirms a similar finding by Sanou (2015), among farmers in Niger. Owning 
the farmland provides a sense of security to the farmer, compared to renting a piece of land, 
where uncertainties about the future of the farmland exists: land owners could evict a farmer 
from the land with little or no prior notice. Thus, farmers with freehold tenure may be less 
ambiguity averse. Larger household sizes could mean that outcome from any bad decision on 
the part of the farmers would affect not only the farmer but many other people. Therefore, 
this could mean that a farmer with a larger household size would be more cautious in making 
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 The discussion of the other attributes of farmers and how they are correlated with risk attitudes is detailed in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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economic choices which may result in delays. This is consistent with findings in the extant 
literature (e.g. Ahsanuzzaman, 2014).  
From this section, it has been demonstrated that only a few personal characteristics affect the 
ambiguity attitude measure and therefore multicollinearity arising from the inclusion of these 
socio-demographic characteristics and the measures of ambiguity attitudes in the technology 
adoption estimation may not be an issue of concern at this point. The result of technology 
adoption and how it is affected by attitudes towards ambiguity is discussed next.  
Table 5.5: Regressions of factors affecting attitudes to ambiguity 




Male  -0.867 
(1.967) 
Married  -0.909 
(1.351) 




Experience  -0.147 
(0.108) 
Experienced Past Weather Shock 1.674 
(1.269) 
Main Occupation 0.990 
(1.260) 
Owns house 0.661 
(1.169) 
Number of Rooms -0.305 
(0.218) 
Membership in FFA 0.136 
(1.414) 
Freehold Tenure -3.097** 
(1.281) 






Constant  4.794 
(3.126) 
R-Squared  0.203 




Figure 5.1: Distribution of farmers according to their ambiguity attitudes 
5.5.5 Effect of ambiguity attitudes and other variables on the speed of adopting the 
AST technology  
The hazard ratios from the estimation of the hazard model are presented in Table 5.6. For 
each variable, a hazard ratio greater than one (1) speeds up adoption, while a hazard ratio of 
less than one (1) is associated with slower rate of adoption. Overall, the value of the shape 
parameter, P, greater than one (1) implies that the probability of adopting the AST increases 
over time. When risk attitudes are not included in the hazard model, it is found that ambiguity 
attitude alone, is not significant in explaining the speed of adopting the AST. When interacted 
with the number of prior adopters, ambiguity attitudes are still not significantly correlated 
with the speed of adopting the AST technology among the farmers in the study area. On the 
other hand, risk attitudes (BVB and TCN (ı)), are found to have statistically significant effect 
on the adoption of the technology, and remain significant when ambiguity attitudes are 
included in the same regression. 
The results obtained in this chapter are similar to Ward and Singh (2014).They find that risk, 
but not ambiguity aversion, has a significant effect on the adoption of new rice seeds among 
Indian farmers. A possible explanation for the finding in this study could stem from the fact 
that 75% of the farmers in this study had adopted the AST technology. Perhaps, some farmers 
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have learnt about the probability distribution associated with the use of the AST technology 
(Sanou, 2015), and hence ambiguity may have been reduced or eliminated and therefore 
plays no significant role in their choice. These outcomes, however, are contrary to the 
findings of Ross et. al., (2010). They find that ambiguity aversion decreases the likelihood of 
technology adoption but risk aversion plays no significant role in the adoption decision. 
If it is true that ambiguity may be eliminated by the number of adopters in same village, then 
it may be inferred that the speed of adopting the AST will increase when more farmers adopt 
the technology in previous seasons. There is evidence of this in the results: the hazard ratio 
for Adopters in Village (cumulative) is greater than one (1) and highly significant in all 
estimations. This suggests that for two identical farmers who have not adopted the AST in 
this season, the farmer who has more adopters in his village is more likely to adopt it in the 
next season. Interaction between ambiguity attitudes and the number of prior adopters of the 
technology, however, is found to have no significant effect on the speed of adoption. In other 
words, even though the number of adopters may influence adoption decisions independently 
of ambiguity attitudes, ambiguity attitudes interacting with the number of adopters has no 
effect on adoption. In addition to the number of prior adopters, ambiguity and risk attitudes, 
some other factors have significant effects on the speed of technology adoption. Age, 
Education, Experience, Number of rooms and Access to credit have hazard ratios greater than 
one (1), implying that these attributes of the farmers accelerate the adoption of the 
technology54. 
Table 5.6: Hazard Ratios for Ambiguity And Risk Attitudes with Weibull Model  
VARIABLE Ambiguity CRRA and Ambiguity  Ambiguity and TCN Parameters 
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH   0.630* 
 
  (0.167) 
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ   0.591 
 
  (0.258) ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ   1.071 
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   (0.063) 
CRRA  0.850***  
  (0.049)  
Adopters  in village (Cumulative)  1.282*** 1.289*** 1.278*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
#Adopters*Ambiguity 1.006 1.005 1.006 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ambiguity 1.029 1.032 1.029 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) 
Age 1.034*** 1.030** 1.035*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Male 1.080 0.781 0.906 
 (0.467) (0.333) (0.423) 
Education 1.073* 1.086** 1.086** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) 
Married 1.594 1.819* 1.610 
 (0.513) (0.599) (0.541) 
Experience 1.084*** 1.080*** 1.069*** 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) 
Experienced Past Weather Shock 1.313 1.607 1.268 
 (0.376) (0.476) (0.376) 
Main Occupation 1.150 1.275 1.324 
 (0.356) (0.405) (0.417) 
Household Size 1.072 1.067 1.068 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) 
Owns house 1.317 1.446 1.493 
 (0.357) (0.396) (0.412) 
Number of Rooms 1.120** 1.124** 1.113* 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.063) 
Freehold 1.122 1.042 1.029 
 (0.346) (0.312) (0.329) 
Extension Contact 0.617 0.540* 0.396** 
 (0.226) (0.201) (0.168) 
Access to Credit  4.728*** 4.325*** 5.543*** 
 (1.723) (1.609) (2.203) 
Extruded Feed 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Floating Cages 0.569 0.557 0.510 
 (0.349) (0.335) (0.309) 
FFA 0.459* 0.439* 0.535 
 (0.208) (0.194) (0.241) 
Ashanti 1.629 2.473 2.722 
 (0.970) (1.482) (1.769) 
Western 1.608 1.547 1.690 
 (0.640) (0.623) (0.688) 
Volta 0.606 0.756 0.813 
 (0.349) (0.429) (0.457) 
P 8.184*** 8.498*** 8.431*** 
 (0.769) (0.797) (0.793) 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,064 2,064 2,064 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively 
Robustness Check  
It may be argued that perhaps the results obtained were influenced by the functional form of 
the hazard model employed. In this study, the preferred model was the Weibull model, 
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because it allows the influence of time-varying variables to be assessed. However, as a 
robustness check on the key outcomes of this present chapter, the speed of adoption is 
assessed using the Cox model; the results are shown in Table 5.7. The hazard ratios of the 
key variables of interest, ambiguity aversion and risk aversion (CRRA) remain unchanged in 
terms of direction: risk aversion (CRRA) but not ambiguity aversion, plays a significant role 
in the speed of adopting the AST technology. Furthermore, the number of prior adopters also 
has a positive and significant effect on the adoption decision of the farmers. These suggest 
that the findings from the analysis are not simply because of the functional form of the hazard 
model employed.  
Table 5.7: Hazard Ratios for Ambiguity and Risk Attitudes with Cox Model 
VARIABLE Ambiguity CRRA and 
Ambiguity  
Ambiguity and TCN 
Parameters 
ıYDOXHIXQFWLRQFXUYDWXUH   0.691 
   (0.182) ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ   0.582 
   (0.253) ȜORVVDYHUVLRQ 
 
  1.047 
  (0.062) 
CRRA  0.867***  
  (0.048)  
Adopters  in village 
(Cumulative)  
1.287*** 1.293*** 1.284*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
#Adopters*Ambiguity 1.006 1.005 1.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ambiguity 1.033 1.035 1.033 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) 
Age 1.034*** 1.031** 1.035*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Male 0.960 0.728 0.850 
 (0.411) (0.310) (0.392) 
Education 1.081** 1.093** 1.089** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
Married 1.597 1.816* 1.610 
 (0.512) (0.598) (0.538) 
Experience 1.080*** 1.076*** 1.066*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Experienced Past Weather 
Shock 
1.308 1.553 1.287 
 (0.376) (0.462) (0.383) 
Main Occupation 1.232 1.346 1.381 
 (0.377) (0.422) (0.431) 
Household Size 1.056 1.055 1.054 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.051) 
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Owns house 1.297 1.405 1.428 
 (0.350) (0.384) (0.393) 
Number of Rooms 1.121** 1.126** 1.113* 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.063) 
Freehold 1.095 1.031 1.007 
 (0.334) (0.306) (0.321) 
Extension Contact 0.641 0.568 0.452* 
 (0.232) (0.209) (0.189) 
Access to Credit  4.421*** 4.115*** 5.135*** 
 (1.588) (1.504) (2.005) 
Extruded Feed 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) 
Floating Cages 0.576 0.561 0.515 
 (0.351) (0.336) (0.313) 
FFA 0.464* 0.450* 0.531 
 (0.203) (0.192) (0.231) 
Ashanti 1.708 2.399 2.538 
 (0.998) (1.407) (1.613) 
Western 1.629 1.553 1.681 
 (0.648) (0.626) (0.680) 
Volta 0.709 0.836 0.882 
 (0.400) (0.465) (0.489) 
Observations 2,064 2,064 2,064 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion 
Research has shown that technology adoption, especially in developing countries, is slow and 
incomplete, at best (Ahsanuzzaman, 2014). This has been attributed to many factors; 
prominent among them is risk aversion. However, prior to the adoption of a new technology, 
the distribution of the possible outcomes of the technology may not be known with certainty 
by the farmers. This introduces ambiguity into the adoption decision, but the literature 
investigating ambiguity attitude and fish production in developing context is scarce. This 
chapter attempts to fill the gap by investigating how ambiguity attitudes influence the 
decisions of a fish farmer in a developing country context; by focussing on the adoption of 
the AST technology, as an example of such decisions. Two main questions are answered in 
this chapter: 




The results from this analysis show that ambiguity preferences of the farmers are affected by 
some personal and socio-economic characteristics of the farmers, including age and 
educational status. For Hypothesis One, the null hypothesis (that ambiguity aversion slows 
adoption) is rejected, in favour of the alternative that ambiguity aversion plays no significant 
role in determining the speed of adopting the AST technology. The second Hypothesis 
(Number of prior adopters and adoption) could not be rejected. This demonstrates that the 
number of prior adopters in a village accelerates the adoption of the AST technology. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that a typical smallholder fish farmer in the study area is 
ambiguity averse; however, this is not correlated with the risk attitude measures.  
It must be highlighted that the results of this chapter regarding risk aversion and adoption 
decisions confirm that the findings in the previous chapter are robust to the inclusion of 
measures of ambiguity aversion. Risk averse farmers are found to have a higher proclivity of 
adopting the AST technology earlier, perhaps because this technology is risk-reducing55.  
This chapter advances and contributes to our comprehension of how behavioural 
characteristics (ambiguity preferences and risk preferences) affect the decision-making 
processes of smallholder fish farmers in a developing country context by combining data 
from a lab experiment in the field, and a survey data on actual farm technology adoption as 
well as demographic characteristics of farmers, all collected in the same experimental 
session.  
The findings from this investigation have policy implications. Though ambiguity attitudes 
have no significant effect on the speed of adopting this technology, it is still possible that in 
villages where this technology is not prevalent, ambiguity aversion could slow the rate of 
adoption, therefore when introducing this technology to new farmers extension agents may 
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 This is also confirmed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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need to provide practical demonstration of the use of the technology and the resultant 
outcome from such demonstration to reduce ambiguity associated with the technology. 
Furthermore, access to credit56 accelerates adoption; therefore it is imperative that if the 
government or policy makers want to enhance the adoption of the AST, measures should be 
put in place to make credit more accessible to smallholder fish farmers.  
Like any other research work, there is still more to learn about the effect of ambiguity 
attitudes on farming decisions in developing countries. This chapter has contributed to the 
knowledge in this respect, but for future research purposes one area to consider is to increase 
the number of farmers recruited for the field experiment. This may enhance the power of 
predicting their economic decisions with their ambiguity attitude measures. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusion 
The overarching objective of this thesis was to elicit and compare the risk attitudes of within-
subject sample of smallholder fish farmers in southern Ghana using three of the frontier 
methods used to elicit risk attitudes in the literature. The risk attitudes elicited from these 
methods are employed in subsequent chapters of this thesis to investigate how risk 
preferences affect production efficiency and technology adoption.  
To achieve this objective, this study employed incentivised field experiments involving 
multiple price lotteries to elicit risk preferences as well as the use of (OOVEHUJ¶VWZR-
colour urn experiment to elicit ambiguity preferences of the same sample of farmers. The 
average farmer is ambiguity averse. There is sufficient evidence from the findings of this 
study that suggests that risk, but not ambiguity preferences influence actual production 
choices of the fish farmers. It is also shown, as in some previous studies, that the method of 
elicitation of risk preferences does have an influence on the measures of risk attitudes, and 
that risk preferences of farmers could be context or domain-specific, rather than constant 
across all domains. A summary of the key findings from each chapter of this thesis is 
provided below. 
Chapter 2 reports the findings of the incentivised multiple price lottery, modelled after Brick 
et. al., (2012) and Tanaka et. al., (2010), employed in eliciting the risk preferences of the 
farmers. Also reported in this chapter are the subjective self-reported risk attitude scores of 
the farmers on an 11-point scale, following Dohmen et. al., (2011). The aim of this chapter 
was to find out if the experimentally elicited risk preferences correlated with the self-reported 
risk attitudes, and whether they both could explain some observed production choices of the 
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farmers. Results show that a typical farmer in our study is risk preferring (from the Brick et. 
al. lottery), or risk averse (from the Tanaka et. al. lottery) depending on the method of 
elicitation, but the two measures of risk attitudes are highly correlated. It is possible that the 
two experiments capture similar attributes of the farmers. Additionally, from the Tanaka et. 
al. (2012) lottery experiment, it was found that the average fish farmer overweights small 
probabilities and is loss averse. Furthermore, the experimental measure of risk preferences 
and the self-reported risk attitude measure provide significant explanation of some but not all 
observed and hypothetical economic and production choices made by the farmers. Thus, it is 
may be concluded that risk preferences of farmers may not be constant in every 
domain/context and elicitation method. Also, hypothetical bias may help explain why the 
stated risk attitude measure (SRRA) is correlated with the hypothetical investment decision of 
the farmers.  
Chapter 3 focusses on the measurement of economic efficiency, and how this measure is 
affected by the risk preferences of the farmers. The risk attitude measures obtained from the 
field experiment conducted in Chapter 2 are used as explanatory variables in this third 
chapter. The economic efficiency is estimated using a deterministic procedure (COLS), 
where all deviation from the economic frontier are attributed to farmer inefficiency, and a 
stochastic (SFA) procedure, which disaggregates deviation from the frontier into farmer 
inefficiency and stochastic factors (outside the farmers¶ control). Before the stochastic 
frontier estimation, a skewness test is conducted on the residuals to justify the use of SFA, 
instead of the COLS. The result showed that our data is not significantly skewed in the right 
direction to warrant the use of SFA, however, I report findings from both the SFA and COLS. 
This is because the SFA incorporates stochastic noise, such as measurement errors in the 
analysis of efficiency. From the SFA analysis, less than 20% of the variation in costs of 
production among the farmers is due to farmer inefficiency. It was expected that more risk 
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averse farmers would be less economic efficient, however, no statistically significant effect of 
risk attitudes on the economic efficiency is evidenced. This could be due to the fact that the 
data did not have the expected skewness, and also because most (about 80%) of the variation 
in the observed economic efficiency is due to stochastic factor factors much more than 
farmer-specific attributes, such risk attitudes.  
Chapter 4 highlights the effect of risk attitudes on the speed of adopting Floating Cages, 
Extruded Feed and Akosombo Strain of Tilapia (AST) technologies in the fish farming sector 
in southern Ghana. The adoption decisions are modelled with the hazard/survival models. 
Contrary to most existing literature on speed of adoption of technologies (e.g. Liu, 2013), the 
analysis shows that risk averse farmers are more likely to adopt AST, extruded/floating feed 
and Floating Cage technologies earlier. This novel outcome is due to the nature of the 
WHFKQRORJLHV LQ TXHVWLRQ DV SHUFHLYHG E\ WKH IDUPHUV /LX¶V  VWXG\ IRU LQVWDQFH
focuses on the adoption of cotton seeds modified genetically with Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) 
bacteria, which enables cotton plants to produce phytotoxins to kill pests; the subjective risks 
posed by these phytotoxins to the farmers themselves may be an additional source of 
uncertainty and a likely reason for the delayed adoption by risk averse farmers. However, in 
this study, even though the AST is also genetically modified, it produces no toxins and yet it 
is more disease-resistant than the local breeds, therefore it may be perceived by the farmers as 
risk-reducing and hence it is not surprising that risk averse farmers adopt this technology 
earlier.57 The outcome from this chapter confirms the need to incorporate risk attitudes in the 
analysis of technology adoption decisions of fish farmers in developing countries.  
Chapter 5 assesses the effects of ambiguity attitudes on the decision to adopt the Akosombo 
Strain of Tilapia technology among smallholder fish farmers using the hazard model. The risk 
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attitude measures used in this chapter were obtained from the field experiment described in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. The ambiguity attitude is elicited following Keller et. al., (2007), as 
the difference in the willingness to pay to play a lottery with risky prospects and a lottery 
with ambiguous prospects. Since the focus of this chapter is how ambiguity attitudes 
influence farming choices, using speed of technology adoption as an example, the hazard 
model is employed. The results from this analysis show that risk aversion, but not ambiguity 
aversion, significantly affects the decision to adopt the AST technology. This outcome is 
robust when each of the behavioural parameters is included independently of each other and 
when they are used together in the hazard model. This suggests that perhaps, risk aversion 
has a more consistent and significant influence on the adoption of technologies in the study 
area than ambiguity aversion. I argue that ambiguity is resolved or at least reduced when 
there is one other adopter in the village of a prospective adopter, but risk is unaffected by the 
presence or absence of other adopters. Therefore, with over 75% farmers having adopted the 
AST in the study area, ambiguity about the technology is diminished, but risk will still 
persist. The finding of this chapter confirms that the result of the previous chapter remains 
robust after the inclusion of ambiguity attitudes. Thus, in the analysis of the adoption of 
technologies, perhaps risk attitudes should be taken into consideration, since they may affect 
the decision and speed of adoption of technology significantly. 
Overall, there is no consensus conclusion among researchers about the best all-round method 
of eliciting risk and ambiguity attitudes and how these behavioural parameters affect 
economic decisions. However, the general understanding is that risk and ambiguity attitudes 
are sensitive to the method of elicitation and context. This study is an attempt to provide 
some insight into the effectiveness of different elicitation methods in measuring the risk 
preferences of smallholder farmers in a developing nation context. This study has shown that 
risk preferences are sensitive to the method of elicitation and that the risk preferences 
188 
 
revealed in the lottery experiments do not offer significant explanation for two specific 
hypothetical economic choices made by fish farmers, at least in a developing world context. 
This finding, however, does not imply that risk attitudes elicited with incentivised lottery 
experiments may never explain risky economic decisions of farmers. Given the enhanced 
comprehension of the farmers using visual aids, such as coloured bingo balls in the field 
experiment, this study claims that risk attitudes elicited from smallholder farmers in the 
developing world context could provide a good prediction of real life, domain-specific risky 
and ambiguous economic choices, such as the actual adoption of technologies. Therefore, it is 
imperative that when designing experiments to elicit risk and ambiguity preferences in 
developing world, participants should be engaged in appropriate and relatable domains and 
contexts specific to their field of operation. Furthermore, more farmers should be recruited in 
future experiments to provide more explanatory power in the regressions.  
6.2 Limitations of the thesis 
The cross-sectional data used in this study came from two main primary sources. The data 
used in Chapter 2 was obtained from a field experiment, involving incentivised multiple price 
lotteries, modelled after Brick et. al. (2012) and Tanaka et. al. (2010). The sample of 120 
farmers, from whom data was obtained were from a larger sample of about 380 farmers who 
were surveyed in an earlier research work carried out by researchers from the University of 
Ghana. This was necessitated by time and financial concerns at the time of the survey, and 
also the relative ease of reaching farmers who had been previously interviewed. The 
FKDOOHQJH ZLWK WKLV µVDPSOH IURP D VDPSOH¶ LV WKDW HYHQ WKRXJK RXU VDPSOH RI  ZDV
representative of the 380, I could not verify whether or not the original sample of 380 was 
truly representative of the population of fish farmers in the study area. This was because it 
was not possible to access the list of farmers from which the 380 were sampled. If the 
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original sample was not representative of the population, it could potentially affect the 
conclusions drawn in this study. 
Another possible limitation of this study is the dataset used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is recall. In 
the survey to collect data on production and output values and technology adoption, farmers 
were asked to recall quantities and prices of inputs used, as well as the output produced in the 
previous season. Since there was no record of these values, I had to take the values provided 
by the farmers as accurate or close to accurate. Thus, the results reported in these chapters 
should be considered with this in mind. 
It is important to note that in spite of the seeming limitations discussed above, the data and 
procedures used in this study are relevant in addressing the research questions in the thesis. 
This is evidenced by the fact that most of the conclusions reached in this study remained 
fairly the same after the inclusion of some variables and alternative estimation procedures. 
Though some of the findings seemed contrary to expectation, there is consistent and robust 
empirical support for the novel outcomes in this study. Nonetheless, given these results and 
the limitations outlined, it is acknowledged that there is scope for future improvement in this 
line of enquiry. 
6.3 Future considerations 
Regarding future research, it will be worthwhile to consider the measurement of the risk and 
ambiguity aversion of the farmers over time to ascertain if the preferences of the farmers 
change over time and if so, to investigate which factors are responsible for this. Also, in the 
measurement of economic efficiency, it would be useful to provide farmers with the 
necessary training to enable them keep up-to-date records for their next season of fish 
farming and to collect these data from season to season to have a panel data. This may enable 
researchers to check for changes in economic efficiencies over time. This would be necessary 
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from a policy perspective as it could provide policy makers with the tools to adjust policies to 
meet changing needs of the farmers over time. 
In eliciting ambiguity attitudes, future research may consider the use of multiple rows of 
lotteries, like in Keller and Sarin (2007). This will enable the elicitation of the certainty 
equivalent measures which are normally employed in the calculation of ambiguity aversion. 
Additionally, future studies may use larger and more representative samples to give a better 
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